Russia-Ukraine: Has the Tide Really Turned?

Enjoying numerical superiority in manpower and materiel, Russia was making slow, albeit costly, progress on the battlefield in eastern Ukraine. Russia was also pummelling Kyiv with missiles and drones while inflicting enormous damage on Ukraine’s energy and military infrastructure. Meanwhile, the United States had largely curtailed financial and military assistance for Ukraine. U.S. proposals to end the fighting mainly reflected Russia’s interests and objectives, with President Trump famously telling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that he was in a weak position with no cards to play.

Over recent months, the war appears to have turned a corner.

Russian battlefield progress has largely stalled; its costly assaults are not yielding significant territorial gains. And despite substantial financial incentives, Russia is finding it harder to recruit new personnel (especially specialists) to make good its huge casualties, estimated at more than 30,000 a month.

All this has boosted Kyiv’s confidence and brought a more muscular tone to Ukraine’s diplomacy - including taunting Putin. Warnings by Zelenskyy to Belarus against becoming actively involved in the war are hitting home, eliciting a meek response from Minsk.

With the brake hitherto applied by former Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán now removed, substantial EU financial assistance is flowing, easing budgetary pressure on Kyiv (although the deepening spat between Warsaw and Kyiv over historical grievances is a worrying development).

Meanwhile, Russia’s economy is under pressure. Inflation is rising, as is deficit spending. With the war economy demanding enormous financial and labour resources, the non-military economy is in trouble. Growth slipped into reverse in the first half of this year. Higher oil and gas revenues arising from the Iran war helped, but less than expected, and Ukrainian attacks have curbed oil refining and export capacity. Putin has admitted that Ukraine’s strikes on Russia’s oil infrastructure are causing difficulties. 

Russian-occupied Crimea is increasingly isolated, its main supply routes vulnerable to Ukrainian attacks, while fuel is being rationed. This is symbolically embarrassing for the Kremlin, turning what was a strategic prize into a logistical liability. It also diminishes Crimea’s value as a base for military operations.

In these circumstances, could the Kremlin be forced to reappraise how it can achieve its political objectives?

One option is escalation through the wider mobilization of reservists. That might bring some military gains at the front but is fraught with domestic political and economic risks, which is why the Kremlin has avoided it so far.

Alternatively, Russia could simply persist with its current failing approach, seeking to grind Ukraine down (and weaken Western resolve) through attrition.

But might Moscow instead now be pressed to accept a ceasefire? This is clearly the goal of Zelenskyy’s campaign of unremitting missile and drone attacks on Russian infrastructure.

But this seems speculative and premature: there’s no evidence that Russia is even interested in a ceasefire. Certainly, Moscow would only accept one that locks in its gains and enables Moscow to pursue an eventual final settlement on Russia’s terms. Settling for anything else would expose the paucity of what Russia’s costly four-year war has achieved so far.

Indeed, a ceasefire would carry significant risks for Kyiv. Russia would use the opportunity to rebuild its military strength and step up political subversion in Ukraine. Politicking would resume in Ukraine, jeopardizing national cohesion and distracting the government from the Russian threat. And it might lead to a slackening in Western support for Ukraine.

So, it's important not to exaggerate the extent to which Ukraine’s fortunes have changed.

Ukraine’s battlefield position remains fragile. Its troops are outnumbered and tired, desertion levels remain high, logistical supply lines vulnerable to Russian drone attacks, and its air defences (starved of Patriot missile stocks) are depleted.

While the Russian economy is straining, it is not about to collapse. China continues to provide a lifeline as an energy and commodities market and source of key industrial goods and technology. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s repressive grip on Russian society (evident from tightening internet controls) makes any regime-threatening unrest improbable.

Putin still seems to think time is on Moscow’s side.

And Moscow’s objectives are unchanged: Putin remains intent on subjugating Ukraine completely. Russia wants full control of the Donbas and southern Ukraine (what he, using the old Tsarist phrase, calls Novorossiya), a friendly government in Kyiv, a cap on Ukrainian armed forces and Ukrainian neutrality.

Essentially, the Kremlin wants Ukraine back in Russia’s sphere of influence, providing the strategic depth that Moscow believes it needs for its security against putative Western threats.

Despite U.S. support for a strong G7 summit statement pledging support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, the Kremlin may not have given up hope that the Trump administration will press Kyiv to accept a settlement effectively meeting Moscow’s interests. Russia expects that Washington’s diplomatic tag team of Witkoff and Kushner will be back in Moscow as soon as their Iran preoccupations permit.

But with Russia showing no willingness to compromise, combined with a more confident Ukraine even less likely to buckle to pressure and settle for an unacceptable deal, there’s no sign the war is about to end.

Ian Hill is a retired senior career diplomat in the New Zealand foreign ministry.

image: A second Ukrainian attack on Gazprom Neft's Moscow oil refinery on the night of 17-18 June has damaged oil processing units and sparked multiple fires. (via Social Media).

This article appeared originally at Lowy Institute's the interpreter.