Indo–U.S. Joint Approach Toward Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been in a state of perpetual conflict from within and from without for almost half a century. Internal conditions resemble the medieval times of the 14^th century when unending wars were common, for example, the 100 Years War between England and France and the 30 Years War in Europe over religious interpretations between Catholics and Protestants. The result of Afghanistan’s 40 years of war is a rating at the bottom of the world’s economic and HDI indicators.

The Soviets also could not fully subjugate the Afghans and administer the country throughout the 1980s, nor could the Taliban in the 1990s. Modern democracy was introduced in Afghanistan in 2002 when Ahmed Karzai was elected President (some accused Karzai of being selected by western powers) and handed over power to Ashraf Ghani in 2014. Ghani serves as a President of a country over which he controls approximately 40% of Afghanistan. Barring the rule of King Zahir Shah from 1933 to 1973 when some modicum of governance was visible, Afghanistan has been in a state of anarchy as a result of the internal disunity and external interference.

Control of Afghanistan from within is quite a paradox. Parts of Afghanistan is controlled by the Afghan government and other parts by the Taliban. Taliban controlled areas are based on the ethnicities and concentration of various tribes like the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Turki. (Refer Fig 1. below).  The Pashtun dominated areas are in the SW, NE and southern borders adjoining Pakistan. The democratically elected Ashraf Ghani government in Afghanistan would be hard pressed to survive if it was not for the international community’s economic and military support. According to a World Bank report of 2011, 97% of the Afghan economy is related to international military spending (Pakistan on Brink – Abdul Rashid). Afghanistan generates no significant domestic economic revenue. Its annual income of $ 3 B is half of its military spending of $ 6 B (Ibid). If the aid flow stops and the government collapses, Afghanistan would surely descend into civil war with no single political entity, or Shura, able to exercise control over the country. Diverse Taliban Shuras are fiercely independent and are somewhat united due to the common goals of throwing out foreign powers and ushering in a stricter form of Islamic rule in the country.

Fig. 1: Map Showing Various Ethnic Groups Concentration in Afghanistan.

UNOSAT Rapid Mapping Service

According to the Norwegian based think tank LANDINFO report of August 2017, the umbrella Taliban organization, called the Quetta Shura, is composed of many regional warlords, particularly the factions of:

The Taliban has not had a strong central leader since Mullah Omar (died 2013). The present head of the umbrella organization, Haibatullah Akhund, has no mass base of his own but is supported by the Iranians and the Russians. Taliban Shuras, like the Haqqani Network, Peshawar Shura and the Mashad Shura are part of the umbrella Quetta Shura, are relatively independent in their areas of influence. In addition, the Shura of the North and the Mashad Shura, based in Iran, control areas in western Afghanistan. Taliban leadership under Haibatullah Akhund is dominated by its deputy who is the leader of the Pakistani dominated Haqqani network, Serajjudin Haqqani.

Overall, the Taliban remains a potent force capable of uniting and launching attacks at will on the ANA (Afghan National Army) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. As per the estimates of ISAF and the Afghan National Directorate of Security (ANDS), the Taliban has a cadre strength of 150,000 fighters with an active force of about 60,000 fighters (the rest being militias on call) and an active strength of 40,000 during peak periods of operation from April to November. The large majority of Taliban is Pashtun, though Tajiks, Hazaras, Baluchis and Uzbeks are also numerous.

The Taliban of today is not the same as the 1990s; it is mellowed, fragmented and relatively weaker. Regardless, negotiating a peace deal is still difficult. Many Taliban factions favor continued armed conflict since they perceive the conflict to be gradually working.

Pakistan, due to its geographic proximity, religious affinity, ethnic similarities, economic and security interests, plays a central role in any peace agreement in Afghanistan. The Pakistani / Afghan border, called the Durand line, is 2430 km. The Durand Line is disputed by Afghanistan in the Baloch and Pashtun areas. Historically united Taliban factions that share ethnic cultures for centuries are now divided by the border.

Pakistan desires a friendly, if not pliable, regime in Kabul. That way Pakistan’s western border is secure and Pakistan can focus on its perceived eternal enemy, India, to its east. The Pakistan leadership, particularly the Army, is obsessed with the strategic depth gained from a friendly Afghanistan. Pakistan has strongly opposed India’s involvement in Afghanistan. Any Indian influence in Kabul would be detrimental to Pakistan’s security interests. Pakistan also fears that India might encourage Baluch and Pashtun insurgency inside Pakistan.

