Is Russia's Information Warfare Campaign a Success?

Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked university and professional military education students to participate in our first annual writing contest by sending us their thoughts on strategy.

The latest evolution in warfare is a trend towards the blurring of the line between war and peace and the shift of conflict into the public domain. A key change in the evolution of warfare has been the role information plays in modern warfare.[1] The latest attempts to grapple with evolving dimensions of warfare have thrown up a large number of concepts used in the East and West to describe the tactics, strategies, and roles associated with the use of information. The variety in these terms in many ways reflects the complexity of a field that encompasses projections of national power, covert and overt activities, and defines nation state responses to state, intrastate, and non-state violence. It is an example of the changes in how nations comprehend and express their national security, as well as the utility and application of armed force in international affairs, not to mention the broader achievement of foreign policy outcomes.

In my Masters dissertation,[2] I presented analysis on Russian disinformation campaigns in Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, and the downing of MH17, which revealed an increase in the volume and sophistication of information operations in the public domain. I assessed a variety of strategies utilised by Russia to achieve an information advantage, highlighting communications on social media, official statements, and involving cyber-warfare as key to all three case studies.

Traditional warfare has long used information and technology to gain a competitive advantage over opponents. The shift is that more of these activities are now occurring in a place visible to the public –– online –– and are now being directed at civilians. This is being enabled and facilitated by the evolution of technology; notably increased digital connectivity, automation, and information security. The combination of what could be characterised as traditional information operations with the new technologies presents a significant challenge to governments, policy-makers, and defence personnel.

Russian operations blur the line between war and peace by using disinformation tactics in the public domain as a part of a broader military strategy in an approach enshrined in doctrine and geopolitical thinking. Disinformation has a long tradition in Russian warfare theory and is derived from spetspropaganda theory[3] but has evolved to include a range of activities and terms including active measures, dezinformatsia,[4] reflexive control,[5] and more recently, perception management. Igor Panarin is widely considered as one of the leading information warfare theorists within Russia. Disinformation, according to Panarin (2012), as translated and articulated by Darczewska,[6] is the “spreading [of] manipulated or fabricated information (or a combination thereof).”[7]

Russia is a particularly interesting and informative case study because it has a long history in the use of denial, deception, and information operations. These activities form a central pillar of Moscow’s approach to statecraft, influence, and conflict, and have been considered a staple of Russian operations since at least the Cold War.[9] Russia has been at the forefront of the field since then[10]and is arguably the most advanced nation in relation to information warfare, particularly disinformation.[11]

The Russian geopolitical doctrine as set out by Panarin “treats information as a dangerous weapon: it is cheap, it is universal, it has unlimited range, it is easily accessible and permeates all state borders without restrictions.”[12] Panarin categorises instruments used in information warfare into the following; (a) propaganda, which can be “black,” “grey,” and “white”; (b) intelligence or information gathering about the opponent; (c) the analytical component, which consists of media monitoring and current situation analysis; (d) the organisational component, which means coordination and steering channels, secret agents influencing media, which shapes the opinion of politicians, and mass media to take the shape desired by the state involved in information warfare; (e) other combined channels, including special operation forces which carry out different sabotage operations.[13]

Further, he defines (translated) terms used in information warfare technology for Russian purposes. In practice these are operations of influence, such as: social control, i.e. influencing society; social manoeuvring, i.e. intentional control of the public aimed at gaining certain benefits; information manipulation, i.e. using authentic information in a way that gives rise to false implications; disinformation, i.e. spreading manipulated or fabricated information or a combination thereof; the fabrication of information, i.e. creating false information, and lobbying, blackmail and extortion of desired information.[14]

Drawing on its long historical practice, Russia has adapted to using new technologies both conceptually and tactically.[15] Blank,[16] Nissen,[17] and Thomas[18] concur that Russian military experts have conceived of a single global information space emerging since the late 90s and that exploitation and dominance of that space would allow a country to alter the global balance of power. Additionally, Thomas[19] and Tatham[20] indicate that “no issue is more important or more fraught with uncertainty than the current and future information environment.”[21] Consistent with these assessments, Russian Chief of General Staff, Valeriy Gerasimov noted the increasingly significant role of ‘non-military measures’ in warfare, indicating that they occur in Russian Federation operations at a rate of 4:1 over military measures.[22] Further, Gerasimov noted that the rise in grey-zone activity and methods of provocation toward conflict have changed to involve the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military means.[23]Gerasimov noted “long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals.”[24] In the 21st century, “we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.”[25]

