The Strait of Hormuz as a Reciprocal Argument in the U.S.–Iran Dispute Over Uranium

The military conflict between the United States and Iran, which grew out of protracted diplomatic efforts to resolve Iran’s nuclear dossier, quickly escalated into a systemic global crisis affecting energy markets, trade, and international security. Formally, the confrontation centers on Iran’s missile and nuclear programs and its regional influence over radical movements. In practice, however, the conflict revolves around two strategic levers: Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium and the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of the world’s oil shipments passes.

In parallel, the United States demanded expanded IAEA inspector access to the Fordow and Natanz facilities, as well as reductions in Iran’s missile programs, including the testing of the Sajjil and Khorramshahr systems, which reached eleven launches in 2024. Another key issue remained freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which, according to 2025 EIA estimates, carried roughly 20–21 percent of global seaborne oil shipments. Against this backdrop, early indicators of a growing crisis began to surface: UKMTO (United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations) issued warnings about suspicious approaches and unidentified small craft near Hormuz starting on 12 December 2025, while Lloyd’s List recorded the first attacks on commercial vessels on 28 February 2026, coinciding with the launch of Operation Epic Fury and the immediate Iranian retaliation. These events effectively marked the onset of the open phase of the conflict, which began on 28 February 2026.

The situation shifted sharply after 22 February 2026, when the United States expanded OFAC sanctions targeting Iran’s petrochemical sector. Between 24 February and 8 March 2026, seventeen attacks on commercial vessels were recorded in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman (Lloyd’s List and UKMTO data). These incidents generated mounting pressure on Washington from allies and international shippers, forcing adjustments in the administration’s public messaging.

By early May 2026, the escalation in the region had taken on a stable and persistent form. Throughout 4–5 May, new missile and drone strikes were recorded against targets in the UAE, including the interception of several cruise missiles over territorial waters and unmanned aerial attacks on tankers near the Strait of Hormuz. In parallel, attempts by small boats to interfere with commercial traffic intensified, requiring direct military responses and the escorting of vessels through high‑risk zones.

At the same time, strikes expanded to infrastructure nodes: a fire was reported at the Fujairah oil hub following a drone attack, resulting in injuries and a temporary halt of operations. The incident underscored the vulnerability of alternative export routes designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and increased pressure on the region’s energy logistics.

Against this backdrop, major shipping companies continued to suspend or reroute transits, diverting vessels to ports in Oman and the eastern UAE. The strait effectively operated under restricted conditions, and the combination of maritime incidents and infrastructure strikes formed a durable risk architecture that shaped the subsequent trajectory of the crisis.

From the outset of the conflict, Tehran adopted a firm and unequivocal position in which the issue of enriched uranium was treated as fundamentally untouchable. For Tehran, enriched uranium is not merely a technological asset but a core component of strategic survival — a resource that enables the state to deter external pressure and preserve political autonomy. Domestically, the issue carries critical weight as well: any concession on uranium would be perceived as a loss of sovereignty and a direct blow to the regime’s legitimacy, rendering compromise politically impossible.

Iran’s rigidity was driven not only by ideological foundations but also by pragmatic calculations. According to IAEA data, Iran possessed substantial reserves of highly enriched uranium, which provided it with a durable negotiating position and reduced the effectiveness of sanctions as a coercive tool. Within the political establishment, there is a broad consensus that relinquishing uranium would create strategic vulnerability and deprive Iran of its primary lever of influence over the United States and its allies.

Thus, Iran’s position allowed for no ambiguity: negotiations were possible only under the condition that enrichment levels and stockpile volumes remained intact. All other issues — the missile program, inspections of nuclear facilities, regional activity — were viewed as secondary and potentially negotiable in later rounds, but none of them touched the fundamental principle Tehran considered the foundation of its security and political stability.

The Strait of Hormuz is a critical node in the global energy system: according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), it carries more than one‑quarter of the world’s seaborne oil exports — around 21 million barrels per day.  For Iran, this route holds strategic significance as the primary channel for exporting crude oil, which constitutes a substantial share of the country’s foreign‑currency revenue. Even under sanctions, Iran exports around 1.6 million barrels of oil per day, and the overwhelming majority of these volumes physically transit the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s economic dependence on oil exports makes any restrictions on tanker passage through the strait a direct threat to national security. A potential blockade or even partial disruption of traffic in Hormuz would immediately reduce state revenue, with more than 30–40 percent of the national budget derived from the oil sector. This is why Tehran views unrestricted access to the strait as a condition equivalent in weight to Washington’s demand for control over uranium enrichment levels.

In response to U.S. pressure on the nuclear program, Iran constructs a mirrored framework: if Washington demands constraints in the uranium domain, Tehran demands the removal of constraints in the oil‑export domain. This logic is rooted in the principle of strategic symmetry. For the United States, the key objective is preventing the expansion of Iran’s nuclear capabilities as a whole, including control over infrastructure and access to sensitive technologies. For Iran, the key objective is guaranteed access to the global oil market through the Strait of Hormuz, as this factor underpins the country’s economic resilience.

Thus, the trajectory and operational tempo of the conflict are shaped by two interdependent resources: U.S. control over the Iranian nuclear file and Iran’s control over the energy chokepoint through which a significant share of global oil trade flows. This mutual vulnerability forms the foundation of the negotiating architecture and defines the limits of possible concessions for both sides.

In such an environment, practical — even if initially unexpected — formats become essential for reducing tensions and establishing a managed trajectory of events. This aligns with the logic of the Yankee angle, where pragmatism, ingenuity, and purposeful design function as tools of stabilization.

