Greenland's Strategic Weight Surges Amid US, China, Russia Jostling

Greenland, an often-overlooked expanse of ice and rock, is fast becoming a focal point of strategic competition between the United States, China and Russia.

‘Buying, owning or taking Greenland’ has been a preoccupation for the U.S. since at least the mid-19th century, Buchanan says. ‘For continental defence, Greenland has always been critical [to the U.S.]. It is their front doorstep, their back doorstep, their side doorstep.’

Denmark formally took possession of Greenland in 1814 under the Treaty of Kiel, after centuries of shifting Norse and colonial control. Since then, the island’s fate has been tethered to powers far larger than its 57,000 inhabitants.

Washington first contemplated annexing Greenland in the 1840s, seeing its position as crucial for continental defence. When Denmark fell to Nazi Germany during World War II, the U.S. occupied Greenland to block German expansion. In 1946, Washington made an offer to buy the island. During the Cold War, Greenland became home to Thule Air Base—now Pituffik Space Base—a linchpin of the nuclear early-warning system.

According to Buchanan, Danish leaders have long bristled at Washington’s ambitions. In the 1940s, King Christian of Denmark resisted overtures from president Franklin Roosevelt, writing heartfelt letters asserting Greenland’s sovereignty, even as his own country was under Nazi occupation. But regardless, U.S. influence grew, leading to clandestine nuclear storage and missile experiments, such as the now-notorious Camp Century project buried beneath the ice.

‘Cold and empty gives you a very good view of space,’ Buchanan says. With little thermal interference from human activity, Greenland offers unmatched clarity for space-based sensors.

But its value extends far beyond defence. The seabed around Greenland holds oil, gas and critical minerals, while its waters sustain rich fisheries. As climate change opens new Arctic shipping routes, Greenland sits at a strategic choke point—the Greenland–Iceland–Britain gap—vital for monitoring Russian submarines and potentially influencing the flow of global trade.

Buchanan says that the number of countries investing in Arctic shipping routes is increasing. Countries, including China and South Korea, are looking to exploit shorter northern sea lanes that could cut shipping times between Asia and Europe by up to 40 percent. Beijing has invested in Russian ports and transshipment hubs along the Northern Sea Route and is building its own nuclear-powered icebreakers.

‘If you start reorientating global shipping through the north, that takes pressure off the Malacca Strait and South China Sea,’ Buchanan warns. ‘It makes Australia a pricey market to resupply’ and undermines economies such as Singapore that rely on shipping.

Buchanan says that Beijing’s interest in Greenland is primarily focused on infrastructure, including bids to build airports. But she finds scientific and educational partnerships, such as the polar research initiative hosted at China’s Yellow River Station in Svalbard, far more concerning.

It is little wonder that the U.S., under any president, would be interested in the strategic value of the island and in which countries—particularly strategic adversaries—may be seeking and gaining influence. More countries, including those in the Indo-Pacific and particularly those with Antarctic interests such as Australia, should take such an interest.

For Copenhagen, Greenland is both an asset and a burden. Its control of the island grants Denmark Arctic nation status and a seat at the table in polar affairs. But it also comes with a complicated colonial past.

On the future of Greenland, polls show overwhelming opposition to becoming part of the U.S., but also strong support for independence from Denmark. Yet independence remains elusive. The 2009 Self-Government Act commits to eventual statehood but requires Danish parliamentary approval.

‘Why would Denmark sever Greenland? It’s like taking off your healthy leg,’ Buchanan says. ‘It gives you vast resources in the Arctic. It’s a bounty gold mine. It makes you a relevant Arctic player.’

With Washington pressing its NATO allies to boost spending, and as China and Russia deepen cooperation in the Arctic, Greenland’s status is no longer peripheral. It is now key to the reshaping of global trade, security and strategic competition.

As Buchanan concludes: ‘You can’t change geography. Greenland is a North American island, not a European one’ and ‘destiny for the Greenlandic people has always been independence, it’s just a matter of how they get there’.

Olivia Nelson is chief of staff and David Wroe is a resident senior fellow at ASPI.

This article appeared originally at The Strategist (ASPI).