Central to these operations is the interface of information; from a warfare, intelligence perspective as well as the information released publicly to local and foreign communities. This is what Janis Berzins argues is the Russian view of modern warfare; one that is based on the idea that the main battlespace is in the mind. ‘Modern warfare’ is to be fought in the mind – and information is the principal tool in this fight, creating a version of reality that suits political and military purposes at all levels of warfare.[26] Berzins outlines key guidelines for Russian military capabilities by 2020, which focus on influence, cultural war, and a move to a permanent state of war that exists in human consciousness.[27] Similarly, Darczewska notes that most Russian authors understand ‘information warfare’ as influencing the consciousness of the masses, which has resulted in a merging of military and non-military as well as the cyber-space and social information space “to control information resources as ‘information weapons.’”[28]

The long-held Russian thinking outlined by Panarin, by the Gerasimov Doctrine, and by Berzins is consistent with the trends more recently identified by Western military theorists, academics, and the intelligence community about hybrid threats, grey-zone warfare, and information warfare.

From a Western perspective, exploitation of information, including disinformation, forms a part of the information warfare and broader (hybrid or otherwise) warfare strategy used; mostly by nation states. It uses information and communication technology in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent and is usually combined with other military activity and directed by military strategy. In other words, it uses the power of information and, increasingly, of public information –– to influence and achieve strategic results.

A key change in the evolution of warfare has been the role information plays in modern warfare.[29]Disinformation can form a part of an information warfare strategy used by defence and intelligence agencies, and is a key component of hybrid warfare.[30] It can also be used as a public information campaign by non-state entities. The purpose of disinformation is to undermine the quality of opposing force information and deny, deflect, or distract information-collection opportunities.[31]In contemporary Western scholarship on the topic of adversary threats, the evolution of the use of public information campaigns in warfare has given rise to notions of hybrid war and threats,[32]asymmetric war[33] and ‘non-linear’ warfare,[34] grey-zone warfare,[35] as well as a number of related (and competing) constructions to explain these phenomena.[36] The upshot is that a growing body of contemporary scholarship now addresses the next phase to incorporate the spectrum of warfare, hybrid, and ‘grey-zone’ thinking.

The variety in these terms in many ways reflects the complexity of a field that encompasses projections of national power, covert and overt activities, and defines nation state responses to state, intrastate, and non-state violence. It is an excellent example of the changes in how nations comprehend and express their national security, as well as the utility and application of armed force in international affairs, not to mention the broader achievement of foreign policy outcomes.

Grey-zone thinking is an evolving discussion about the space between peace and war, where the threshold for engaging an adversary is seen as too low, or the provocations occur covertly. Hoffman defines 'grey-zone' conflicts as those that include deliberate multidimensional activities by a state actor below the threshold of aggressive use of military force.[37] Hoffman further denotes a grey-zone conflict as one that includes integration of traditional state institutions (such as the military and diplomacy) and other sub-national instruments of power, proxy forces, and information warfare, in an ambitious war to gain an advantage without engaging in overt conflict and maintaining deniability.[38]

Hoffman highlights that "grey-zone conflicts are aimed at a gap in our intellectual preparation of the battle-space and a seam in how we think about conflict."[39] Nadia Schadlow defines this seam of thinking as the space between war and peace that is constantly churning with political, economic, and security competitions that constantly require attention.[40] It is called the ‘grey-zone’ because the adversary takes advantage of this ‘seam of thinking’ and a democratic requirement to identify actions, gain public and political support, and declare military action.[41] In other words, an adversary exploits uncertainty in our thresholds and an unwillingness to use force that does not appear proportionate.

