Why MASGA Matters for the ROK–U.S. Alliance

The U.S.–ROK alliance has long rested on the credibility of American extended deterrence and South Korea’s own growing military capabilities. However, the alliance now faces a strategic challenge: the erosion of the U.S. naval industrial base. The U.S. Navy, once unrivaled, struggles to meet force structure goals due to shipbuilding delays, cost overruns, and limited capacity across its yards. This industrial shortfall risks undermining not only U.S. global maritime power but also the effectiveness of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, where China’s naval expansion continues at a breakneck pace. It is in this context that the MASGA— “Make America Shipbuilding Great Again”—initiative, which envisions leveraging South Korea’s advanced shipbuilding sector to revitalize U.S. naval capacity, becomes a vital agenda for both Washington and Seoul.

South Korea offers precisely what the U.S. needs: world-class shipbuilding capacity, efficiency, and reliability. South Korean firms such as Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai are global leaders in both commercial and naval shipbuilding, with advanced technologies in propulsion, stealth design, and integrated logistics support. Seoul has demonstrated that it can produce complex platforms like KDX destroyers, Aegis-equipped vessels, and KSS-III submarines at competitive cost and within compressed timelines. By integrating Korean shipyards into the U.S. supply chain under the MASGA concept, the U.S. could alleviate pressure on its overstretched industrial base and accelerate the delivery of critical hulls.

Critics may argue that outsourcing naval production undermines the sovereignty of U.S. defense industries. Yet such concerns overlook the fact that alliance resilience is increasingly measured by industrial interoperability as much as by operational interoperability. Just as the F-35 program involves multiple partners in production, maintenance, and component supply, MASGA could institutionalize an allied shipbuilding framework that distributes burdens while reinforcing common interests. For Washington, this would not dilute but rather multiply industrial capacity, while keeping strategic design and command firmly in American hands. For Seoul, it would represent a leap forward in defense-industrial integration with its principal ally, cementing South Korea not just as a buyer of U.S. systems but as a co-producer of global security.

There are also broader alliance benefits. First, MASGA would enhance deterrence credibility by ensuring that the U.S. Navy has the hull numbers and maintenance depth required to operate forward in the Indo-Pacific. A fleet that is seen as unable to meet commitments invites miscalculation; one that can regenerate strength through allied shipbuilding signals staying power. Second, it would bind the U.S. and South Korea in a deeper web of strategic interdependence. The alliance has already expanded beyond the Korean Peninsula into global issues such as Ukraine, cyber defense, and space security. Industrial cooperation on shipbuilding would extend this trend, anchoring the alliance in a tangible infrastructure of shared production.

Third, MASGA fits squarely into Washington’s own rhetoric on burden-sharing. Rather than viewing allied contributions narrowly in terms of troop deployments or host-nation support, MASGA redefines burden-sharing in industrial and technological terms. South Korea, through its competitive shipbuilding sector, would be providing a capability that the U.S. urgently needs, while benefiting from access to advanced U.S. naval technologies and design standards. This is not charity but a mutually reinforcing partnership.

Of course, challenges remain. Legal frameworks such as the Jones Act, concerns about technology transfer, and potential opposition from U.S. labor unions could complicate implementation. Seoul, for its part, would need to ensure that its participation in MASGA does not trigger pushback from Beijing, which already views ROK–U.S. military cooperation with suspicion. But these hurdles are not insurmountable. They call for political leadership, careful framing, and institutional design—treating MASGA not as an outsourcing scheme but as an allied capacity-building initiative central to alliance security.

The Indo-Pacific security environment is entering a decisive decade. China’s naval rise, North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities, and Russia’s disruptive behavior in the maritime domain all point to a future where sea power will be even more critical. The U.S.–ROK alliance must adapt not only in operational terms but also in industrial foundations. MASGA offers a practical pathway: by linking South Korea’s proven shipbuilding strengths to America’s strategic requirements, it strengthens deterrence, reinforces alliance credibility, and ensures that the maritime balance does not tilt irreversibly. For both Washington and Seoul, this is not about shipbuilding alone; it is about securing the alliance’s future in an era of intensifying great-power competition.

Jihoon Yu is a research fellow and the director of external cooperation at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. Jihoon was the member of Task Force for South Korea’s light aircraft carrier project and Jangbogo-III submarine project. He is the main author of the ROK Navy’s Navy Vision 2045. His area of expertise includes the ROK-US alliance, the ROK-Europe security cooperation, inter-Korean relations, national security, maritime security, and maritime strategy. He earned his MA in National Security Affairs from the US Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in Political Science from Syracuse University.