What the Iran-KSA Normalization Means for US and Middle East Security

Russia went out its way to show its disinterest in this affair; China, too, played to the Saudi popular sentiment, which resented what it perceived as a witch hunt. While outwardly Trump appeared to be pro-Saudi, his presidency empowered the elements of the Saudi establishment that favored peace deals with the Houthis in Yemen and their backers, the Khomeinists in Iran. Moreover, when Iran attacked ARAMCO in September 2020, the U.S. signaled to the international community to keep mum on the real source of the attack and took no action. This sent a chilling message to the Saudis that the U.S. was determined to minimize its presence in the Middle East even at the cost of credibility as the regional security guarantor.

The Biden administration merely accelerated events already in motion. The Old Guard and pro-Brotherhood elements in Saudi Arabia were looking for an excuse to shift to China and have succeeded in reorienting many projects intended by the Crown Prince to advance U.S.- and EU-KSA relations. Even NEOM is increasingly “Made in China.” U.S. contractors and consultants who bailed at the peak of the Khashoggi affair may have had only themselves to blame, but President Biden’s personal attacks on the Crown Prince served as an excuse for the Old Guard to chase more openly after the China, a preferred partner given its corruption and dismissal of human rights look at China’s horrific treatment of its own people in Hong Kong or the Uyghur Muslims).

Another consideration was undermining the rapid rise of the Crown Prince and his pro-Israel policies. Under the Biden administration that dynamic shifted backwards very rapidly; a recent critique of comments by an Israeli official by the Saudi Foreign Ministry described him as an “Israeli occupation official”. 

While it is easy to blame Biden for alienating the Saudis and empowering Iran with the administration’s fixation on the nuclear deal, the Saudis had their own reasons for embracing the China-brokered rapprochement. With the struggle for power between the Old Guard and the reformists, the former are seeking to settle the conflict in Yemen by handing over the country to the Houthis. However, such a deal is impossible without Iran’s blessing—and Iran has no reason to cave on its goals to weaken Saudi Arabia without a major concession. The peace deal, which opens Iran’s doors to Saudi markets and to a greater role inside OPEC+, provides such a concession.

It is no coincidence that the Saudi FM visited Moscow the day before the normalization agreement announcement. Russia and Iran are part of a tripartite gas cartel with Qatar, and share common interests in the oil market, particularly after Russia sanctions. Moscow and Tehran also have a growing defense relationship while Saudis have a fair share of American weapons. As this author has been warning for years, Russia has been exploiting every opportunity to divide KSA and the U.S.. It just so happens that Qatar and the Old Guard members of the Saudi Royal Family are significant investors in Russian energy markets. Iran and Russia are members of China’s new anti-NATO bloc, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Already, in 2018, the Old Guard put an end to a successful Al Hudaydah offensive by then-Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman. Ideologically closer to Khomeinists and their proxies than to liberals and reformists, the Houthis even have a history of Brotherhood faction support from their fight against Egyptian communists during the Cold War.  The security impact of the peace deal with the Houthis would be devastating. Iran would likely agree to freeze the attacks of its proxies on Saudis, instead focusing the offensive on the Southern Yemenis and unleashing an even deadlier civil war in Yemen. The Southerners would be left without air support to face Houthi-led Northerners equipped with sophisticated Iranian weapons.

There is mounting evidence indicating that the Houthis are gearing up for an offensive. Moreover, the Houthis would likely move to attack Israeli targets independently or in concert with Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”: Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, IRGC, and Iraqi militias. The threat of a combined, encirclement attack on Israel may deter Jerusalem from taking any serious action against Iran going nuclear.

With one fifth of the global oil and gas trade passing through the Strait of Hormuz, Houthis would have their hands untied to disrupt the freedom of navigation, further encumbering American ships in the vicinity. These developments would provide the Saudis with only a short-lived respite.

Access to Saudi markets would strengthen Iran’s economic situation, providing more funding for terrorism, but Iran’s ultimate goal is regional dominance through religion by replacing Saudis as the Custodian of Two Holy Mosques. Normalization would pave the way for Iranian intelligence to incite violence in the Shia-dominated East and encourage jihadist groups.

Although progress with the Saudis is likely to be very slow, Tehran is by far the stronger negotiator. Moreover, China’s backing invites Beijing’s far greater investment and entrenchment in both countries, with the possibility of building naval bases and pushing its surveillance state model even farther – with more security apparatchiks around to disrupt U.S. intelligence efforts and military operations in the region.  China’s rise in the region could transform UAE and even Saudi into vassal states over time; Hong Kongs with natural resources.

Economic and cultural activity in Saudi Arabia is geared towards the United States as entire generations have grown up accustomed to U.S. markets and influence.  However, the Biden administration’s ideological fixation to excise the Crown Prince from public life, to appease China to support climate change cooperation, and to draw Iran back into some version of the nuclear deal is proving disastrous. Washington has empowered the anti-reformist, antisemitic, and anti-American political factions in KSA and pushed a critical ally into the embrace of U.S. adversaries. U.S. officials did not learn from a similar turn by the UAE in 2022 and have now encouraged the view that pivoting to Iran and China will be met with tacit approval, if not an invitation to the White House.

Irina Tsukerman is a national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, and President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory. She has written and commented extensively on defense and security issues, Russia, China, U.S. foreign policy, and information warfare.