Russia: Doubling Down in Ukraine – and Against the West
Last updated 01:00 PM EDT • Read time: 5m
Peace talks continue in name only, as Moscow counts on exhaustion to secure gains it cannot win on the battlefield.
Hopes turned out misplaced that Kyiv’s long-range drone attacks on Russian energy and other infrastructure over the summer heralded a turning of the tide in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As winter approaches, Ukraine finds itself under relentless, widespread and damaging Russian missile and drone assaults.
Russia’s strategy seems clear: sustain maximum battlefield pressure on Ukraine; intensify aerial onslaughts against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure; step up hybrid attacks on Kyiv’s European allies; all the while engaging performatively in US efforts to secure a negotiated settlement to end the war.
Russia has been unable so far to seize the key “fortress” cities of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk and Kostyantynivka. This war of attrition, with the battlefield dominated by drones, has offered Moscow little scope for dramatic advances (although an innovative Ukrainian counter-offensive (Opens in new window) has recently made targeted gains).
Russia continues to sustain heavy casualties, requiring it to recruit at least 30,000 new troops monthly. This has been getting harder via voluntary recruitment, prompting speculation (Opens in new window) that Moscow might engage in a creeping mobilisation – something the Kremlin would prefer to avoid for political and economic reasons. However, Ukraine too is suffering substantial losses (Opens in new window), and faces a growing deficit in personnel and munitions, relative to its much larger adversary.
Vladimir Putin still thinks time is on Russia’s side – and that it can outlast both Kyiv and its European supporters.
Ukraine’s efforts to counter these attacks have been hampered by insufficient air defences – especially Patriot systems. As colder winter conditions set in over coming months, Russia will intensify its missile and drone attacks, seeking to destroy key energy and logistic infrastructure. Moscow wants to undermine civilian morale by making life intolerable, especially in Kyiv, thereby bringing the city to its knees.
Ukraine faces other problems, too. The economy is floundering (Opens in new window), with its vital but besieged steel industry at a standstill, and grain exports cut off through Black Sea ports. Kyiv is also running out of money, and has sought an advance on EU (Opens in new window) and IMF (Opens in new window) funding for 2027.
Signs are growing of disunity within the Ukrainian political elite, not helped by missteps (Opens in new window) from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Moscow will doubtless seek to foment such dissension, seeking to distract and undermine Kyiv’s war effort.
Further afield, Russia will step up efforts to influence opinion and weaken support for Ukraine in Europe – as European leaders have warned recently.
This may include social media manipulation, political interference, cyber-attacks, and sabotage. Such “grey-zone” malign actions are calibrated not to provoke a collective response under NATO’s Article V but aim to unsettle public opinion and discourage European support (military, economic and political) for Ukraine.
So far, European support has held firm. But the rise of populist parties on the right and left, challenging traditional centrist governments, especially in France and Germany, suggests European support may come under greater pressure next year.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy meeting with troops in Kupyansk in December (President of Ukraine/Flickr)
Meanwhile, Russia will doubtless affect a continuing interest in US efforts to negotiate an end to the fighting in Ukraine. But, unless such a settlement meets Moscow’s key interests and objectives, its engagement will be essentially performative.
Moscow will aim to keep the Trump administration on side, while driving a wedge between Washington and its European allies. Moscow is reportedly offering Washington bilateral commercial advantages, presumably to persuade it to pressure Kyiv into accepting a deal.
But there’s no real sign that Moscow is seriously interested yet in ending the fighting.
Grumbling in the Russian elite and wider population about tiring of the war is hardly surprising. Economic strains from the burden of war are growing. But in Russia, public opinion can be managed (and if necessary, dissent repressed), while the economic problems are not of an order to constrain Putin’s determination to continue the fighting until the Kremlin’s objectives are achieved.
Nor does Moscow consider itself isolated in the world. In recent weeks, Putin has engaged with its BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation partners, including China and India, while also portraying itself as a leader of the “Global Majority”, contesting Western domination of traditional multilateral institutions.
Recent statements by Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indicate that Moscow remains committed to achieving its core objectives – control over all of Donbas, pliant government in Kyiv, and Ukrainian neutrality – such as would draw Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence.
And it’s not just Ukraine.
In his speech last week to the Valdai Discussion Club, Putin reiterated that Moscow considered the Ukraine war a proxy conflict, with Kyiv merely a puppet acting at the behest of Western governments intent on undermining Russia.
Reflecting that Russia sees itself pitched in long-term confrontation with the West, Moscow’s 2027 budget projects a 27% rise in defence spending. The cost will be borne by reduced spending on health and education, and a rising budget deficit.
The Kremlin, then, remains determined to achieve its goals in Ukraine, while pursuing its wider ambition to build Russia’s military capabilities to bolster Russia’s standing and influence in the emerging multipolar world.
Ian Hill is a retired senior career diplomat in the New Zealand foreign ministry.
This article appeared originally at Lowy Institute's the inerpreter.