
Don't Scrap CMMC. Fix How It Is Enforced.
Last updated 05:48 AM EDT • Read time: 5m
On July 13, the Pentagon suspended the planned Phase II expansion of its Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) program and gave a task force 60 days to rethink the approach. As a C3PAO, we think the Pentagon got it half right and offer our candid advice on the circumstances.
Since 2017, defense contractors handling covered information under applicable contracts have been required to protect sensitive defense information such as blueprints, technical data, and logistics details our adversaries actively steal. For years, enforcement relied largely on the honor system: companies graded their own security and reported the score. It did not work.
A 2024 survey of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), entitled Defense on the Brink, found that only 4% of contractors believed they were ready for certification and the average self-reported score remained well below a passing mark of 110. The reality was that much of the supply chain wasn’t sufficiently securing the data.
The Pentagon’s answer was to require nearly every contractor to pass a professional third-party assessment. That was a sound instinct, but that model imposed costs and capacity demands that only large companies could bear. Pentagon estimates have suggested that tens of thousands of companies could ultimately require third-part assessments. SBA's Office of Advocacy has also questioned whether the authorized assessment ecosystem can meet that demand without creating significant cost and capacity constraints. Layer on assessment and compliance costs that routinely run into six figures, many times what the security itself should cost, and you don’t have a security program. You have a traffic jam with a luxury toll. The Small Business Administration (SBA) said as much, and it was right.
The suspension is understandable. But simply relying more heavily on self-assessments would recreate much of the original problem. Small businesses don’t necessarily win under self-policing. They end up competing against rivals willing to overstate their readiness.
There is a third option, and the agency that sounded the loudest alarm about CMMC’s cost already offers part of the model. To compete for many federal small-business set-asides, a company does not submit to an up-front audit. It self-certifies to SBA that it qualifies, wins work on that representation, and accepts that it can be checked at any time. If it misrepresents itself, the company must answer to the government’s fraud penalties. That system governs hundreds of thousands of firms without an army of inspectors, because it runs on self-certification, random sampling, targeted government verification, with serious consequences when those representations are knowingly false.
The SBA is not a perfect parallel. Company size is easier to verify than cybersecurity performance, and some SBA programs involve more than simple self-certification. But its basic structure offers a useful principle: permit companies to compete based on accountable representations, verify through targeted review and impose serious consequences when those representations are knowingly false. Here is how the Pentagon can apply the SBA’s approach through a seven-step pilot program:
- Require consent up front. When a company reports its security score to the government, it would also consent to a potential audit on 30 days’ notice. This would not create a separate mandate, but rather, would become a condition of doing business with the Department of War (DoW), the same way self-certifying your size is a condition of competing for a set-aside.
- Test an affordable assessment rate. Companies selected for verification could pay for their own assessments, while participating assessment firms accept a standardized program rate. A pilot could test a target price of approximately $15,000 for a narrowly scoped remote assessment, with defined line items for travel, additional complexity and locations, and other changes in scope.
- Assign the assessor. A neutral accreditation body (one already exists) would assign each audit based on assessor availability and enforce a 30-day clock. Companies would not be allowed to select a preferred assessor, and assessments would no longer be delayed by scheduling limbo.
- Tie consequences to verified findings. Limited gaps could place a company on a corrective action plan. More significant gaps could restrict eligibility for new awards until the issues are fixed. The most serious failures could trigger a work stoppage, subject to standardized review and appeal procedures
- Use contract administration first. A failed audit should generally begin as a contract administrative and remediation matter, not a penalty proceeding under long-standing rules. Correct the deficiencies, pass a re-assessment, and the company becomes eligible for the work again.
- Treat false statements differently from ordinary gaps. A control gap can often be remediated. A knowing misrepresentation is different. A company whose claimed score wildly exceeds its audited score gets referred to the appropriate fraud review, the enforcement track the Justice Department is already using.
- Subsidize only those who truly need help. At an affordable assessment price, many firms can pay their own way. For the smallest suppliers, the Pentagon could cover an initial audit through existing small-business and industrial-base programs, including efforts such as the Army’s NCODE contract vehicle, on which ATX Defense is an awardee.
Nearly all of it runs on existing contract rules and program procedures: no new authority to fine anyone, no new legislation, and no major new spending. It would rely on targeted subsidies that already exist rather than broad new spending programs. A pilot could launch inside the task force’s own 60-day review window.
The requirement to protect defense information isn’t going away, because the theft isn’t going away. The task force must determine how to verify contractors’ claims without pricing responsible small businesses out of the defense market. The SBA’s experience offers part of the answer. The Pentagon should adapt that principle to the realities of defense security.
Zach Walker and Shawn Kotoske, co-founders of ATX Defense and Army veterans.

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