The United States has provided significant security assistance for decades to Pakistan in part under the assumption that Pakistan advocated peace in Afghanistan and was assisting in creating a more moderate, constructive position by the Taliban. Recent U.S. Presidential Administrations began to realize Pakistan has been disingenuous as evidenced by continued Taliban attacks within Afghanistan. The Trump administration has wisely ended most of the decades-long volume of aid payments to Pakistan.

The opening of a Taliban office in Qatar in 1999, facilitated by German intelligence, helped open a window whereby some form of contact could be established with the otherwise reclusive Taliban.

Since the bombing of the twin towers in NYC on September 11, 2001, known as 9/11, the U.S. implemented three strategic phases for Afghanistan:

September-November 2001–Covert Ops began by U.S. to overthrow Taliban Government in Afghanistan in September; Air War begins by U.S. and Britain in Afghanistan in October; Northern Alliance takes over Kabul against U.S. wishes in November.

December 2001–Kandahar, southern Taliban stronghold, fell; Taliban rule ended; Taliban retreated into rural areas of Afghanistan and into Pakistan; battle of Tora Bora; bin Laden, leader of al Qaeda, believed to have escaped Tora Bora into Pakistan; Al Qaeda established in tribal areas of Pakistan along the Northern Western border with Afghanistan.

March 2002–Other countries entered the war as U.S. allies; Australia, Norway, Denmark, France, and Germany in March; Bush announced Marshall Plan for Afghanistan in April; substantial U.S. financial assistance implemented for Afghanistan; $38 billion between 2001 and 2009; Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec Def, announced end to “major combat” in Afghanistan in May 2003.

October 2004–First democratic elections held in Afghanistan; Karzai elected for a 5-year term of office; new constitution adopted; Taliban implemented a new strategy using IEDs and suicide bombers; copied Iraqi War strategy against U.S. in 2005.

2008–Bombing at Indian Embassy to Afghanistan; killed more than 50; the Afghan government accused Pakistan Intelligence services of backing the attack; Pakistan denied charges.

February 2009–Obama military forces surge; new strategy implemented by U.S.: protect Afghanistan population from Taliban attacks versus killing large numbers of Taliban; encourage Taliban to defect; U.S. military deaths increased from 2009 to 2010 to twice the amount; U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan dramatically increased.

August 2009–Karzai reelected to an additional 5-year term; government accused of widespread corruption; In February 2010, Pakistan arrested second in command of Taliban forces, Mullah Baradar; Baradar advocated political settlement of war versus military solution Karzai at odds with U.S. government; threatened to join Taliban in April 2010.

June 2010–McCrystal replaced by Petraeus; Wikileaks breach; classified documents revealed likely Pakistani Intelligence services support for Taliban

May 2011–bin Laden killed in Pakistan; In June 2011, U.S. announced reconciliation talks with Taliban; U.S. troop levels reached its peak of around 100,000 at the cost of $313 billion; Obama announced an accelerated timeline for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan; all troops to be removed by 2014.

September 2014–Karzai’s term as president ends; Ashraf Ghani elected; Bilateral Security Agreement advocated by U.S. signed; In December 2014, NATO combat operations officially end in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s Defense Forces reach a level of around 195,000 as of 2014, with 70-80% of the fighting done by the 30,000 strong Commandos, an elite Afghan Army sub-part (Wikipedia, 2014)

The new Afghan government signed a peace treaty in the summer of 2016 with the second largest insurgent group in Afghanistan, the Hezb-i-Islami. The Hezb-i-Islami is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, known as the butcher of Kabul for his insurgent actions in the late 1990s. Hekmatyar and the new president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, signed the first peace agreement since hostilities began in 2001.

The peace plan had 25 points, with the followers of Hezb-i-Islam being granted immunity for all past actions and crimes and full political rights restored. The desire for foreign fighters to depart Afghanistan was also a point of the plan. The hope for Afghan President Ghani was that the agreement would lead to other insurgent groups following suit. That hope failed to materialize.

Pakistan welcomed the agreement and declared there was no military solution for the war in Afghanistan; instead, Pakistan said any peace had to be through political action executed by Afghans. Regardless, the agreement was viewed as largely symbolic from the start and time has proved the initial views of the agreement to be true.

The 2016 peace agreement failed to motivate other insurgent groups to follow suit (Al Jazeera News Services, Sept 2016). Following the 2016 peace agreement, there has been a crescendo of voices recognizing the need to reach a peace agreement for all elements of the Taliban. Women rights have improved as has the achievement of improved living conditions across much of Afghanistan. (Conciliation Resources, June 2017; Peace Insight, February 2015; Lemmon, Sept 2018).