The notion of a blurring between traditional rules of engagement and the spectrum of war and peace is exemplified in a speech by General Joe Votel, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, in September 2015; “increasingly, adversaries [are] selecting such strategies to stay within the grey-zone… broadcast[ing] their intentions as we see in China’s Three Warfares, and Russia’s Gerasimov Doctrine.”[42] It should be recognised then, that Russian objectives and actions (as well as those by other actors) are less likely to fall into such clear definitions or rules of engagement.

Kier Giles makes the crucial point that to-date, Western information operations distinguish clearly between war and peacetime rules of engagement.[43] Giles highlights the erosion of the distinction between war and peace and the emergence of a ‘grey-zone’ in Russian thinking.[44] This distinction is vital to understanding Russia’s key disinformation approaches to date, forming a part of a larger strategy to achieve military and socio-cultural dominance.[45] In contrast, Stephen Blank highlights the tactics and operations Russia sees as legitimate during peacetime;viruses and malware are important in order to compromise the information assets of the engineering systems of the enemy. Other aspects are accumulating (stealing) information on the enemy, by intelligence gathering, while developing and testing one’s own IW weapons (Blank 2014).

viruses and malware are important in order to compromise the information assets of the engineering systems of the enemy. Other aspects are accumulating (stealing) information on the enemy, by intelligence gathering, while developing and testing one’s own IW weapons (Blank 2014).

Michael Mazarr concurs that there is significant evidence that Moscow has “consciously undertaken grey-zone approaches” in relation to Ukraine.[46]

Russian operations blur the line between war and peace by using disinformation tactics in the public domain, as a part of a broader military strategy. In my Masters research, I presented research on Russian disinformation campaigns in Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, and the downing of MH17 which revealed an increase in the volume and sophistication of information operations in the public domain. I assessed a variety of strategies utilised by Russia to achieve an information advantage, highlighting communications on social media, through official statements, and involving cyber-warfare as key to all three case studies. Further, the analysis of timeliness, specificity, and accurate targeting in my research provides evidence to support that Russia’s actions were informed by militarised strategy and shows that Russian disinformation campaigns are a part of a broader and integrated military campaign –– consistent with Russian doctrine.

Since 2014, Russian information influence capability has progressed in sophistication[47] and escalated in deployment so rapidly that it now appears to be engaging in provocation towards opponents, predominantly NATO members and the US,[48] and is no longer defending previously stated and contradictory positions. These factors, combined with a Western belief that democracy is founded on truth and accuracy from officials,[49] make it difficult to counteract. Western countries have historically split information and cyber operations, whereas Russian thinking has included the systems as well as the information[50]–– which has afforded it a significant conceptual, and more recently, operational advantage.[51]

Kommersant Photo/Kommersant (Getty Images)

An example of this can be seen this in the now infamous ‘little green men’ occupying Ukrainian military and government buildings in 2014. Many of the local information campaigns occurred as a social media campaign (largely on VKontakte) referring to the soldiers as polite people and encouraging local support for their presence.[52] Meanwhile, Ukrainian television and radio was replaced by Russian broadcasting[53] after telecommunications facilities were attacked.[54]Concurrently, official statements were used to communicate to foreign audiences. Vladimir Putin initially denied the Green Men were Russian soldiers (March 2014)[55] suggesting they were patriotic Russian uniform purchasers.[56] He later conceded a small role by non-state, but Russian, actors (April 2014).[57] By late 2015 however, Putin admitted a significant role by Russian Special Forces.[58]

Interestingly, these acknowledgements occurred incrementally. The timeliness of disinformation acted as an enabler, supporting military objectives. Official statements about Russian involvement in U.S. election hacking follow a similar pattern of statements in relation to the annexation of Crimea. Putin’s recent statements that patriotic-hackers are like ‘out-of-bed–artists’[59] and uncontrolled by the state, appears similar to the incremental acknowledgements in relation to the ‘Little Green Men’ –– later admitted to be Russian state forces. Similar to the Crimea example, Russia initially remained strategically silent and then ignored requests for clarification. This has been followed by disinformation campaigns in relation to the election and now this acceptance that it may be Russian people but not the state. It’s possible that Putin is beginning the process of admitting the Russian state is behind 2016 non-military measures.

