Trump and Putin Both Want a Strong Europe

Marking three years of Russia's war in Ukraine and facing four years of confrontational diplomacy with America, European leaders are both defiant and anxious.

What European leaders do not realize is that both Trump and Putin want a strong Europe.

The rupture with America erupted dramatically last month when Vice President J.D. Vance articulated an unexpected dismantling of European security. In stark contrast to historical professions of alliance unity, Vance asserted the obstacle to security was not external, but internal -- "the enemy within...the retreat of Europe from … its most fundamental values." Vance unflinchingly condemned restrictions on free speech, hostility to populist parties, and the annulment of elections in Romania.

On the last, Vance warned electoral mandates were fundamental to security but would be unattainable if leaders sidelined those who questioned who “gets to be a part of our shared society."

This democratic deficit is directly traceable to the prevailing elite’s failed experiment with multiculturalism.

After the Cold War, Europe broached the consequences of an oppressive ideology -- the re-emergence of suppressed ethnic conflicts, as in former Yugoslavia. The tragedy reminded elites of the dangers resulting from nationalism and the threat posed to the newly established European Union.

Subsequent to the September 11 terrorist attacks in America and follow-on acts in Europe, leaders and citizens alike questioned the sustainability, and desirability, of continued immigration, principally Muslims from the Middle East.

Compounding the socio-economic circumstances and incidence of terrorism was the increasingly prevalent uneasiness that immigrant cultures were incompatible with European values. Moreover, opponents were particularly angered by the moral relativism espoused by proponents of multiculturalism when conduct in immigrant communities contravened European mores.

To opponents, social cohesion was being eroded by excessive immigration. To proponents, a progressive future was being impeded by the persistent racism.

Invariably, divisions encapsulated a simple but fraught question: "what can be reasonably expected in incorporating immigrants from different cultures into an already existing way of life?"

The arrival of one million Muslim refugees from the Syrian civil war in 2015 marked a point of no return; anti-immigration parties gained ground electorally, convulsing an elite determined to uphold multiculturalism.

In time, multiculturalism became the opposition’s shorthand for dissatisfaction with the economy, regulations, Brussels, and relations with America and Russia.

Castigated as far right, anti-immigration parties nevertheless began advancing in elections across the continent. Established parties responded by condemning them as extremists and crafting untenable coalition governments solely to exclude them.

When the pandemic foreclosed in-person contact, social media became a principal venue for discourse. However, the elite used the opportunity to restrict anti-immigrant sentiment, disguising the steps as countermeasures to "hate speech" and Russian disinformation.

Unable to tolerate civic populism, an increasingly dire elite resorted to cowering behind digital Maginot Lines and subverting democracy, such as voiding Calin Georgescu's near victory in Romania, refusing to accommodate AfD in recent German elections, and adopting the Digital Services Act, which compels social media companies to censor content.

The maneuvers only betrayed "Europe’s essential weakness before America."

Trump readily articulates America’s strengths vis-à-vis Russia and China and understands overcoming their combination in Eurasia is achievable if Europe reaffirms its commitment to free expression and representative government.

If America mourns the debilitation of Europe by multiculturalism, then Russia pressures Europe for having become multicultural.

A major factor in the Soviet Union’s collapse was the intractability of its "nationalities problem," especially in the Muslim-majority constituent republics.

Post-Soviet Russia inherited the problem within its new borders, bloodily epitomized in Chechnya. Putin secured his power, in part, by brutally suppressing this insurgency.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Putin aligned with the West in hopes of uniting against a shared Islamist enemy.

The Bush Administration's unilateralism foreclosed the opportunity whereafter Putin began signaling his opposition to American unipolarity, most notably at the Munich security conference in 2007.

Nevertheless, Putin is simultaneously acutely aware of Russia's bleak demographic future, warning as early as 2000 of becoming an "enfeebled nation".

According to a 2022 AEI study, Russia's population in 2022 totaled approximately 146 million. According to Pew Research, the number of Muslims in Russia will total approximately 18.6 million in 2030, nearly 13 percent of the projected population. By 2050, the AEI study projects Russia's population will decrease to 136 million.

On Russia’s borders, the predominantly Muslim populations of former Soviet Central Asian republics will total approximately 89 million by 2050.

The populations of Iran and Turkey will be 92.2 million and 95.8 million, respectively, by 2050.

More momentously, Pew Research projects a sizable Muslim population in Europe by 2050 depending on the level of immigration.

In 2050, the proportion of Muslims in the U.K., France, and Germany could rise to between ten and twenty percent -- decisive percentages in divided electorates.

While the shifts are modest, they entail substantial quantitative growth paired against projected declines in the non-Muslim population. The current non-Muslim / Muslim balance is 495 million vis-à-vis 19.5 million; future balances could range from 445.9 vs 35.8 million to 463 vs 75.6 million.

Poised to almost double or quadruple in the next three decades, the Muslim population in Western Europe will constitute a major political bloc or, more distressingly, a larger pool of potential recruits for radical Islam.

A Europe increasingly responsive to Muslim concerns is less likely to overlook Russia’s ruthless tactics against Islamists. More alarmingly, a Europe incubating more Islamic extremists will only compound the threat emanating from the Caucasus and the Middle East, which now includes Syrian militants.

In the worst case scenario, by 2050, 116 million Russians will share the country with 20 million Muslims inside its borders and 352.6 million Muslims on its western and southwestern borders (as well as a Chinese "frenemy" on its sparsely populated Siberian perimeter).

Russia may gain when European politics and NATO unity are undermined, but it gains more if support (financial and informational) for anti-immigration parties succeeds in preventing the above demographic scenarios. (Note, Russia has not supported leftist parties or waged political warfare against Denmark, which is governed by a center-left coalition that maintains a strict immigration regime.)

Putin readily recognizes Russia’s weakness vis-à-vis the United States and China and understands preventing the existential nightmare of encirclement by hostile powers is achievable if Europe becomes less multicultural.

In the aftermath of the disastrous Trump-Zelenskyy meeting, European allies signaled their intent to remain united vis-à-vis Russia and to commit the resources necessary to ensure continental security.

If the newfound urgency to forge an independent security posture is undertaken in conjunction with restoring economic competitiveness via the Draghi Plan and implementing the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, as well as constructive engagement with anti-immigration parties, then Europe would be on a path to strength and stability.

Trump may have upended decades of transatlantic unity, but America is politically, economically, and civilizationally bound to Europe and, without a strong Europe, he cannot prepare America for its future competition with China.

Putin may have ended decades of peace, but Russia is commensurately bound to Europe and, without a strong Europe, he will find it “extraordinarily difficult” to maintain, much less improve, Russia’s fragile geopolitical future.

R. Jordan Prescott is a private contractor working in defense and national security since 2002. He has been published in The National Interest, Small Wars Journal, Modern War Institute, 19fortyfive, and RealClearDefense.