In 2017, Trump unveiled a new strategy for Afghanistan. The strategy advocates bringing pressure on the Taliban to come to the peace table. The strategy includes four main parts: (1) maximum military pressure, especially through airstrikes and special operations raids. According to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan commander John Nicolson, the increased pressure is meant to bring a "tidal wave of air power" that would be "the beginning of the end for the Taliban;" (2) targeting the Taliban’s financial resources from foreign sources and Opium production; (3) publicly question the war’s legitimacy especially within religious groups; and (4) putting pressure on Pakistan to expel or capture Afghan Taliban operating within Pakistan (Azami, September 2018).

The Trump strategy is viewed as a failure thus far. The reasons? The air strikes have killed many Taliban leaders, but have also caused significant civilian casualties. Taliban still hold more territory than in the past. The opium eradication efforts have not appeared to stem the cash flowing into the Taliban. Last, there are few signs of a paradigm shift in Pakistan's Afghanistan strategy in spite of U.S. suspension to Pakistan of military assistance and aid (Azami, September 2018).

During a March 2018 visit to Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense James Mattis said that some members of the Taliban might be willing to pursue peace, especially considering a fracturing in the group that has occurred over the past few years. BG Michael Fenzel, an Army planning officer, said there has been “significant evidence across the entire country that there is interest” in reconciliation, with groups of 10 and 20 Taliban fighters at a time turning themselves in. But Fenzel added that the defections were not at a critical mass point as yet.

During the Afghan President Ghani’s meetings with Mattis, he said President Trump’s new South Asia strategy, adopted in August 2017, emphasizes that talking about peace with the Taliban “is not tantamount to surrender or to collapse.” The strategy focuses on military and diplomatic pressure on the Taliban to encourage a negotiated settlement. There is no timetable for U.S. military withdrawal, a notable difference to the Obama Administration strategy. To implement the strategy, Mattis is one of few leaders that encouraged Trump to increase troop strength from 11,000 to 14,500.

As of October 2017, the Afghan Government reportedly controlled about 56% of the 407 districts across Afghanistan. The Taliban controlled 14%, while another 30% remain contested. The Afghanistan Government control of its country fell dramatically, since it had control of 72% in the fall of 2016, with 7% controlled by the Taliban and 21% of the districts contested. Therefore, Mattis recommended a strategy of increasing the air campaign against the Taliban. There were 1,337 coalition air strikes against the Taliban in all of 2016. From January through August 2017, there were 4,361 air strikes by the coalition against the Taliban (Lamonte, March 2018).

Regardless, hope for peace abounded from 2016 until a June ceasefire was reached in 2018 during a Muslim holiday. The June ceasefire was followed by the first time high-level meetings in Qatar between top Taliban officials and U.S. officials in July 2018. Taliban leaders had insisted for years that they wanted direct talks with the U.S., so the Qatar meeting was viewed as a potential breakthrough (Constable, July 2018). Other Taliban officials renounced the June and July progress as “conspiracies and foreign plots” (Hassan, August 2018).

The latter view appears to have carried the day, because since August 2018 there has been a dramatic increase in the war’s violence. Some reports indicate Taliban rebels have reasons not to seem too eager to make peace for reasons related to fear of losing their hardcore fighters to the region’s more aggressive Islamic State forces (Constable, July 2018). On August 10, 2018, the Taliban mounted attacks on the city of Ghazni. The fighting has been some of the most violent of the entire 17-year war. Afghan President Ghani sought a three-month truce, but to no avail (Osman, September 2018).

A decade ago, the U.S. and Afghan governments estimated that there were around 15,000 insurgents in Afghanistan. Today, the estimated number of militants exceeds 60,000. Afghan forces have been fighting hard to stop the Taliban's expansion. But their casualty rate remains alarmingly high and appears to be increasing (Azami, September 2018).

Parliamentary polls, which have already been delayed by more than three years, were

held on October 20, 2018. The results are due to be released in December 2018. Presidential elections, which are due to take place in April 2019, will be an even bigger challenge (Witte, Cliff; Encyclopedia Britannica).

In October 2018, the U.S. appointed Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-born U.S. diplomat, as its special representative to broker a peace deal with the Taliban. The Taliban is difficult to negotiate with since their demands are for complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghan soil, the release of some of their prisoners, and the Taliban’s refusal to talk to the Ashraf Ghani government.

Russia also organized the Moscow dialogue on November 9, 2018. Twelve nations participated in the dialogue. The dialogue achieved little, but the participation of the countries was a shot in the arm for Russian diplomacy.