In 2015, the U.S. Ambassador to Germany, John B. Emerson, highlighted the challenge of countering Kremlin disinformation, saying; “this campaign of obfuscation has become all too familiar since the occupation of Crimea.”[60] Nimmo and Lucas argue that Russian disinformation does not aim to inform but to provoke doubt, disagreement, and ultimately, paralysis. In this context, it is calibrated to confuse, befuddle, and distract. They argued that modern Russia has weaponized information, turning the media into an arm of state power projection.[61] To use the words of Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss: “Since at least 2008, Kremlin military and intelligence thinkers have been talking about information not in the familiar terms of ‘persuasion,’ ‘public diplomacy,’ or even ‘propaganda,’ but in weaponized terms, as a tool to confuse, blackmail, demoralize, subvert, and paralyse.”[62]

Of great significance here is that this evolution of military thinking has occurred amid two key environmental changes. It has been set amidst a time of paradigm shift: an uncertain and ever changing geopolitical landscape, large-scale migration growth, and increased regional conflict and posturing combined with a globalised, and crucially, a constantly connected world.

Driving the ease and effectiveness of information operations are some key technology and social changes such as access to information, increased digital connectivity of devices, a very short news cycle driven by social media, cloud technology, and in particular, what I call ‘amplification and automation’.

Hamilton 68 | Tracking Russian Influence Operations on Twitter

Extrapolating from the definitions of hybrid warfare proffered by Hoffman and Kilcullen,[63] I argue that the world has continued to evolve, and technology continued its pace of change, and the role of information in society has shifted. The expeditious development of technology has dramatically changed the information environment and the role of information in society.[64] The reach, impact, volume, speed, and persistence of information now available[65] has therefore changed the way states, businesses, groups, and individuals communicate,[66] and the way they form and develop relationships.[67] It has and continues to redefine notions of national security, privacy, work, and recreation.[68] Rapid digitisation, increased connectivity and reliance on the internet, cyberspace, and electronic communications has changed the way we do business and exchange information; how we shop, bank, navigate and, importantly, how we trust.[69] There is no evidence that it will slow down, and these changes have resulted in a change in the role and value of information to government, military, and national security operations.

Automation is evolving rapidly in an attempt to harness this information explosion, wide-spread digital connectivity, and increasingly, big data analytics and machine learning (enabled by improvements in technology and infrastructure). Automation is increasing in the dissemination and curation of information we access and receive. Significantly for the grey-zone is the news and media aspect, but it also affects personal information, health records, and government data. In the not too distant future it will affect all digital information. Social media amplification is linked to automation. The speed at which information can be shared (by individuals or automated entities) can amplify the messages on social media and impact the perception of users. The implications of identifying military strategy and strategic intent from public information campaigns and specifically disinformation campaigns are significant now and likely to increase as enabling infrastructure and methods continue to evolve rapidly in volume, velocity, variety, and breadth in an epoch of heightened conflict and global insecurity.

Traditional warfare has long used information and technology to gain a competitive advantage over opponents. The shift is that more of these activities are now occurring in a place visible to the public –– online –– and is now being directed at civilians. A key implication for the future is about what Russia calls active or non-military measures –– in achieving foreign policy goals –– and military outcomes.  Russia claimed non-military measures occurred at rate of 4-to-1 in 2013.[70]

As the ever-growing volume of literature on this topic illustrates, we are currently observing the great value in sustained disinformation campaigns. The low cost and high effectiveness of these non-military measures combined with few counter-measures as well as strong drivers of change (such as automation) increasing their effectiveness, indicate their use will continue to increase. This has significant implications for policy makers, analysts, and defence personnel. It means that public legitimacy and support can change dramatically and very quickly. It creates a more volatile and polarised operating environment.

Also, we are looking at trends toward controlling information infrastructure (internet, television, media etc.) during war like conflict. But also, during pre-conflict –– such as prior to annexing Crimea. This means that protecting infrastructure –– and certainly information security –– will continue to be crucial in future conflict.  And pre-conflict. In a world where the line between war and peace is unclear.

Miah Hammond-Errey recently completed a Master of National Security Policy (Advanced)—graduating with Honours—at the National Security College of the Australian National University having won an Australian Government Commonwealth Sponsored Place. She has a Master of Criminology from Sydney University Law School and a Bachelor of Arts from Sydney University.

