Bandwagoning with Israel

Over the last twenty years, Middle Eastern alliance politics has experienced a significant shift. For the majority of the post-1948 era, Arab states considered Israel their main adversary. However, the current geopolitical reality is quite different. The last few years have seen an increasing number of Arab states establish some form of overt or tacit alignment with Israel. While this rapprochement is most visible via the Abraham Accords, the development raises a major theoretical and policy question: Will bandwagoning with Israel increase regional stability by providing a collective deterrent to common threats; or will it produce asymmetrical relationships that will limit the future ability of Arab states to make independent, long-term strategic decisions?

Alliance politics has a "double edge" as well. While an ally can provide greater deterrence and help ensure the security of a country's political regime, they create a dependency where one or both parties have less independence to pursue their own foreign policies. Dependency theorists argue that when countries have unequal levels of technological advancement and/or military capability, there will be limitations placed upon their ability to pursue flexible foreign policies for extended periods of time. In this paper, it will be argued that bandwagoning with Israel is a means through which to gain some immediate benefits regarding the stability of its neighbors (regime security) and to increase deterrence against the other neighboring states; however, this strategy is likely to create structural dependencies that could reduce Israel's long term autonomy to pursue whatever foreign policy options that are deemed desirable by Israeli leaders. Therefore, bandwagoning does not necessarily result in either complete stability or absolute subordination to another state; instead, it creates a dynamic of enhanced security, while at the same time creating potential limitations on the foreign policy options available to Israel.

Redefining Regional Security Challenges in the Middle East

The Middle East is widely viewed as a regional security complex where multiple security challenges are closely interlinked through rivalry. In a regional security complex, Buzan and Waeever (1998) contend that security concerns will be geographically proximate and socially constructed; therefore, security relationships in such regions will have a spatial dimension and will reflect the political and social identity of the states involved.

For much of the latter half of the 20th century the Arab-Israeli conflict represented the central axis of insecurity for the states of the Middle East. However, during the first decade of the 21st century the hierarchy of threat among states within the Middle East underwent a significant transformation.

Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and particularly after the onset of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Iran's military intervention across the entire Middle East transformed the security calculus of many states. By providing material and ideological support to non-state actors in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, Iran extended its military capabilities beyond its national boundaries. Many of the Gulf monarchy states increasingly came to view this Iranian activism as a destabilizing and revisionist force in the region.

As noted by F. Gregory Gause, the Middle East had entered a period of multipolar competition where the principal organizing principle of foreign policy would no longer be ideological solidarity but regime survival.

As a result of these developments, Israel's strategic position in the Middle East was repositioned. Although Israel and the Gulf monarchy states have long been at odds, they were no longer perceiving each other as being the primary existential threats to each other. Rather, Israel began to emerge as an acceptable counterweight to Iran for some of the Gulf monarchy states. This shift in perception led to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and Israel in the form of the Abraham Accords.

This development can be seen as reflective of classic balance-of-threat logic from a realist perspective. According to balance-of-threat logic, states will seek out alliances that provide them with enhanced security as a response to perceived threats. Therefore, if the principal threat facing states in the Gulf region is now Iran, then forming an alliance with Israel would represent a rational choice for those states.

However, this logic also suggests that the formation of alliances could increase polarization, thus increasing the likelihood of states becoming entrenched in "bloc" politics as opposed to fostering comprehensive stability.

Regime Security & Domestic Factors

Bandwagoning with Israel should be viewed as part of a broader regime security framework for authoritarian governments. In the pursuit of regime security, authoritarian governments often view their survival as being paramount to ideological consistency. Through collaboration with Israel, authoritarian governments have access to high level defense technologies and methods to share intelligence and develop cybersecurity capabilities. Israel's defense industry is one of the most advanced globally and therefore provides authoritarian governments with an array of tools to enhance their external deterrent capacity and internal control capacity.

Of particular relevance to this discussion is the potential role of the integration of cybersecurity and surveillance technologies in enhancing regime security. As modern authoritarianism increasingly relies on digital governance and monitoring to ensure compliance and protect critical infrastructure, collaborating with Israeli companies and institutions enhances authoritarian governments' ability to monitor and suppress domestic dissent and prevent cyber-attacks from outside the state.

There are tangible and immediate benefits to integrating into these technologies however there is also the risk of creating dependency. Immanuel Wallerstein's World System Analysis views the creation of technological and knowledge asymmetries as a source of structurally defined hierarchies. Within the Middle East region Israel is qualitatively superior in terms of military capability and technological prowess than any other country in the region. Therefore, when authoritarian governments construct their security architecture based on the provision of foreign technical expertise and participation in foreign innovation ecosystems, they may constrain their own autonomy in incremental fashion. This dependency is structural rather than coercive in nature; critical systems become embedded in transnational networks that cannot be disentangled.

This creates a paradox, the tools that provide greater regime stability potentially diminish an authoritarian government's long term strategic flexibility. If authoritarian governments have differing views on foreign policy and they have become heavily dependent on Israeli technologies and systems they will face significant challenges in attempting to adjust their foreign policy. Additionally, over time, such structural asymmetries may influence decision making processes in subtle yet significant ways.

