Iran Nuke Debate Is Another Narrative Collapse
Last updated 07:10 AM EDT • Read time: 5m
The debate about ‘when and if’ Iran might develop a nuclear weapon is a series of misleading narratives. The issue is much simpler than the Biden Administration, the media, and most analysts portrayed: if Iran has enough weapons-grade (90+ percent pure) Uranium 235 -- and the minimum quantity necessary is about 33 pounds (15 kilograms) -- it *has* a nuclear weapon. In December, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General, Rafael Grossi, claimed that Iran is accelerating its uranium enrichment to up to 60 percent and already has enough material to make four nuclear weapons if its material is enriched further.[i] [ii]
It is technically easy to build an atomic weapon, even with less than the ideal weapons-grade levels of enrichment, if one has the requisite amount of U235, period. The Hiroshima bomb used only around 80 percent enriched U-235. At such levels, Iran’s current highly enriched uranium stockpile could feed nearly 10 weapons. Greater purity (past 60 percent) merely makes a weapon more efficient (greater yield). But a weapon can likely be fashioned by Iran today.[iii] Moreover, all this discussion about miniaturization or ballistic missile development is irrelevant – that discussion is speaking to the status of more advanced Iranian delivery vehicles (such as ballistic missiles) and warhead miniaturization, which are entirely unnecessary.
The Hiroshima bomb was never even tested by the Americans. It was a large device/weapon and was dropped, like a large refrigerator, from an aircraft. The Manhattan Project engineers were so confident that it would work, they built this type of weapon (a ‘gun-type’ weapon) around the requisite U235 and dropped it on Hiroshima.[iv] The Trinity device was tested merely to see if the implosion method was a more efficient trigger. It was, though this method was hardly necessary. The Hiroshima bomb killed more than the Nagasaki bomb.
A simple gun-type weapon can easily be delivered by aircraft, drone, dhow, submarine, suicide ship, or truck, assuming of course the delivery platform can penetrate target defenses or drop or deliver something the size of a large desk. But if a clandestine and successful delivery means can be discerned, a weapon the size of the Hiroshima bomb can easily devastate an entire city. And most cities are on or near a coastline.
Assessments about how close Iran is to developing a bomb are, therefore, misleading, if not nonsensical; a simple atomic gun-type or even implosion-type weapon could be fashioned easily by any state, assuming the state has acquired the requisite amount of highly enriched U235.
Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated under the Obama Administration,[vii] Iran was allowed to keep 660 lbs. (300 kg) of low enriched uranium. Plus, the JCPOA allowed Iran to:
- continue to enrich uranium
- stockpile additional uranium
- use advanced centrifuges to enrich uranium more quickly
- conduct unlimited ‘research and development’ on uranium-enrichment centrifuges
- build and operate facilities to enrich uranium without restrictions[viii]
Nor, of course, did the JCPOA require Iran to submit to “anytime, anywhere” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of facilities and military sites where such nuclear activities are suspected to be occurring.
The appropriate negotiation demand, therefore, of the Iranian nuclear program must be the end – entirely – of the Iranian enrichment program and the dismantling of its capabilities, and the handing over of the existing Iranian, highly enriched uranium. Of course, Iran will scoff at such a demand – the result of the failure of the Obama and Biden Administration to pursue a coherent and reassuring disarmament policy.
The first Trump Administration squeezed Iran toward financial strain and political collapse – its preferred policy goal. The two democratic Administrations attempted to work with Iranian leadership in exchange for limits and concessions on the Iranian enrichment program.
The U.S. intelligence community (IC) has somewhat mis-led policymakers by assessing when Iran will likely have a robust nuclear weapon with ballistic missile delivery vehicles. Such a threshold is too late to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. U.S. policymakers have relied on these IC assurances to kick the decision, and policy can down the road, now to the point where Iran very possibly has a bomb, and we are playing games over its definition.
James Van de Velde, Ph.D., is a Professor at the National Defense University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U. S. Government.
Notes:
[i] Alexander Cornwell, Francois Murphy, John Irish, “Exclusive: Iran dramatically accelerating uranium enrichment to near bomb grade, IAEA says,” Reuters, December 6, 2024.” Exclusive: Iran dramatically accelerating uranium enrichment to near bomb grade, IAEA says | Reuters
[ii] Francois Murphy, “Iran offers to cap sensitive uranium stock as IAEA resolution looms,” Reuters, November 20, 2024. Iran offers to cap sensitive uranium stock as IAEA resolution looms | Reuters
[iii] Andrea Stricker, “Iran May Be on the verge of a Nuclear Weapon; Will Israel and the United States Act?” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, February 6, 2025. Iran May Be on the Verge of a Nuclear Weapon; Will Israel and the United States Act?
[iv] “Iran’s Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential,” Iran Watch: Tracking Iran’s Unconventional Weapon Capabilities, December 18, 2024. Iran's Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential | Iran Watch
[v] Cameron Curtis, “Does Iran Already Have a Nuclear Bomb?,” Warrior Maven, October 9, 2024. Does Iran Already Have a Nuclear Bomb? - Warrior Maven
[vii] David Smith, “Iran ships 25,000lb of low-enriched uranium to Russia as part of nuclear deal,” The Guardian, December 28, 2015. Iran ships 25,000lb of low-enriched uranium to Russia as part of nuclear deal | Iran | The Guardian
[viii] The Iran Nuclear Deal: What’s Wrong with It And What Can We Do Now?” United Against Nuclear Iran. The Iran Nuclear Deal: What's Wrong With It And What Can We Do Now?
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