This article appeared originally at Strategy Bridge.

[1] The value of information to the success of military operations has long been acknowledged as crucial to success. Due to the centrality of intelligence and information in military planning and operations, much has been written about its evolution. In 1993, General Gordon Sullivan is credited with noting that “information is the currency of victory on the battlefield”. 'Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations', Joint Chiefs of Staff United States of America Department of Defense (Incorporating change 20 November 2014). The shift in the role of information has been noted in widespread academic, military, and public policy environments in the West but also in the East.

[2] My Masters research (Information influence in an era of global uncertainty and digital connectivity) proposed a conceptual framework for assessing the shifts in Russian disinformation campaign, by the timeliness, specificity, and targeted nature of communications as well as dissemination tactics. The key research aims were to;

(i) Identify the key strategies used by Russia in the development and implementation of disinformation campaigns (affecting Western interests)?

(ii) Ascertain whether insights from cases of Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, and the MH17 investigation contribute to this.

My research methodology was to survey the existing literature on the evolution and the changing nature of the role of information in warfare. I then applied the many and varied existing information warfare approaches to Russian disinformation campaigns. These models deal well with aspects of information operations but do not address the challenges posed by widespread disinformation directed by military strategy nor do they address cyber warfare. My research employed both empirical and conceptual approaches in order to address the main research question and develop a conceptual framework of information influence. As a component of this, my research identified key instances of proven disinformation released by Russian government agencies or state controlled agencies in relation to the investigation of the downing of MH17, hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea. Empirical data was compiled from scholarly journals, newspaper reports, online media, policy speeches and monographs, press conferences as well as published interviews and statements, and includes more than 125 English and translated (Russian and Ukrainian) primary sources as well as a larger base of secondary sources. This empirical data was analysed to identify and explain the tactics used by Russia in the development and implementation of disinformation campaigns and identify potential strategic goals.

[3] Spetspropaganda (special propaganda) is psychological and propaganda warfare that was used under Stalin but disappeared briefly in the 1990s. It was removed from the Russian curriculum (Military Information and Foreign Languages Department of the Military University of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation) in the 1990s to be reintroduced in 2000. Darczewska, Jolanta (2014), 'The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study ', in Anna ?abuszewska (ed.), Point of View (42; Warsaw OSW Centre for Eastern Studies).

[4] In 1982, Greenberg wrote an eminent piece on the role of deception in decision theory noting that disinformation refers to the use of information to mislead the enemy. “The use of public media, military, and diplomatic channels known to be monitored, diplomacy itself and the enemy’s own espionage system all fall under this heading.” “The Russian word dezinformatsiya is somewhat more inclusive; it includes all deception except camouflage (maskirovka).”(Greenberg 1982) One particular covert active measure, known as dezinformatsiya , was an especially refined KGB technique. A CIA expert once described disinformation as ‘‘operations aiming at pollution of the opinion-making process in the West.’’ Holland, Max (2006), 'The Propagation and Power of Communist Security Services Dezinformatsiya', International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 19 (1), 1-31.

[5] Reflexive control is defined by Thomas as a means of conveying information to an opponent that is specially prepared to incline them to voluntarily make a predetermined decision desired by the initiator. Thomas, Timothy (2015), 'Russia’s Military Strategy and Ukraine: Indirect, Asymmetric—and Putin-Led', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 28 (3), 445-61 (p455; p460).

[6] Darczewska, Jolanta (2014), 'The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study', in Anna ?abuszewska (ed.), Point of View (42; Warsaw OSW Centre for Eastern Studies).

[7] This is consistent with most standard and military dictionary definitions (false information, intended to mislead, deriving from the 1939 German disinformation service, dissemination of deliberately false information, etc.).

