
A 99-1 Problem: Can DoD Protect the Warfighter on a Nuclear Battlefield?
Last updated 10:52 PM EST • Read time: 7m
A 99-1 Problem: Can DoD Protect the Warfighter on a Nuclear Battlefield?
The threat of a future nuclear battlefield has probably never been greater in world history.
Today, there are nine nuclear weapon states, three of which are U.S. adversaries. Of these, Russia is currently engaged in an unlawful war of aggression where the possibility of nuclear weapon use has been intimated multiple times. Another, Iran—the biggest driver of destabilization in the Middle East—unleashed hundreds of ballistic missiles against a sovereign nation with no direct kinetic or diplomatic response from the U.S. nor the world community. Further, Iran continues unchecked with the development of a nuclear weapon capability. Lastly, China maintains broad, unrestrained expansion of its nuclear weapon program while also antagonizing each of its regional neighbors save for communist North Korea.
What does this mean for the men and women of the U.S. Military? Simple: the possibility that a nuclear weapon will be deployed against our forces around the world is higher today than in recent memory. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense (DoD) is not doing nearly enough to ensure the American warfighter is able to fight, survive, and win on a nuclear battlefield. The Trump Administration can fix this.
In recent years, much has been said about the Department’s need to modernize and update the capabilities of America’s nuclear weapon enterprise. All true. As Russia invests in nuclear modernization and China unapologetically increases the numbers and capabilities of its warheads, so too must America modernize. Indeed, the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies highlight these priorities and the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review acknowledges the need for an effective nuclear deterrent. Further, the FY25 Defense Budget amplifies this necessity by prioritizing, among other areas, Nuclear Enterprise Modernization and missile defense of the homeland. These investments must continue and increase. However, this is not enough.
While the U.S. is correctly increasing resources to modernize the traditional nuclear triad, we are leaving behind the research, development, and procurement of sufficient radiological and nuclear (RN) medical defense. This lack of investment is recognized inside the Pentagon, but these concerns have not garnered proportionate attention in the budget and policy offices. This oversight needs immediate rectification, or we risk deploying warfighters woefully unprepared in a future nuclear conflict.
Broadly speaking, the Department funds medical countermeasures and personnel protection in the following areas: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN). According to the Department’s FY25 Budget submission, the U.S. military will invest nearly $1.7 billion researching, developing, testing, and procuring defensive capabilities to detect, mitigate, counter, and respond to chemical and biological (CB) threats. Investing significant resources in countering CB threats is necessary and proper, and I applaud attention to these areas.
However, the Department requested a paltry $14 million for RN defense and, regrettably, these funds are restricted to non-medical detection capabilities. It is important to note that the U.S. Government, broadly, has invested in RN medical defense. The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority has funded the development of multiple Food and Drug Administration approvals or licensures of therapeutics for thermal burns. These are extremely important and would be valuable for approval, through modification, for the warfighter. And while the Department’s investment in detectors and dosimeters should be lauded the lack of investment for medical response should be questioned. We know all these threats are serious, but a 99:1 ratio in spending makes little sense. DoD has the opportunity and responsibility to show leadership on this issue.
In fact, both Trump and Biden Administration strategy documents have designated China as America’s preeminent challenge, with Russia a close second. Further, senior national security officials have repeatedly warned about the growing Chinese nuclear arsenal and the potential use of nuclear weapons by Putin in Ukraine. In response, the Department has invested in missile defense and nuclear weapon modernization. But why not improve RN medical defense capabilities for our warfighters?
Post WWII Cold War competition, combined with arms control regimes and broad counterproliferation efforts from the 1980s through the 2010s, succeeded in both reducing nuclear stockpiles and limiting testing and deployment of strategic weapons. In turn, policymakers began to believe that the threat of nuclear weapons was diminished. This may have been a reasonable assessment at the time, but no longer.
While the U.S. is rightly modernizing all legs of the nuclear triad and missile defense systems, the Department and Congress must act to ensure American men and women are equipped to fight and win on a future nuclear battlefield.
First, the Department must immediately commence a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) “All-Hazards Assessment” to fully understand current and future threats across the CBRN spectrum. This assessment should focus on the capabilities of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea with a lesser emphasis on non-state actors. (Given the Department’s 2023 Biodefense Posture Review and its regular review of such threats across the United States Government, another in depth biological threat assessment would be unnecessarily duplicative.) This assessment must identify resourcing recommendations across all CBRN threats rather than just chemical and biological. The lion’s share of the review and analytical rigor should focus on radiological and nuclear threats. If the Department does not initiate this review, then Congress should insert a requirement during the current conference negotiations of the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act so that it can be completed prior to the FY26 budget and legislative process.
Second, the Secretary should name the U.S. Navy in coordination with the U.S. Marine Corps as the Executive Agent for RN defense. While federal law names the U.S. Army as the Executive Agent for chemical and biological warfare and medical defense, there is no service directly responsible for radiological and nuclear medical defense. The way the Department works, capabilities need a Service to take responsibility. There are numerous organizations within the Department that work to combat RN warfare’s impacts. However, with no service component specifically responsible for planning, managing, and executing the development and procurement of these capabilities, the wellbeing of our warfighters remains imperiled.
Third, Congress should amend Chapter 32 of Tile 50 in the U.S. Code to rename it the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Warfare Defense Program (CBRN Warfare Defense Program). Further, Section 1522 should be amended to “Conduct of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense program.” The requirements, management, oversight, and funding responsibilities of the program can put these threats on equal footing commensurate with the analysis coming from the aforementioned CBRN “All-Hazards Assessment”.
Fourth, and most importantly, funding levels should be immediately altered in the FY25 National Defense Authorization and Defense Appropriations bills. A 99 to 1 spending ratio is unacceptable. I encourage Congress to self-correct President Biden’s FY25 budget submission to spending levels that more accurately reflect the global CBRN threat environment and the future battlefield that our warfighters might face.
The growing radiological and nuclear threat environment poses great risk in our ability to fight, survive, and win on the future battlefield. Together, President Trump’s Pentagon and Congress can assess the global CBRN threat faced by our military, establish legal authorities and proper oversight, and fund warfighter defenses at the appropriate level. But it must start now.
David F. Lasseter is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering WMD in the Trump Administration, visiting fellow at the National Security Institute, and Founder of Horizons Global Solutions.
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