Is Man or Machine the Greater Nuclear Danger?

The atomic era is now 80 years old but there is still an unresolved fundamental debate about its greatest danger: is it man or machine? Is the main problem the nuclear weapons themselves or those who control them? The answer will drive America’s approach to both deterrence and risk reduction.

Some who believe nuclear weapons are the primary danger point to growing political tensions as states grow their arsenals, plus the history of false alarms, accidents, and other operational failures. Fewer nuclear weapons, in their view, should lead to fewer nuclear dangers.

Others believe that nuclear weapons are tools used by political leaders – whether for good or for ill depends on who wields them. The United Kingdom, for instance, owns more nuclear weapons than North Korea, yet most of the world is concerned about aggression from Pyongyang, not London. For proponents of this view, an inadequate U.S. nuclear arsenal would in fact heighten nuclear dangers. Revisionist autocracies like China and Russia may see their nuclear advantages as useful coercive tools for expansion.

History demonstrates that nuclear weapons are uniquely dangerous, but their total number provides no indication of the level of nuclear danger. Today, for instance, total stockpile levels in the world have not been this low since the 1950s, down about 80% since the height of the Cold War. And yet, nobody would say nuclear dangers are down by 80%. 

Indeed, the number of nuclear weapons is not even strongly correlated with the number of accidents or crises involving such weapons. The number of nuclear accidents and crises varied from year to year during the Cold War based more on handling procedures and political considerations respectively than on overall stockpile levels.

What does this mean for U.S. policy? If nuclear dangers and nuclear numbers are not strongly linked, then the United States can safely ignore those who say it is dangerous to build more nuclear weapons beyond the replacement-level already planned. Critics will cry that the United States will be starting an “arms race,” ignoring of course that China and Russia began racing years ago. But even granting their claim, the one thing worse than an arms race is allowing revisionist dictatorships to believe they can exploit their nuclear advantages at the expense of the United States and its allies.

Indeed, Russia harbors no inhibition about brandishing nuclear threats to unwind democratic support for Ukraine. And China, too, is shielding its long-running revisionist campaign in Asia with a massive nuclear buildup. For revisionist autocracies, nuclear weapons are more than a deterrent. They are tools to carve up vulnerable countries and cow Western democracies.

In an era of greater budget constraints, it can be tempting to buy the line that fewer nuclear weapons means less danger. Ronald Reagan, who signed the world’s first nuclear arms-reduction treaty as president, nevertheless understood that who owned the weapons was far more important than just how many there were. Speaking of those in the peace movement who wanted the United States to unilaterally cut its arsenal, he stated, “They would wage peace by weakening the free. And that just doesn't make sense.”

The Gipper’s logic is as relevant today as ever. The problem isn’t nuclear weapons – it’s who wields them.

The Trump administration should engage in energetic public diplomacy to expose just how autocratic behavior differs from that of America’s – and why a robust U.S. nuclear posture mitigates danger by strengthening deterrence.

Peace through strength will depend on nothing less.

Matthew R. Costlow is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy. Kyle Balzer is a Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.