[9] Blank, Stephen (2011),'Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defense Doctrine', in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press), Darczewska, Jolanta (2015), 'The Devil is in The Details: Information Warfare In The Light Of Russia’s Military Doctrine ', in Anna ?abuszewska (ed.), Point of View (50; Warsaw Os?rodek Studiów Wschodnich / Centre for Eastern Studies). Franke, Ulrik (2015), 'War by non-military means: Understanding Russian information warfare', in Carolina Vendil Pallin (ed.), (FOI-R--4065--SE: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)). Giles, Keir (2009), 'Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020', (NATO Defense College, Rome). Giles, Keir (2014), 'Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues', in Czosseck, C; Ottis, R and Ziolkowski, K (ed.), International Conference on Cyber Conflict (NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn). Giles, Keir, et al. (2015), 'The Russian Challenge', (London: Chatham House Report). Holland, Max (2006), 'The Propagation and Power of Communist Security Services Dezinformatsiya', International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 19 (1), 1-31. KreÌ?k?is, JaÌ?nis (2015), 'Collective memory as a resource in Russian information warfare against Latvia', Science journal (Communication and information) 8. Kofman, Michael and Rojansky, Matthew (2015a), 'A Closer look at Russia’s “Hybrid War”', Kennan Cable (No. 7 Kennan Institute). Kofman, Michael and Rojansky, Matthew (2015b), 'U.S. and German Views on Ukraine: The Risks of Trans-Atlantic Misunderstanding', (Washington: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung). Lanoszka, Alexander (2016), 'Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe', International Affairs, 92 (1). Liñán, Miguel Vázquez (2010), 'History as a propaganda tool in Putin’s Russia', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 43 (2), 167-78. Mazarr, Michael J. (2015), 'Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding A Changing Era of Conflict', Advancing Strategic Thought Series (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press). Palmer, Diego A. Ruiz (2015), 'Back to the future? Russia’s hybrid warfare, revolutions in military affairs, and Cold War comparisons', Research Paper NATO Defense College, 120. Thomas, Timothy (1997), 'Deterring Information Warfare: A New Strategic Challenge', Parameters, XXVI (4 Winter 1996-1997), 81-91. Thomas, Timothy (2014), 'Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27 (1), 101-30. Thomas, Timothy (2015b) Russia Military Strategy [online text], Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO).

[10] Giles, Keir, et al. (2015), 'The Russian Challenge', (London: Chatham House Report). Giles, Keir (2015a), 'Russia and Its Neighbours: Old Attitudes, New Capabilities', in Kenneth Geers (Ed.) (ed.), Chapter 2 in Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE). Popescu, Alba Iulia Catrinel (2014), 'Observations Regarding the Actuality of the Hybrid War. Case Study: Ukraine', Strategic Impact, 4. Renz, Bettina and Smith, Hanna (2016), 'Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going Beyond the Label', Russia and Hybrid Warfare: definitions, capabilities, scope and possible responses” report 1/2016 (University of Helsinki, Finland: Aleksanteri Institute). Thomas, Timothy (1997), 'Deterring Information Warfare: A New Strategic Challenge', Parameters, XXVI (4 Winter 1996-1997), 81-91. Thomas, Timothy (2000a), 'The Russian View of Information War', The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office Publications). Thomas, Timothy (2000b), 'Google Confronts China’s “Three Warfares”', Parameters, Summer 2010. Thomas, Timothy (2001), 'Information Security Thinking: A Comparison of U.S., Russia and Chinese Concepts', The Science and culture Series (August 2001: Nuclear Strategy and Peace Technology, International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies), 344-58. Thomas, Timothy (2004), 'Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and the Military', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17 (2), 237-56. Thomas, Timothy (2011) Recasting the Red Star (Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S.). Thomas, Timothy (2015) Russia Military Strategy [online text], Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO).

[11] Bartles, Charles K. (2016), 'Getting Gerasimov Right', Military Review, January-February 2016, Galeotti, Mark (2016), 'Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia’s ‘new way of war’?', Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27 (2), 282-301. Giles, Keir (2015a), 'Russia and Its Neighbours: Old Attitudes, New Capabilities', in Kenneth Geers (Ed.) (ed.), Chapter 2 in Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE). Thomas, Timothy (2001), 'Information Security Thinking: A Comparison Of U.S., Russia and Chinese Concepts', The Science and culture Series (August 2001: Nuclear Strategy and Peace Technology, International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies), 344-58. Thomas, Timothy (2004), 'Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and the Military', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17 (2), 237-56. Thomas, Timothy (2011) Recasting the Red Star (Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S.), Thomas, Timothy (2014), 'Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27 (1), 101-30. Thomas, Timothy (2015) Russia Military Strategy[online text], Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO).

