In Iran, the U.S. Could Learn from Other Wars

Uneven U.S. conduct of the war on Iran suggests the absence of a clear idea of its purposes, risks, and benefits. and of inattention to lessons from other conflicts. With strategic coherence and competent leadership, the U.S. could accomplish more than it has. 

If regime change was a goal of Epic Fury, it was beyond reach. Iran’s hardliners remain in power. They have survived also a large popular uprising earlier this year, violently suppressed. The militant Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps may now be stronger. The 1991 Gulf War devastated Iraq’s military but Saddam’s brutal regime endured. U.S. leaders might have expected that a weaker blow against a larger Iran – the size of Alaska, with 90+ million people -- might not oust its rulers. 

The U.S. might have better understood the revolution transforming fighting in Ukraine, a robotization of warfare. Iran’s short-range precision-guided missiles and long-range attack drones are potent. Iran was an attack drone pioneer with the long-range Shahed. Russia has developed an improved Shahed and sent it to Iran. Leveraging this technology and control of the Hormuz Strait on three sides, Iran was certain to be able to threaten shipping and neighbors’ infrastructure.

U.S. leaders seemed overconfident of a quick win in Iran, just as Russia did in 2022 in Ukraine. They could have learned from many U.S. war games over the years that highlighted the difficulties and disadvantages of fighting Iran. Awareness of other checkered wars might have been sobering. 

Geographic depth helps Iran and Ukraine be resilient. Having relied on it to help defeat Napolean and Hitler, Moscow might have better appreciated Ukraine’s large area. U.S. leaders might have given more weight to Iran’s expanse. 

Geographic depth can also beget complacency. The U.S. took risks, such as parking valuable aircraft in the open in neighboring countries. It might have deployed assault and sea control forces to Oman and the United Arab Emirates to lessen the impact of an Iranian closure of the Strait. 

Political leaders should make a credible public case that a war is driven by strategic necessity. U.S. audiences were given little warning of or coherent rationale for this expanded war. In two previous Gulf crises, the U.S. worked hard to do this. In 1990, the U.S. engineered a United Nations Security Council resolution that authorized "all means necessary" to evict Iraq from Kuwait. The Senate and a majority o Americans agreed. In 2002, the U.S. failed to persuade the Security Council, but the Senate authorized the use of force and most Americans agreed. 

The U.S. did not even try to obtain UN support for the current war. The Secretary-General warned of its “grave consequences.” Congress was divided and most Americans opposed the war. Allies were angry at not being consulted. The attempt last year to defund the Voice of America implied that U.S. leaders might not value persuading foreigners. In contrast, in World War II the robust Office of War Information was central to U.S. strategy at home and abroad. 

The U.S. seems eager to avoid a resumption of full-scale hostilities. But because ceasefires or agreements with Iran could be unstable, the U.S. should continue to improve its military posture in the region, informed in part by lessons from other wars. 

William Courtney was a career foreign service officer who served as deputy negotiator in U.S.-Soviet Defense and Space Talks (missile defense) and ambassador to the U.S.-USSR commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Peter A. Wilson is a defense strategist. He teaches a course on the history of military technological innovation at the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute. 

image: A U.S. Marine with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 265 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, supervise and control communication networks at a forward arming and refueling point in support of Operation Epic Fury in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, May 3, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)