The Coming Crisis of America's Military Alliances

As Philippe Legrain pointed out in The Strategist last week, the election of Donald Trump as the next US president threatens to further undermine the liberal international order. Thus far, US military alliances in Asia and Europe have been a cornerstone of this structure. There’s a good chance that many of these alliances could soon be faced with a major crisis.

Moreover, Trump has displayed a deep-seated belief in an isolationist foreign policy and the need for allies to pay a greater share of the burden. Indeed, no other successful presidential candidate has so frequently questioned whether the United States would defend its allies. This’s not only a problem for NATO but also for allies and partners in Asia–Pacific. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are extremely worried about the implications of a Trump presidency. Should Trump exacerbate fears in Tokyo and Seoul about US abandonment, both could even weigh their nuclear options; Taiwan is also a ‘latent’ nuclear power.

Some commentators (here and here) argue that Trump could revitalise the pivot through building a ‘350 ship navy’ and a ‘bold’ military strategy against China. However, America’s military hardware has never been the main issue for the rebalance. Rather, the problem has been one of credible leadership ‘within’ the alliances. And Trump’s transactional understanding of alliances—the ‘more you pay, the more we protect you’—fails to understand that America’s leadership capacity and disproportionate influence has been based on its provision of significant resources. The ‘free rider’ argument is flawed in regards to most alliances. In the case of Japan, for instance, it neglects Tokyo’s significant ‘host nation’ support for US troops and the fact that its relatively low defence spending in terms of GDP (which still makes it the second most powerful navy in the region in qualitative terms) is a means to reassure neighbours about its intentions. US presence in South Korea provides Washington with significant deterrent posture vis-à-vis the nuclear regime in the North. And even in Europe, US strategic investments have delivered a return which can only partly be measured in monetary terms: broad acceptance of US transatlantic leadership but also access to critical infrastructure for global force projection, for example through bases in Germany.

Trump’s presidency could make the United States and key alliances strategically poorer. Of course, it’s still early days and the incoming administration could heed the sanguine advice by Ralph Cossa and others on how to reassure allies in Asia. Yet, in regards to Asia, David Sanger has pointed out that one of Trump’s more consistent themes is his belief that Japan has been ‘ripping off’ its US ally. Trump is also likely to pressure South Korea to increase its host nation support and to complete the transfer of operational wartime control (OPCON) to South Korean forces.

Moreover, highly institutionalised alliances such as NATO have demonstrated a remarkable resilience against shock events and strategic discontinuities. But we shouldn’t bet on it and just expect that Trump will moderate his views in office. More than anything, Trump’s pro-Russia stance as well as support for xenophobic and authoritarian positions are unlikely to subside, making cohesion within NATO a very difficult undertaking. Obama’s reassurance attempts that Trump will stick to US’ NATO commitments will hardly persuade European allies. While calls for ‘greater burden sharing’ have been repeated by almost every post-war US administration, in the context of Trump’s ideology America’s alliances could soon face a major crisis.

Benjamin Schreer is Professor in Security Studies and Head of the Department for Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University.

This article appeared originally at The Strategist (ASPI).