The Air Superiority Challenge

April 15^th, 1953, just an ordinary day in most places, but on this frigid spring day on the Korean peninsula, an all-too-familiar event was taking place. To the best of U.S. Air Force memory and research, on this day, a small contingent of American ground troops came under attack from a propeller-driven enemy aircraft, and by most accounts, two U.S. Army members made the ultimate sacrifice. That day was a sad day.

This standard has sunk in so far that in the lead up to Vietnam, U.S. combat aircraft that relied on air superiority versus U.S. combat aircraft that could provide dedicated air superiority was roughly about 3:1. Fast-forward to 2017 and that ratio is now 7:1! That’s right, for every single U.S. combat aircraft capable of providing dedicated air superiority, there are now seven relying on that particular freedom of movement within the battlespace. And this does not include potentially thousands of smaller unmanned systems!

First, if such a large percentage of operations depend on air superiority, investments toward maintaining continued air superiority are paramount. Additionally, the more systems procured, the more surety must be exercised regarding those that provide. In summary, the Combat Air Forces of the US and its Allies could easily paint themselves into a corner if they “un-balance” their forces too much. Therefore, we (as the U.S. JCA) do not need less or near-peer capable air superiority aircraft - we need more capable systems. Penetrating Counter-Air (PCA) along with a mix of supporting/supported systems is not an option – It is a burgeoning requirement! In short, whether it be aircraft or a system-of-systems the JCS community must studiously acquire, properly procure, and rigorously test/evaluate evolutionary and revolutionary systems that can provide another 70+ years of this critically essential aspect of warfighting. 

Second, the JCA realm must assess current vulnerabilities through specific lenses.

For example, many shipping companies rely solely on GPS for safety, effectiveness, and efficiencies. What if for one day the GPS constellation was inoperable? If there are no real “backup” systems, then Condition “A” is relevant. If, however, there is an adequate backup system(s) within operations, then Condition “B” is invoked. In a shipping company, with suitable alternatives, the tough leadership issue is when and how to upgrade or protect systems for future success. Should one buy more reliable GPS receivers or possibly an enhanced communications suite to increase readiness for inevitable degradations or failures? This simple example has direct parallels to the future of air superiority.

Whether in air, space, or cyberspace, dependency (or the levels thereof) must be taken into account to guide future foci of science & technology, research & development, not to mention acquisition & procurement. In the JCA built system, Condition “A” is where we are living, especially in regards to air superiority. Therefore, if Condition A grows, so does the need for MORE, not less, air superiority ensuring capabilities, platforms, and systems.

Finally, JCA leadership must ascertain which domain(s) are essential to future warfighting capabilities. For instance, if the JCA is relying predominantly on some “network-enabled” weapon or weapon system, then the “network” might very well be the domain of dependency. If “all-aspect stealth” is the answer for future warfare, that drives a different focus. In all of these avenues, the enemy gets a vote.

So one might wonder, “why this article” or “why now”? Well, the bottom line is this - The USAF F-22 is the last aircraft the US has designed and built to provide air superiority. It finished over two decades of development and testing (beginning in 1981) to become IOC in 2005. Meaning that if we begin now, in earnest, toward creating the next generation air superiority capability and it takes a similar amount of time, then IOC/fielding would be about 2040. While the F-35 is a great airplane, it is not designed specifically for, nor as capable in, the air superiority realm. Not to be trite, but a lot of air superiority and “first look-first shot-first kill” is a compilation of physics equations, and in this, the F-22 wins hands-down. Therefore, the friendly Combat Air Forces (CAF) must grasp a simple, yet profound, fact.

Decades of dominance in a realm creates inherent and iterative assumptions over time that may be detrimental to future operations.

In short, like freedom, it’s tough to maintain, but even harder to regain. Thus, America’s full effort will be required across the services (JCA) to preserve tactical and operational advantages that in turn come to fruition in strategic ways. In addition to Air Forces, the US Joint team is also becoming increasingly dependent on this same single common denominator = Air Superiority. That’s another topic for another time.

"The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government."

Colonel Lance A. Wilkins entered the United States Air Force in 1994 as a distinguished military graduate of the United States Air Force Academy. He is a Command Pilot and Weapons Instructor with over 2,500 hours in several different aircraft including 1700 hours in the F-15. He has over 350 combat hours in the Middle East. His diverse background includes extensive experience in DoD programs of the highest classification as well as over 6 years of weapons evaluation and testing.