The Guiding Principles To Compel an Iran Settlement

On September 24, Iran presented a seven-day plan with the United States aimed at ending hostilities, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and restarting nuclear negotiations in exchange for lifting the U.S. naval blockade. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi noted that offer closely mirrors the commitments in the now-defunct 14-point preliminary memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in June. President Trump swiftly rejected the plan on September 26, signaling that military operations will continue well past the November midterms.

Iran’s ability to weather economic pressure is directly sustained by its vast out-of-country oil stockpiles. Ironically, this cushion was created by Washington’s own stop-and-go blockade enforcement. When the U.S. naval blockade was first imposed on April 13, it severely constrained Iranian exports. However, a month-long enforcement lapse from mid-June to mid-July gave Tehran the exact operational breather it needed to flush out its stored crude out of domestic ports and into foreign floating storage. Even with the blockade reinstated on July 14, Iran continues to draw from these pre-positioned and replenished overseas reserves to finance its campaign.

A stop-and-go blockade fails to starve the regime; only unyielding, continuous enforcement can force Tehran to negotiate. Persistent enforcement cuts off direct exports to foreign buyers—such as China, which purchases roughly 90% of Iranian crude—while preventing Tehran from leaving domestic hubs like Kharg Island, which handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports, to refill its overseas reserves. Within several months without replenishment under an unbroken blockade, Tehran's overseas buffer will run dry. Without oil exports funding 50% to 60% of the government budget—including direct allocations to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—the regime will face catastrophic deficits, skyrocketing inflation, and an inability to pay state workers or maintain essential public services. The broader economy will collapse under the weight of an insolvent government, forcing Tehran to negotiate in earnest rather than cling to unrealistic demands like its latest seven-point ultimatum.

Before deciding on a strategic path forward, President Trump must guard against accepting a seemingly commonsense, but dangerously flawed, settlement. He could easily be drawn toward a weak compromise by viewing his ordering for strikes on three core nuclear facilities in 2025 as having already achieved a historic milestone—setting back Tehran’s program by years in a way seven predecessors failed to do since 1979. Under this line of thinking, agreeing to Tehran’s offer in the preliminary MOU to dilute its 440 kg of 60% enriched uranium might seem sufficient to claim that "Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon."

However, uranium dilution merely delays Iran’s nuclear weapon timeline by roughly five years. It fails to solve the fundamental systemic problem: allowing Iran—and future nuclear aspirants—to continuously build weapons capability under the guise of peaceful nuclear energy programs.

Such a superficial settlement would ultimately replicate the fatal flaws of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). A JCPOA-style monitoring framework is inherently vulnerable to undetected nuclear breakout—where a nuclear aspirant quietly attains a breakout that can no longer be stopped or reversed before nuclear weaponization. Furthermore, it fails to resolve Fred Iklé’s famous national security question: "After detection—what?"

To achieve the non-negotiable goal of preventing Iran from ever acquiring nuclear weapons capability, any settlement must go far beyond simple uranium dilution. It must fundamentally redefine the concepts of verification monitoring, timely detection, and mandatory violation penalties including pre-authorized military strikes to eliminate non-compliant nuclear capability. Crucially, it must prohibit nuclear aspirants from pursuing sensitive dual-use nuclear infrastructure altogether such as uranium enrichment, reprocessing to recover plutonium, and the use of plutonium to fuel nuclear reactors.

President Trump must signal that he is fully prepared for a two-year war posture. He must make clear that regardless of domestic political shifts or upcoming midterm outcomes, he holds two full years in office to enforce two non-negotiable objectives: Iran will never be permitted a nuclear weapon, and the Strait of Hormuz will remain permanently open to international commerce toll-free. In restoring the historic title of the Department of War, the administration invoked President George Washington’s famous declaration that “to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” By embracing Washington's foundational principle, President Trump can demonstrate that being visibly prepared for a longer war is the single best way to secure a peaceful settlement soonest.

Two core commitments will help translate these guiding principles into actions that compel an Iran settlement soonest by forcing Tehran to recognize that returning to negotiations as soon as possible and signing a fair and enforceable agreement as soon as possible is its only viable path:

First, the United States should execute a calibrated, highly cost-effective, and humane retaliatory strategy.

Second, the administration should overhaul its public communication. Keeping adversaries guessing cannot come at the expense of keeping the American public and international allies in the dark. The administration must clearly articulate its ultimate war aims, directly address public economic concerns regarding energy prices, and forcefully convey the catastrophic, irreversible human and financial costs of allowing a nuclear-armed Iran—noting that its current stockpile of enriched uranium is sufficient for 11 nuclear bombs that could inflict over one million fatalities.

A swift and lasting peace cannot be bought through hasty concessions or temporary reprieves. By grounding U.S. strategy in these guiding principles and core commitments, Washington will compel Tehran to recognize that agreeing to a fair, permanent settlement as soon as possible is its only viable option to avoid an intolerable, collapsing economy.

Brian G. Chow is an independent policy analyst with more than 200 publications on national security issues. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Case Western Reserve University and an MBA with distinction and a Ph.D. in finance from the University of Michigan. He can be reached on X at @briangchow