United States and Europe: A Divorce of Convenience

For decades, the American military presence in Europe has remained one of the key pillars of the continent’s security architecture. It provided not only deterrence against the Soviet Union and later Russia, but also ensured U.S. political and military leadership within NATO, forming the backbone of the entire Euro‑Atlantic security system. Even after the end of the Cold War and a substantial reduction of forward‑deployed forces, U.S. troops in Europe continued to play a leading role, shaping allied defense planning and operational assumptions.

Domestic Pressure to Scale Back Overseas Commitments

In recent years, U.S. foreign policy has been shaped by a persistent domestic demand to reallocate resources toward internal priorities. Debates about America being “overextended” globally, the need to reduce spending on overseas operations, and the push to refocus on domestic issues are present across both Republican and Democratic political circles, though articulated differently. For the U.S. military presence in Europe, this means it is increasingly evaluated through the lens of “return on investment” and forced to compete for resources with other theaters of potential and actual threats. As a significant portion of the American public and political class views China as the primary long‑term challenge, the European theater is gradually losing its status as an unquestioned priority. This does not negate formal Article 5 commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty, but it strengthens the argument for optimization, downsizing, and redistribution of forces — a trend reflected in documents such as the National Defense Strategy and the National Security Strategy, where competition with China is codified as the central strategic priority.

Resource Reallocation Toward Deterring China

Recent U.S. strategic documents consistently highlight a shift of focus toward the Indo‑Pacific and toward long‑term competition with China as the core of American strategy. This shift is visible in force‑planning assumptions, budgetary structures, the development of defense‑political frameworks with regional partners, and discussions about the global configuration of U.S. forward presence. From a force‑planning perspective, maintaining the current density of forces in Europe while potentially increasing posture in the Indo‑Pacific would require either a substantial rise in defense spending or a redistribution of existing resources. Given political constraints on budget growth and competing priorities, the logic of reallocating assets toward China deterrence is becoming increasingly pronounced. This creates systemic pressure on the European theater, particularly on those elements of the U.S. presence that are viewed as “enhancing” rather than critically essential.

The Indo‑Pacific has been codified in U.S. strategic documents as the primary theater of long‑term competition with China. This is stated directly in the Indo‑Pacific Strategy, which defines the region as the central axis of American strategic planning. This shift is reflected not only in rhetoric but also in practical steps: the development of AUKUS and the Quad, the strengthening of naval presence, and the expansion of defense cooperation with regional partners. For Europe, this means it is no longer the sole — or even the primary — arena through which the United States executes its global strategy. As Washington seeks to build a coherent approach spanning both theaters, the European direction is increasingly viewed as a space where allies must assume greater responsibility, freeing U.S. resources for the Indo‑Pacific.

U.S. Fatigue with the Role of Europe’s Primary Security Provider

Since NATO’s founding, the United States has served as the principal guarantor of European security. This role provided Washington with political influence but also entrenched an asymmetry: European states could afford years of underinvestment in defense while relying on the American presence. After 2014 — and especially after 2022 — European allies began increasing defense budgets, yet the U.S. debate about Europe’s insufficient contribution has not disappeared. It has intensified amid expectations that European states should assume a greater share of responsibility for their own defense. During the Trump administration, these expectations were articulated explicitly: in 2018 Washington demanded that allies meet the 2% GDP benchmark without delay, and later Trump publicly cited a 4% target, linking the scale of U.S. presence in Europe to European defense spending levels. Within this logic, reducing the U.S. footprint in Europe can be viewed as a tool to incentivize European defense autonomy and rebalance the burden within the Alliance.

The Rising Importance of European Armies in Europe’s Defense

A reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe acts as a catalyst for systemic stress, automatically elevating the importance of national armed forces across European states. This concerns not only force size and equipment, but also the ability to operate within joint planning frameworks and sustain critical functions such as logistics, intelligence, air and missile defense, and other essential enablers. For many countries, this requires a shift from a model of “supplementing” American dominance to one in which European armies themselves form the backbone of continental defense. Such a transition demands not only increased spending but also changes in military culture, planning practices, and political responsibility.

