Russian Doctrine Designs Fire-Strike Complex Its Own Army Is Assembling by Hand

Executive Summary:

The connective tissue is named, not notional. The decision-support and automated-command systems meant to bind the complex together Sprut-S, LIS, Repei, Groza are real tactical-echelon programs, and the canonical kill chain is concrete: a drone detects, a neural-network processing module classifies, a cartographic tactical-situation messenger hands off the target, and a loitering munition closes on it. The promised payoff is a matrix battle space in which overlapping zones of cover and engagement fuse into a single management cycle, shortening the detect-to-strike loop toward real time while cutting the weight and cost of each launch. The same logic is meant to scale upward. The complex is arrayed not as one flat web but as nested echelons of elementary modules at the squad-to-company level, then platform and weapons complexes, then formation-level networks whose collective task is to strip the enemy’s battle order of its freedom of maneuver. Effectiveness is given a metric to match. The count of enemy objects uncovered and the designations and fire corrections passed, measured against expended resources. It is, in short, an attempt to write the Ukrainian drone war back into General Staff doctrine and to do it in the vocabulary of Silicon Valley.

Figure 1. Conceptual Diagram of the Fire Engagement Complex

What the FEC envisions from the top is already being improvised from the bottom, across frontline practice from September 2025 through May 2026 (Obobshchenie boevogo opyta SVO, 4th notebook, May 2026). The same kill chain is there but built by hand, out of mismatched parts, under conditions the doctrine mostly elides.

Its most efficient form is the fiber-optic first-person-view (FPV) drone, immune to the electronic warfare (EW) that saturates the front. The high-resolution feed lets operators select the weak point on each hull. In one episode on the Kursk axis, fiber-guided drones destroyed forty-two enemy armored vehicles in two and a half hours. Around it, the troops have assembled a repeatable sensor-shooter routine for hunting enemy drone crews. Radio-technical reconnaissance fixes the approximate location, a Mavik-class quadcopter confirms the exact spot, and an FPV drone delivers the strike, with a near-miss of five meters enough to disable the crew’s control electronics with fragments. In practice, the rule is sharper still: kill the control or video antenna the instant you find it, then watch for the repair party, because the crew rarely moves by day and the antenna is what gives its position away. Target handoff, meanwhile, has migrated almost entirely off terrain reference points and onto planned targets marked on electronic maps “working by the palette,” in the field idiom the bottom-up realization of the very cartographic-messenger handoff the complex envisions, arrived at without it.

The counter-drone side has produced its own hand-built complex that mirrors the KOP’s logic point for point. Mobile fire groups operate from pre-designated duty points and move to pre-planned firing points only after a radar warning of an approaching enemy drone is passed down from the unit command post along set routes; for each firing point the crews prepare a fire card with reference points, safe firing angles, and coded designations, so that engagement is a matter of executing a rehearsed script rather than improvising. Air-defense posts spend most of their time under cover and emerge on command for engagements lasting on the order of twenty seconds: three or four riflemen to a drone, ten meters apart in the forward trenches, firing tracer in aimed bursts—then withdraw. Detection itself has been reduced to procedure: observers cycle their active hearing protection on and off in roughly eight- and five-second intervals because the amplified headsets destroy any sense of bearing to the sound. This is reconnaissance, cueing, and fires integrated in the small radar-to-command-post-to-fire-team chain to a coded firing point assembled not from Sprut-S and a trusted VPN but from a man with a radar set and a laminated card.

The reconnaissance side of this hand-built complex is just as procedural. To locate enemy FPV operators, intercept posts fitted with directional patch antennas watch the adversary’s analog video feed and log the chain of landmarks crossing the camera road junctions, chimneys, and distinctive buildings, along with the intervals between them and the flight’s total duration, reconstructing the launch point and range from the geometry. It is targeted by triangulation and stopwatch. The human analog of the neural-network module the doctrine would have done the work, accurate enough to cue the fiber-optic drone that the network was supposed to network and cannot.

The deeper change is structural, and it runs ahead of the doctrine rather than behind it. Defense has transformed from a chain of strongpoints into a chain of observation posts. Forward positions are held lightly, wired with command-detonated mines, and abandoned on contact to draw pursuers into flanking fire, because the transparent, drone-saturated battlefield makes any fixed, occupied position a target. Offense has likewise dissolved into eight-to-ten-minute vehicle “rushes” of five to nine kilometers (3.1–5.6 miles) between tree lines; motorcycles are preferred to buggies precisely because a single rider is a poorer target than a group, timed so the enemy cannot react inside the window. Teaching pure infantry tactics is now reckoned practically useless, ranked below shooting at drones, counter-drone EW, movement under drone control, and battlefield transport in training priority. The FEC describes a complex of platforms; the front has already rewritten an entire tactical grammar around the sensor-strike cycle the complex is meant to serve.