The Palestinian Question and Legitimacy Challenges

The support for normalizing relations with Israel is based at the elite level on a strategic logic, however the majority of the Arab people are still very invested in the question of Palestine, as such, there is a significant gap between official positions toward Israel by governments, and what the people of this region want. Because the issue of Palestine has remained central to political identity and the political discourse of the region, this divide will continue to create legitimacy challenges for regimes attempting to normalize their relations with Israel.

Therefore, regimes can legitimize their decision to normalize their relations with Israel based upon pragmatic reasons (diversifying their economy; creating an atmosphere for security cooperation; etc.) - yet they must simultaneously manage the skepticism of their societies. When levels of violence escalate between Israel and the Palestinians, then it makes it easier for regimes to face criticism from within their own societies about their diplomatic alignments with Israel.

In the same way that elite consensus can provide stability to a regime's relationship with another state, so too can the accumulation of opposition from society undermine this type of stability over time.

Therefore, aligning themselves with Israel creates a multi-layered stability. On one hand, the stability created through elite consensus will result in greater inter-state deterring. On the other hand, it will create legitimate challenges at the domestic level. Therefore, the long-term success or failure of a regime's efforts to maintain its alignment with Israel will depend not only upon the continued existence of external threats, but also how well that regime manages its internal politics.

Alliance hierarchies and strategic autonomy

Alliance dynamics are inherently asymmetric. The qualitative military advantage that Israel enjoys (recognized as such by U.S. strategic doctrine) defines the extent to which cooperation can occur. Partners who are smaller or less technologically sophisticated will be forced to operate from an asymmetric bargaining position.

Snyder's alliance theory identifies two distinct potential problems for smaller members in alliances: "abandonment" and "entrapment." Members of the Gulf states who form alliances with Israel risk being abandoned in a time of crisis while simultaneously facing the possibility of being drawn into conflicts that do not align with their national security interests.

The issue of maintaining strategic autonomy is central to this discussion. Are Gulf state governments able to diversify their foreign policy portfolios when they deepen their relationships with Israel? Saudi Arabia has demonstrated hedging behavior through its outreach efforts to China and Russia; this appears to be an effort to mitigate its reliance on any one particular country. However, there are limits to how much diversification can occur when a country's defense and intelligence infrastructure becomes deeply integrated.

Finally, alliance durability depends on the internal politics of member countries. For example, changes in Israeli leadership or changes in Israel's strategic doctrine could create new priorities and/or challenges for weaker members to address. Therefore, weaker members' ability to pursue their own policies will likely be constrained by the need to respond to the changing circumstances created by stronger allies. Strategic dependence, therefore, is dynamic and is influenced by the evolving nature of the domestic politics of member countries.

Regional stability and division

Advocates of normalization argue that the integration of an Israel-Gulf axis will increase deterrence from Iran and lower the risk of conflict between states. A number of factors can be cited which indicate this -- integrated missile defense systems, improved communication and sharing of intelligence, and economic interdependence created through normalization of relations with Gulf States -- all of these elements suggest that they can help improve crisis management and diminish miscalculations.

However, there are also risks associated with increased coordination and interdependence among states which could result in the reinforcement of division/polarization. For example, if Iran believes its neighbors have formed an "encirclement" alliance with Israel, then it may attempt to increase its use of asymmetric tactics (including proxy wars) against the alliance. In this way, while the overall stability of the region may continue to exist at a high level of deterrence, the region's states may still engage in a pattern of sustained but low-level violence, which is relative and conditional in the circumstances.

Without a comprehensive regional security structure, the prospects for lasting peace in the region appear to be even less likely. While bilateral relationships between the different states in the region may be useful for improving relations and reducing tensions, they do not provide the same benefits as having an inclusive framework for addressing the deep-seated rivalries between many of the states in the region. If greater diplomacy is not engaged in the region, then the "bloc" nature of regional politics is likely to exacerbate the existing divisions within the region rather than serve to lessen or eliminate them.

Conclusion

The bandwagoning with Israel is a pragmatic choice for Arab states due to their changing perception of threats in the Middle East. This realignment has provided several benefits including enhanced security, improved deterrence capabilities vis-a-vis Iran, and access to technology as part of this relationship. These factors have contributed to a short-term measure of regional stability based on similar strategic goals among Arab states.

In addition to the advantages mentioned above, the bandwagoning with Israel also creates structural disparities among the parties involved. The potential for developing a form of strategic dependence through increased technological development, sharing intelligence and coordinating diplomatically could potentially limit the ability of some Arab states to act independently in the future. Additionally, domestic legitimacy issues surrounding the Palestinian issue further complicate the sustainability of the bandwagoning with Israel.

Ultimately, the bandwagoning with Israel can be viewed neither as a guaranteed means of achieving lasting stability nor as a foregone conclusion of becoming dependent on Israel. The bandwagoning with Israel is a decision made by each individual state based on a variety of factors including changing perceptions of threats, domestic politics and changes in the balance of power within the region. Ultimately, the long-term implications of the bandwagoning with Israel will depend upon whether the current alignment develops into a broader and more institutionalized security arrangement, or if it becomes one of many polarizing alliances that continue to create rivalries in the region, but in a different configuration than before.

Chick Edmond is a Political Scientist and Graduate Researcher in the International Studies program at Old Dominion University. His research focuses on Nuclear Deterrence Strategies, Geopolitics in Europe/Africa and the balance of power between NATO and Russia.