The Adoption of an EU Defense Doctrine and the Acceleration of Autonomization

The debate on EU strategic autonomy has been ongoing for years, but until recently it remained largely conceptual and political. The prospect of a reduced U.S. footprint in Europe turns this debate into a practical requirement: without its own defense doctrine, without agreed‑upon priorities, and without mechanisms for collective response, the EU becomes dependent on decisions made outside its own defense‑planning structures — a dynamic reflected in the EU Strategic Compass 2022, which underscores the need to develop autonomous European defense capabilities. Adopting a pan‑European defense doctrine that does not automatically rely on U.S. military presence becomes a logical step as Washington reallocates resources. Such a doctrine must define:

• the EU’s levels of ambition in defense;

• the distribution of responsibilities among member states;

• priority areas for the development of armed forces and defense industries;

• mechanisms for interaction with NATO and the United Kingdom.

This process inevitably accelerates the autonomization of European defense, even if NATO formally remains the central institution of collective defense.

The Emergence of New European Defense Formats

A reduction of the U.S. presence reinforces the trend toward forming new European defense formats based on regional interests, functional specialization, and the ability to act faster than large multilateral structures. This process is already visible in the form of mini‑blocs, ad‑hoc coalitions, and technological alliances that complement — rather than replace — NATO. Examples include AUKUS as a narrow technological alliance, NORDEFCO as a stable Northern European framework, the French‑Greek defense pact, and the operational coalition of European states formed around the protection of Denmark’s territorial integrity during the crisis involving Greenland. These formats demonstrate that within large alliances, flexible groupings of states emerge that can respond to specific threats without waiting for full consensus. For Europe, this marks a shift toward a multilayered security architecture in which regional groupings become an important mechanism for burden‑sharing and resilience under long‑term uncertainty.

Rising Defense Expenditures Among EU States

These dynamics inevitably require an increase in the financial burden on European states. Many European governments have already announced that they have reached or exceeded the 2% of GDP defense‑spending benchmark established within NATO. Under the scenario of a reduced U.S. presence, this threshold becomes a lower bound rather than a target — a shift consistent with the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, which underscores the need to strengthen Europe’s defense capabilities. Defense spending is set to rise for several reasons:

• fulfilling commitments outlined in the NATO Defence Investment Pledge 2014,

• compensating for the reduction of the American contribution,

• developing indigenous air and missile defense, intelligence, cyber defense, and logistics systems, as articulated in the Missile Defense Review,

• modernizing armed forces for high‑intensity operations, as reflected in the NATO Readiness Initiative,

• expanding an industrial base capable of sustaining prolonged conflicts, as described in the EU Defence Industrial Strategy.

For many states, this implies a reassessment of budgetary priorities and a political debate over what level of defense burden society is prepared to sustain in the long term.

The Need for Accelerated Development of Indigenous Weapons Systems

A reduction of the U.S. presence forces Europe to confront not only the quantity but also the quality of its armaments. The issue concerns the ability to produce and sustain a full spectrum of systems — from precision‑guided munitions and air defense assets to elements of strategic deterrence. The debate on European nuclear deterrence is already underway in expert circles and periodically enters the public domain, particularly regarding France’s role. Paris has announced a comprehensive modernization of its nuclear forces: replacing its ballistic‑missile submarines with the SNLE‑3G class beginning in 2035, introducing the M51.3 missile after 2025 with a planned transition to the M51.4 in the early 2030s, and upgrading the air‑delivered component through the ASMPA‑R program. To a lesser extent, this also concerns the United Kingdom as Europe’s second nuclear‑armed state.

Beyond the strategic level, the issue extends to conventional capabilities. In air and missile defense, key assets are concentrated in France (SAMP/T NG) and Germany (IRIS‑T SLM), which can partially offset a reduced American contribution. In electronic warfare and signals intelligence, France and Italy possess the strongest potential, developing their own EW suites and SIGINT systems. In aviation, the primary burden falls on France (Rafale) and the Eurofighter consortium, and in the future on the FCAS and Tempest programs. Satellite reconnaissance and surveillance rely on French and German orbital constellations, including optical and radar‑imaging systems. Production of precision‑guided weapons and missile systems is distributed among France, Germany, Italy, and the Nordic states, all of which are already expanding capacity.