Set side by side, the designed complex and the assembled one part company precisely at the contours the doctrine treats as solved. The fiber-optic drone, the single most lethal element of the real kill chain, cannot be networked at all. It cannot fly over rivers, because the current drags and snaps the cable. Its practical reach is on the order of fifteen kilometers, and to free-hunt it  a second reconnaissance drone is required to cue it onto the target. That is the opposite of an open-architecture mesh. A two-drone manual relay run by line of sight and voice. Airborne radio relays, used to extend range, carry a disqualifying flaw of their own. The operator cannot see the strength of the control signal reaching the relayed drone, only the reception at the relay itself, so a drone walking into a jamming envelope is simply lost without warning (Obobshchenie boevogo opyta SVO, 2nd notebook, 2025). The mesh topology meant to be the FEC backbone is, in the field, the layer most likely to fail silently under the very electronic-warfare conditions invoked to justify it.

Figure 2. Operational Employment Scheme of the Fire Engagement Complex Based on Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and Loitering Munitions

The navigation and connectivity contours fare no better against ground truth. The most consequential connectivity lesson is retrospective. After the Starlink satellite-internet service ceased functioning for Russian users, frontline communications degraded sharply, video transmission became especially difficult, and units fell back on chains of point-to-point radio bridges with markedly reduced throughput and Starlink terminals could not be located by the direction-finding equipment available to forward units (Kommersant, February 5). The adversary fielded the resilient, low-probability-of-intercept space layer. On positioning, field practice is not the AKNS beacon field but its low-technology shadow: GPS receivers used in receive-only mode for orientation, GPS modules desoldered from equipment to deny emissions, Wi-Fi routers strung through tunnel trenches in place of radio. GNSS denial is now a permanent condition of the front, and EW is its dominant feature. The AKNS is a serious engineering answer to it. No such navigation field, however, has been deployed at scale, and troops are solving the problem by going analog, not by going integrated.

The decisive objection to the FEC is not technical. By its own internal reckoning, the Russian army is institutionally incapable of the exact fusion the complex assumes: making the whole exceed the sum of its parts. Regiments and even separate battalions fight many small wars simultaneously on the same ground, with limited interaction between adjacent formations and with higher headquarters reduced largely to administration. The proximate cause is an incentive structure that taxes integration. For a commander, reaching beyond his unit’s apparatus boundaries means extra coordination, extra reporting, and liability exposure, so he avoids it. The workaround the troops have devised is itself diagnostic: lateral cooperation runs on an informal network of reciprocal favors between units whose help might later be needed, integration purchased privately, soldier to soldier, precisely because the institution will not supply it. A second, more corrosive pathology follows by explicit analogy to Robert McNamara’s Vietnam-era metrics and the body-count distortions of the Afghan counterinsurgency. A Russian “working for the report” that turns measurable outputs into the object rather than the means, with the failure mode arriving in the concrete: a mortar battery commander reporting fire that was never delivered, and a non-existent tank invented to satisfy the reporting chain. A kill web is only as good as the data moving through it. A culture that fabricates detections and damage assessments poisons the neural-network module and the cartographic messenger alike, and no mesh corrects a sensor contour that lies.

Even where the human parts are honest, they fray. Assault groups rehearse a planned sequence on ranges and achieve coordination there, only to see it fall apart on the real objective because of accumulated stress and fatigue, judged remediable only by rotation off the line at least weekly rather than the actual cadence of a few days a month. The seamless, real-time fusion the FEC assumes is being asked of men who cannot reliably reproduce a rehearsed drill while being hunted.

The choice of foil becomes self-incriminating. Naming Palantir and Anduril as both model and menace concedes that the gap being closed is one of software and integration (Izborskiy Klub, April 28, 2025). The evidence points the other way. Improvised artificial intelligence (AI) is already in Russian hands. Tank gunners used an AI tool to build extended firing tables out to fifteen kilometers (9.3 miles), and captured enemy footage of laser-designation and colored-contour target marking left observers unsure whether they were seeing a physical laser or a virtual overlay generated by automation. The components are arriving from the bottom. The connective tissue is missing, and the same army that cannot get adjacent battalions to share a fire mission is unlikely to be redeemed by a trusted VPN.

For Ukrainian and allied planners, three judgments follow, each falsifiable. First, treat the KOP as a statement of aspiration and a candid threat assessment, not as evidence of fielded capability. The high-confidence near-term reality is the improvised, EW-vulnerable, river-stoppable kill chain now operating at the tactical edge. Second, indicators of genuine progress are organizational and observable. Meaningful proliferation of the named decision-support systems below brigade level, the appearance of AKNS local-navigation fields along the line of contact, and, hardest, a measurable decline in the report-gaming and unit stovepiping that currently define the force. Absent movement on the third, the first two will under-deliver, and the probability that Russia fields anything resembling the full FEC at operational scale within the next twelve to eighteen months should be assessed as low. Third, the asymmetry presently runs the other way. The relay-mothership architecture dropping FPV swarms into the Russian rear, and the Starlink connectivity edge, register on Russia’s own account as enemy capabilities. The KOP is, in the end, a mirror held up to a Ukrainian way of war that the Russian General Staff has decided it must imitate, and the most useful signal for Kyiv is which of its own advantages Moscow has identified as decisive and intends to copy.

Hlib Parfonov is an analyst with The Jamestown Foundation. Since 2020, he has headed security policy at the Doctrine Center for Political Studies in Kyiv. He specializes in geospatial intelligence, open-source intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), including electronic support measures (ESM), and electronic warfare. He serves in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and is a combat veteran.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.