India has invested much in Afghanistan with aid and projects over $3 B. Notable contributions are the construction of Salma dam, Afghan Parliament, and 116 High Impact Development projects in 31 provinces in areas such as education, health and agriculture. Afghanistan potentially provides a land route from India through Pakistan into central Asian republics, an option that Pakistan has long denied India. With this in mind, India constructed a road connecting Zaranj to Delaram within Afghanistan. Zaranj also connects to Chabahar, a port in Iran. India has assisted in making Chabahar operational. Pakistan likely resents India’s involvement in the port at Chabahar greatly, making possible India’s land route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that will help not only India but also the economic interests of Afghanistan and the Central Asian Regions (Refer Figure 2 below).

Fig 2: Map showing connectivity to CARs and Afghanistan from Chahbahar, Iran.

Google Maps

Militarily, India is limited in the role it can play in Afghanistan. India has a policy of not sending troops to any country that does not have a U.N. mandate. Training of the Afghan military and providing limited military hardware is all that India can do. Putting boots on the ground, which would likely be welcomed by countries except for Pakistan, is not a possibility. Not only is military involvement by India in Afghanistan politically unviable, but India’s security needs would also become tenuous if it became involved militarily in Afghanistan. As per an article by Gen Ashok Mehta (The Tribune, Chandigarh, 14 Nov 2018), dispatching troops to Afghanistan would no doubt demonstrate the Modi government’s solidarity with the Trump Administration, but it would be difficult to spare a large force without jeopardizing India’s security interests. Also, to support Indian troops in Afghanistan would create a monumental logistical burden which might not be sustainable.

Pakistan continues its dangerous policies in Kashmir, similar to its actions in Afghanistan. Any political instability in South Asia affects India. Both India and Afghanistan are threatened by Islamic extremism. Presence of politically powerful extremist elements in Afghanistan would raise India’s security concerns as militancy and terrorism would further raise its ugly head in Kashmir. The only way to find common ground in Afghanistan is to either afford each side their most devout goals or continue the killing process until each side reforms their most devout goals. Pakistan and radical Taliban groups are not motivated to adopt a peaceful solution. Much more can and should be done to prove to Pakistan where a peaceful Afghanistan is in their interests.

Recent proposed U.S. troop reductions by the Trump Administration would likely serve exactly the opposite of what should be done. The extreme elements of the Taliban will receive a message that the U.S. has finally had enough in Afghanistan. The perceived end of U.S. involvement has dramatically enhanced the strength of their negotiation position in any peace negotiations.    

A relatively quiet interested party is also the world’s largest democracy, India. The U.S. and India share many common goals, such as a desire for peace within the region, a counter to potentially negative motivations of China in the region, the desire to expand economic trade between the U.S. and India as well as other countries within the South Asia region, and last, but perhaps not least, a desire to motivate Pakistan away from support of terrorism and toward peaceful co-existence. Any joint approach toward Afghanistan by the U.S. and India is desirable and must be dogmatically pursued even if it threatens the interests of China and Pakistan in Afghanistan.

The U.S. should reverse course on the announcement of U.S. troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Instead, the U.S. should consider troop level increases in Afghanistan before any additional peace negotiations to gain a peace that meets at least some of the long-term U.S. goals for Afghanistan. The U.S. must avoid emboldening radical Islamic groups within the region to repeat events like 9/11.

India and the U.S. should form a joint effort to improve Afghanistan’s infrastructure.

India should continue its assistance in the rebuild of Afghanistan’s National Defense Forces and consider expansion of similar efforts. India and the U.S. should begin to form joint approaches towards the same efforts to stabilize Afghanistan’s military forces with the goal of creating a more effective Afghan Defense Force. India has experience in such efforts from involvement in Sri Lanka, Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, and Bhutan.

India has more historical experience in dealing with ethnic, religious differences between groups of people. The U.S. should find ways to include India in the peace process in a way that does not antagonize Pakistan. One way to accomplish the inclusion of India in the peace process negotiations is to leverage India’s relationship with Iran. Iran has a constructive relationship at present with Pakistan, and may, with India’s encouragement, be willing to urge the Pakistanis toward a more constructive, peaceful solution in Afghanistan.

Brig Arvind Thakur, a retired Cavalry Officer, Indian Army, is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

Dr. Michael Padgett, Colonel (Ret.), is a former Air Defense, Ordnance, and Acquisition Corps officer. He has written another article on U.S. India defense cooperation and several on national security issues. He can be contacted at sopadgett@aol.com.