In the context of a potential reduction of the U.S. role in European security, the question of how Europe will provide strategic and operational deterrence acquires a practical dimension — particularly against the backdrop of the Nuclear Posture Review, which defines the U.S. role in NATO’s nuclear‑deterrence architecture, and in line with the principles outlined in the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, including discussions of European participation in sustaining deterrence under evolving U.S. priorities. Without developing its own industrial and technological base capable of supporting systems at both the strategic and operational levels, Europe remains dependent on decisions made outside its political space.

Weakening of NATO’s Eastern Flank

The American presence on NATO’s eastern flank after 2014 — and especially after 2022 — became a central element of deterrence against Russia. Rotational units providing continuous presence without permanent basing, reinforced contingents, expanded infrastructure, and recurring exercises sent Moscow a clear signal of the Alliance’s readiness to defend its members. A reduction of these forces, even with formal commitments intact, is perceived as a contraction of forward presence and of available ready forces. For the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, and other countries on the eastern flank, this translates into increased demands on their own armed forces and on regional coordination. At the same time, the importance of military‑relevant infrastructure grows — transport corridors, logistics hubs, pre‑positioned equipment sites, and reception facilities that enable rapid force buildup in a crisis. This requires sustained investment in transportation networks, logistics, and pre‑positioning, storage, and maintenance of equipment.

The Growing Role of the United Kingdom as an Independent Pole of Military Self‑Sufficiency

After leaving the EU, the United Kingdom has preserved — and in some respects strengthened — its role as one of Europe’s key military actors. Its historically developed defense‑industrial base, nuclear arsenal, global military‑political presence, and close ties with the United States allow London to claim the status of an autonomous pole within Europe’s security architecture. Under conditions of a reduced U.S. footprint in Europe, the UK’s role expands along several vectors:

• as a provider of advanced weapons and technologies; • as an initiator of regional security formats (for example, in Northern Europe);

• as a political intermediary between the United States and European allies;

• as an actor capable of making independent decisions on the use of force across a wide spectrum.

For continental Europe, this introduces an additional layer of variability: defense policy must be shaped simultaneously within the frameworks of the EU, NATO, and bilateral/multilateral arrangements with London.

The Gap Between Political Commitments and Military Capabilities

The North Atlantic Treaty establishes collective defense as a fundamental principle, but the practical implementation of this principle depends on the willingness and ability of member states to provide the military means required. In recent years, the debate over the discrepancy between political declarations and the actual capabilities of armed forces has become increasingly relevant. European states face the need not only to increase defense spending but also to ensure rapid deployment capacity, resilient logistics, interoperability of weapons systems, and readiness for high‑intensity operations.

In this context, assessing the real readiness of NATO members to fulfill their obligations under Article 5 becomes increasingly important. This includes procedures such as the Defense Planning Process, the NATO Defence Planning Capability Review, the Readiness Initiative, Force Generation, Military Mobility, and Host Nation Support. Evaluating each country’s ability to participate meaningfully in collective defense becomes a key element of planning. This concerns not only military capabilities but also political will, which varies depending on domestic conditions, public opinion, and threat perception.

An additional indicator of structural change has been reporting on U.S. plans to significantly reduce their contribution to NATO requirements, including cutting the number of strategic bombers and fighter aircraft by roughly one‑third, reducing the number of destroyers, and completely withdrawing submarine support for Alliance missions. Washington has also stated that European allies must independently provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance UAV systems, while the United States will retain only the nuclear‑deterrence component in Europe. These steps have been presented as a logical redistribution of burden and reflect a broader trend in which responsibility for the continent’s conventional defense shifts toward European states. For NATO, this means the need to accelerate planning adaptation and reassess the distribution of responsibilities within the Alliance.

Within this logic, different levels of U.S. force reduction produce three distinct scenarios:

• A 20–30% reduction — increased burden on European armies, accelerated modernization, higher demands on logistics and air/missile defense, and potential redistribution of contingents and elements of nuclear deterrence.

• A 40–50% reduction — disruption of the balance of forces on NATO’s eastern flank and increased pressure on the Alliance’s political cohesion.

• A reduction of more than 50% to a symbolic level — risk of fragmentation of European defense and a shift toward a multipolar security architecture within the collective West.

These scenarios affect the stability of NATO’s eastern flank in different ways, with the greatest impact on the Baltic states and Poland.

