On Arms Delays, Learn From Ukraine or Lose to China

The war in Ukraine has exposed a deep vulnerability: from missiles to tanks, the West at present cannot produce needed weapons at speed and scale. This has meant a desperate struggle for Ukraine, but it also portends a potential crisis for the U.S. in the seas and air should an unanticipated prolonged conflict occur in the future such as is the possible case with Taiwan.

The U.S. can either learn from the delay of munitions and platforms in Ukraine or risk losing to China.

In February, the Biden Administration announced it would not provide Kiev with ATACM long-range missiles because there were too few available in U.S. inventories. Because the most modern up to date M1 tanks cannot be produced quickly enough, drawdown authorities are one option to consider in addition to providing less capable versions of the M1. Neither of these solutions are desired to meet strategic battlefield objectives.

Beyond munitions shortages, America is also fielding too few F-35s – the platform most essential for both deterring and winning should war break out. Unclassified assessments from USINDOPACOM assess China will enjoy a numerical advantage over the U.S. in 5th Generation fighters of 3:2 by 2025. This is in addition to the overwhelming numerical superiority China already enjoys in missiles, warships, and conventional aircraft. The United States procured the F35 specifically for its 5^th Gen advantages that bring superior capabilities, but the services still need sufficient quantities to join the fight.

If the U.S. wants to avoid the costly delays in platforms that Ukraine is suffering today, our nation needs to build more F-35s. DoD is moving in a positive direction here, as reflected in the administration’s most recent budget, but time is of the essence.

This year will likely see delivery of the 1,000^th F-35, as well as production of the Lot 15 aircraft, with a tech refresh that will facilitate integration of more weapon systems. The F-35 program now counts 17 international partners, with a new international F35 training facility in Arkansas soon to be officially stood up. Procurement, operating and sustainment costs have significantly decreased, so much so the Air Force even decided to curtail purchases of other less capable aircraft.

In other words, the defense industrial base is primed to deliver more F-35s to the U.S. and its international partners. Several bureaucratic hurdles remain, however.

First up: getting the right testing infrastructure (i.e., more testing aircraft) and satisfying the full rate production requirements soonest which are currently being delayed by the development of a fully functioning aircraft simulation environment.

The Defense Department is currently on tap to build the simulator, and according to the Government Accountability Office, an internal assessment determined it was feasible for the program office to complete simulator development and begin final tests by August 2022.

But that simulator is yet to be certified, and – by regulation – its operation is a prerequisite for full-rate production of the fighters. Put simply, the government needs to enable itself: 17 international partners and foreign military sales and 1,000 aircraft should justify giving the green light to full-rate production, especially in light of the threat in the Indo-Pacific.

Congress showed wisdom when they approved multi-year munitions in the last Defense Authorization. It is time now to do the same with airframes, ideally with five-year multi-aircraft buys.

Multi-year procurement injects stability into the supply chain, stability in the supply chain grows deterrence, and deterrence prevents war. Should deterrence fail, multi-year procurement also makes current forces as effective as possible by providing breadth and depth to the parts, munitions, and maintenance needed for the fight.

As one colleague recently remarked, “America’s defense industrial base is on a wartime footing, but it’s the first time we’ve done so without America’s military.” Congress can close this gap – and Pentagon planners must help.

Nations may go to war with the force on hand, but they don’t keep them once hostilities begin. There are losses, first and foremost of human beings – soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen, and yes civilians – as well as ships, vehicles, and aircraft. Beyond the unforgiving climate of combat, those platforms also suffer attrition: wear-and-tear, maintenance delays, and accidents.

But it isn’t 1943 anymore. For all the good work undertaken so far, the industrial base is not primed to deliver a ship per day, as happened at the height of World War II. Recall now that America lost more than 2,000 aircraft over the course of the Vietnam War, against an adversary that was hardly a peer in terms of air power. That figure is twice the total number of F-35s in service in the U.S. armed forces today in 2023.

Building the world’s most sophisticated fighter aircraft is going to take considerable time, unlike most other weapons programs, and that’s why the U.S. must build mass now. Waiting until hostilities commence to speed production is deeply misguided and utterly unrealistic.

An old expression advises, “In tumultuous times, do the next right thing.” Since the start of the Ukraine war, decisionmakers in America’s defense enterprise have taken several key steps to better answer the harsh realities of the international security environment, principally approving multi-year munitions procurement.

It’s time to do “the next right thing” with air assets. Removing bureaucratic red tape and speeding production of the F-35 can help the U.S. preclude a Pacific war altogether or, at least, prevail if conflict comes. If not, we need only look to Ukraine to see what the future holds.

Rob Schroder and Michael Dehner are Marine aviators and former program leaders with nearly 50 years working in aviation and on major DoD programs. Schroder is the founder of SteerBridge.