Behind Moscow's Arms Control Offensive

Russia has a long track record of importuning the United States and its allies regarding arms control treaties and negotiations. But the sentiment Moscow presents to the West is far from altruistic. Indeed, having largely completed its nuclear modernization and reached the limit of what it can spend on defense, Russia wants to lock in its gains before the US can begin the “aggressive modernization” of its nuclear weapons and before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can react with deployments to counter Russian violations of the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Those violations apparently go beyond the Novator (9M729, a.k.a. SSC-8) missile to include other land-based cruise missiles. This Russian offensive travels on two tracks. As regards the INF Treaty, Russia is pursuing negotiations with European states and making public proclamations in favor of a moratorium on short- and intermediate-range missiles in Europe (TASS, February 18). Moscow does so knowing that nobody has retaliated to date even though it built and deployed numerous INF-noncompliant systems that can be easily hidden and then strike European cities and targets (UAWire, February 22). As for the second track, Russia continues to threaten the US and Europe with retaliatory measures should they choose to react to its violations of the INF Treaty (Kremlin.ru, February 20, 2019).

These deployments conform to the ongoing Russian practice of adapting land- and sea-based cruise missiles for use on other platforms, including aircraft. And they further suggest that negotiating any new arms control treaty with Moscow would face difficulties in working out a satisfactory verification mechanism for Russia’s new intermediate- and short-range nuclear or hypersonic missiles. Those classes of systems have long been developed and fielded by China (not having been a party to any US-Soviet Cold War–era strategic arms control agreement). But Moscow has hitherto proved utterly unable to persuade Beijing to negotiate, despite stating a decade ago that it would not discuss any new arms control treaties unless they were multilateral—i.e., included China. This reality clearly raises questions about Moscow’s purported leverage over its “ally” in Beijing (Yaleglobal.yale.edu, January 23, 2020). Moreover, Russia’s routine boasting about just how many precision-strike and other weapons it has built in the last decade demonstrates that it does not genuinely seek peace; and it certainly belies Russian claims that Moscow would not be the first to deploy new (formerly treaty banned) weapons following the demise of the INF (see EDM, February 13). Finally the unresolved problems in the defense industrial sector, coupled with the real constraints on defense spending, may force Russia to rely even more on its nuclear weapons. These trends will make any future arms control talks even more problematic, especially if Chinese involvement or proper verification cannot be ensured (see EDM, February 27).

Dr. Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow and resident Russia expert at the American Foreign Policy Council. Previously, he worked as a professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.