Rising Risks for the Baltic States and Poland. The Baltic states and Poland view the American military presence as a critically important element of their security. After the start of the hybrid war in Ukraine in 2014 — and especially after the beginning of its open phase in 2022 — these countries became the focal point of NATO’s efforts to strengthen the eastern flank. A reduction of the U.S. force posture creates conditions in which deterrence potential decreases. This does not automatically increase the probability of conflict, but it does heighten the region’s sensitivity to shifts in the military balance, political signaling, and the dynamics and direction of crises. Beyond the Baltic states and Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary also fall within the zone of potential risk. The reasons differ: geography, political uncertainty, infrastructure limitations, or specific features of national defense policy. Each country requires a separate assessment of the factors shaping its resilience to external pressure.

Increased Russian Pressure on NATO’s Periphery

Russian policy toward neighboring states employs a wide spectrum of instruments: unambiguous demonstrations of military force, cyber operations, energy pressure, information campaigns, and diplomatic maneuvering. A reduction in the density of the American presence may encourage more active use of these instruments against states perceived as vulnerable. These include:

• Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — due to geography, limited national resources, and proximity to Russian territory;

• Poland — as a key element of NATO logistics;

• Romania — due to its role in the Black Sea region;

• Bulgaria and Slovakia — due to political heterogeneity and internal dynamics;

• Hungary — due to dependence on Russian energy leverage and periodic blocking of NATO and EU decisions, with signs of foreign‑policy adjustment after the change of government.

Forms of pressure may include demonstrative military activity, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, influence operations, economic restrictions, and diplomatic steps aimed at generating tension.

During another large‑scale overnight strike on Ukraine on 29 May 2026, a Russian attack drone crossed into Romanian territory and impacted a residential high‑rise in Galați. For Bucharest and for the Alliance, the incident served as a further test of resolve. Episodes of this kind do not signal the onset of a wider conflict, but they illustrate that Russia closely tracks NATO’s responses and exploits every opportunity to assess how prepared the Alliance is to react when a strike lands on the territory of a member state.

The Emergence of “Grey Zones” of Security

A reduction of the American presence may lead to the formation of areas where the level of protection and political clarity is lower than in NATO’s central states. These areas can be described as “grey zones” of security. They may include:

• states where political will to fulfill NATO obligations is uncertain;

• countries where infrastructure for rapid force deployment is insufficiently developed;

• regions where internal political processes create uncertainty about the state’s ability to respond to external threats.

The likelihood that such zones transform into areas of heightened tension depends on a combination of factors: external pressure, internal political dynamics, the degree of integration into NATO structures, and the ability to conduct independent defense.

Europe as an Independent Pole

A reduction of the American presence creates conditions in which Europe gains an incentive to develop its own strategic agency. This includes strengthening defense institutions, expanding the industrial base, formulating common doctrines, and increasing coordination among states. This process requires reconciling interests that do not always align, yet the trend toward forming an independent strategic pole is becoming increasingly visible. It manifests in debates on strategic autonomy, initiatives to develop Europe’s defense‑industrial base, and attempts to craft common approaches to foreign policy.

Fragmentation Within the EU

European defense policy evolves under conditions of significant divergence among member states. These differences concern threat perception, economic capacity, political priorities, and historical experience. A reduction of the American presence amplifies these divergences. Eastern‑flank states focus on strengthening defense and increasing deterrence density. Southern states prioritize migration, Mediterranean security, and economic stability. Western European countries emphasize industrial‑base development and strategic autonomy. This fragmentation does not preclude cooperation, but it complicates the formation of a unified strategy. Under these conditions, regional formats capable of compensating for the limits of EU‑wide coordination gain importance.

The Growing Role of Regional Blocs

Given the differences among states, regional formats become increasingly significant. They allow for faster alignment of positions, coordinated action, and the development of joint projects. Such formats include:

• Northern Europe — cooperation within NORDEFCO and engagement with the United Kingdom;

• Eastern Europe — initiatives focused on strengthening defense and logistics;

• Southern Europe — coordination on Mediterranean security and migration.

Regional blocs are becoming an important component of the security architecture, complementing EU‑wide and transatlantic structures.