1. A Splitting Atom That Unites

A bilateral U.S.–Iran project is proposed for the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant on Iranian territory. The format is based on equal participation of both sides in the design, management, and oversight of the fuel cycle. This approach shifts Iran’s nuclear program from a zone of conflict into a zone of technological cooperation — simultaneously validating Tehran’s official claims of pursuing only peaceful nuclear energy and providing Washington with a level of transparency unattainable through any other mechanism.

Fuel for the plant would be supplied within the framework of the joint project, while all spent fuel would be removed from Iran under an agreed mechanism. This eliminates the possibility of accumulating materials that could trigger strategic suspicion, while preserving Iran’s sovereign right to develop its own energy sector. The United States gains practical control over the most sensitive element — the movement of nuclear material — not through inspections or coercive pressure, but through participation in a shared facility. Iran, in turn, receives recognition of its right to peaceful nuclear energy, access to technology, and an infrastructure project that cannot be rejected without reputational cost.

The spent fuel can be sent for reprocessing in third countries, where it would be converted into MOX fuel or low‑enriched materials for research reactors. A portion of isotopes could be used for producing medical radionuclides, giving the project a humanitarian dimension. Another option is the creation of a dedicated international technical center — independent of political structures — where the fuel would undergo reprocessing or long‑term storage.

The spent fuel removed from Iran under the project can be processed through several technologically mature pathways. The most common is the production of MOX fuel — a mixed‑oxide material based on uranium and plutonium, used in power reactors across Europe and Asia. MOX enables the reintegration of materials into the fuel cycle, reduces the need for natural uranium, and decreases the volume of high‑level waste. Alternatively, spent fuel can be converted into low‑enriched materials for research reactors, used for extracting medical radionuclides, or sent to specialized geological repositories in third countries. All these options preclude military use of the material while turning waste into an energy, research, or medical asset.

Thus, Washington gives Tehran an opportunity to demonstrate to the world the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

Such a project creates a new architecture in which the conflict ceases to be a zero‑sum game. The United States gains transparency and control without demanding concessions. Iran gains the development of peaceful nuclear energy without threats to sovereignty. Both sides preserve political face, and the logic of the conflict shifts from escalation to technological partnership — where the path out of crisis becomes not a concession, but a shared achievement.

2. A Broad View of a Narrow Strait

To stabilize the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, a joint U.S.–Iran regime for regulating vessel passage is proposed, modeled on principles embedded in the Montreux Convention. Under this format, civilian shipping remains fully open and requires no additional clearances, while the transit of military vessels is permitted only with the consent of both parties. If either side raises an objection, the passage of the military vessel is automatically suspended until the cause of disagreement is resolved.

The regime would be administered through a joint technical body funded by a symbolic transit fee levied exclusively on commercial vessels. This fee is not fiscal in nature; it exists solely to support the operation of coordination structures, including traffic monitoring, navigational data exchange, and the maintenance of a unified notification system. Such a mechanism does not alter the existing balance of power, does not infringe on Iran’s sovereign rights, and does not transfer control to the United States — but it removes a key source of uncertainty, transforming the strait from a potential escalation trigger into a managed operational space.

The United States gains predictability and transparency that cannot be achieved through unilateral measures. Iran gains recognition of its role in ensuring maritime security without relinquishing the strategic significance of the strait. The joint regime creates a structure in which security is maintained through procedural alignment and mutual oversight. This format significantly reduces escalation risk while allowing both sides to preserve political face.

The root of the current U.S.–Iran confrontation lies in the uncompromising positions both sides hold regarding the means by which Iran secures its internal and military stability. For Washington, it is essential to deny Tehran the ability to enrich uranium to weapons‑grade levels and in quantities that could enable the production of a nuclear weapon. For Tehran, its accumulated enriched uranium is a materialized symbol of freedom from external pressure, a tool of regional deterrence, and a pillar of domestic political stability. Understanding this, Iran’s leadership removes the issue of enriched uranium from the negotiating space altogether, while simultaneously creating a new point of vulnerability for the United States — the threat of disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Responding in a mirrored fashion, Washington sought to restrict Tehran’s access to revenue needed to sustain the conflict, which only intensified volatility in global energy markets. The resulting politico‑military zugzwang forced both sides to search for solutions that do not require capitulation and allow each to preserve political face. Within this logic, two formats emerge that can move the conflict out of deadlock. Both have already been outlined above, and both represent structural solutions rather than concessions. The joint peaceful‑nuclear‑energy project creates a transparent and controlled fuel cycle in which uranium ceases to be a source of strategic uncertainty. The joint transit regime for the Strait of Hormuz establishes a predictable navigation system and reduces the risk of incidents without infringing on the sovereign interests of either party. Each format gives the United States and Iran the ability to obtain key security guarantees without political surrender, thereby opening a path toward de‑escalation. Taken together, these two formats outline a set of conditions that could, if adopted, serve as a functional basis for future negotiations.

On this basis, these solutions create a new architecture in which the conflict is no longer framed as a zero‑sum contest. The United States gains transparency and predictability without demanding unilateral concessions. Iran gains the development of peaceful nuclear energy and recognition of its role in securing the strait without threats to sovereignty. Within this architecture, the exit from crisis takes the form of a shared achievement — restoring regional and global security to a manageable state.

Sergey E. Ivashchenko is a strategic analyst working at the intersection of escalation dynamics, information strategy, and long‑range strategic forecasting.