A Shift in the Logic of Deterrence A reduction of the American presence leads to a shift in the logic of deterrence. Whereas U.S. military power previously formed the core of deterrence, the importance of European armed forces, industrial capacity, infrastructure, and political will now increases. Deterrence becomes more distributed and multilayered. It incorporates national forces, regional formats, EU‑level initiatives, and interaction with NATO. This approach requires a high degree of coordination and resilience, which becomes a central challenge for European states.

A Window of Opportunity for Pressure

A reduction in the density of the American presence may be perceived by Russia as an opportunity to increase pressure on NATO’s peripheral states and on countries outside the Alliance. This may include diplomatic initiatives, economic measures, information campaigns, and demonstrative military activity. However, the potential for such pressure is constrained by Russia’s resource and operational limitations.

The Risk of Misinterpreting Signals

A shifting balance of power can lead to misjudgements about intentions and capabilities on both sides. Under conditions of heightened tension, such miscalculations can become a factor of escalation. For Russia and European states, maintaining communication channels and avoiding steps that could be interpreted as preparations for aggressive action becomes essential.

The Growing Role of the Nuclear Factor

Given limited capacity for large‑scale ground operations, Russia may place greater emphasis on its nuclear component as an instrument of strategic pressure. This increases the importance of strategic‑stability issues and arms‑control mechanisms. At the same time, Russia’s ability to compensate for the limitations of its ground forces through non‑nuclear means remains constrained, especially after more than four years of high‑intensity combat operations in Ukraine.

Limitations of the Russian Armed Forces in Ground Operations

The Russian Armed Forces face constraints related to resources, logistics, and the need to distribute forces across multiple theaters. This reduces the likelihood of large‑scale ground operations against NATO states. At the same time, Russia retains the ability to employ missile and unmanned systems to demonstrate force and test the Alliance’s response. Such actions may be used to probe NATO’s level of readiness for collective defense.

The reduction of the American force posture in Europe is shaping a new strategic reality in which the traditional foundations of Euro‑Atlantic security are shifting. This is not a single decision but the result of multiple converging factors: domestic political dynamics in the United States, the reallocation of resources toward the Indo‑Pacific, intensifying competition with China, and rising expectations placed on European allies.

For Europe, this marks a transition from a model centered on an external guarantor to one in which key elements of defense are generated within the continent itself. Such a transition requires strengthening the industrial base, aligning strategic priorities, reinforcing regional formats, and developing a common doctrine capable of ensuring resilience under long‑term uncertainty.

For NATO, the reduction of the U.S. presence becomes a test of the Alliance’s ability to sustain collective defense under a shifting balance of power. The importance of political will, force interoperability, resilient logistics, and rapid‑response readiness increases. Particular attention is required on the eastern flank, where the level of forward presence directly affects crisis prevention.

For Russia, the changing configuration of forces in Europe creates space for more active use of influence tools, including demonstrative military activity, cyber operations, and information campaigns. However, a reduction of the American presence does not automatically expand Russia’s capacity for large‑scale operations, producing a complex and ambiguous strategic environment. Against this backdrop, European states are accelerating the restructuring of their own security architecture, moving toward a more distributed model.

In parallel, the reduction of the American contribution and the emergence of regional defense formats indicate that Europe’s security architecture is becoming multilayered. NATO remains the central institution of collective defense, but the system’s resilience increasingly depends on Europe’s ability to act autonomously — within the EU, as well as through ad‑hoc coalitions and regional alliances. These developments reflect an adaptation to a new strategic environment in which responsibility is more evenly distributed and responses to threats become more flexible.

In the long term, Europe gains a strong incentive to develop its own strategic agency. This process will evolve gradually, taking into account differences among states, but the trend toward strengthening European defense is becoming more pronounced. The Euro‑Atlantic security architecture is becoming more layered and distributed, and European states’ responsibility for their own security more direct.

It is important to recognize that the configuration of the American military presence in Europe is shaped by political cycles within the United States. Historical experience shows that Washington’s approach to the European theater can shift depending on the priorities of a given administration. Over the next several years, this may lead to adjustments of the current course and a return to a more traditional model of U.S. engagement, reflecting the unique role of the United States in ensuring the defense and stability of the European continent.

Sergey E. Ivashchenko is a strategic analyst working at the intersection of escalation dynamics, information strategy, and long‑range strategic forecasting.