[12] Darczewska, Jolanta (2014), 'The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study', in Anna ?abuszewska (ed.), Point of View (42; Warsaw OSW Centre for Eastern Studies). p7.

[13] Darczewska, Jolanta (2014), 'The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study', in Anna ?abuszewska (ed.), Point of View (42; Warsaw OSW Centre for Eastern Studies). p15.

[14] Darczewska, Jolanta (2014), 'The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study ', in Anna ?abuszewska (ed.), Point of View (42; Warsaw OSW Centre for Eastern Studies). pp15.

[15] Bartles, Charles K. (2016), 'Getting Gerasimov Right', Military Review, January-February 2016, Darczewska, Jolanta (2015), 'The Devil Is In The Details: Information Warfare In The Light Of Russia’s Military Doctrine', in Anna ?abuszewska (ed.), Point of View (50; WarsawOs?rodek Studiów Wschodnich / Centre for Eastern Studies), Galeotti, Mark (2016), 'Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia’s ‘new way of war’?', Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27 (2), 282-301, Mazarr, Michael J. (2015), 'Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding A Changing Era of Conflict', Advancing Strategic Thought Series (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press), Nissen, Thomas Elkjer (2015a), '#TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia- @Characteristics_of_Contemporary_Conflicts', (Copenhagen, Denmark: Royal Danish Defence College), and Selhorst, Tony (2016), 'Russia’s Perception Warfare: The development of Gerasimov’s doctrine in Estonia and Georgia and its application in Ukraine', Militaire Spectator, Jaargang 185 (Nummer 4 – 2016).

[16] Blank, Stephen (2011),'Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defense Doctrine', in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press).

[17] Nissen, Thomas Elkjer (2015a), '#TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia- @Characteristics_of_ Contemporary_Conflicts', (Copenhagen, Denmark: Royal Danish Defence College). Nissen, Thomas Elkjer (2015b), '#GetUsedToLosingControl - Social Media, Strategic Narratives and Stratcom', The Three Swords Magazine, 28, 45-49,

[18] Thomas, Timothy (2000), 'The Russian View of Information War', The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office Publications),

[19] Thomas, Timothy (2000), 'The Russian View of Information War', The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office Publications).

[20]Tatham, Steve (2013), 'US Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communication', (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Press).

[21] Thomas, Timothy (2000), 'The Russian View of Information War', The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office Publications) p2.

[22] Thomas, Timothy (2015), 'Russia’s Military Strategy and Ukraine: Indirect, Asymmetric—and Putin-Led', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 28 (3), 445-61

[23] Bartles, Charles K. (2016), 'Getting Gerasimov Right', Military Review, January-February 2016, Galeotti, M. (2014). Putin’s Secret Weapon. Foreign Policy. 7 July 2014, Galeotti, Mark (2014) 'The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War', In Moscow’s Shadows, 6 July 2014. Retrieved fromhttps://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war  Accessed 26 June 2016, and Selhorst, Tony (2016), 'Russia’s Perception Warfare: The development of Gerasimov’s doctrine in Estonia and Georgia and its application in Ukraine', Militaire Spectator, Jaargang 185 (Nummer 4 – 2016)

[24] Mazarr, Michael J. (2015), 'Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding A Changing Era of Conflict', Advancing Strategic Thought Series (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press). p42.

[25] Mazarr, Michael J. (2015), 'Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding A Changing Era of Conflict', Advancing Strategic Thought Series (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press). p42.

[26] Berzins, Janis (2014), 'Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy', Policy Paper 2 (National Defence Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research).

[27] Berzins notes that victory on the battlefield is seen as the operationalisation of a well-orchestrated campaign of strategic communication, using clear political, psychological, and information strategies and that the capabilities to fully operationalization what Russian military thinkers call “New Generation Warfare” to be achieved by 2020. Berzins, Janis (2014), 'Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy', Policy Paper 2 (National Defence Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research). (p 5).

[28] Darczewska, Jolanta (2014), 'The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study ', in Anna ?abuszewska (ed.), Point of View (42; Warsaw OSW Centre for Eastern Studies) p12.

[29] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2014), 'Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations ', Joint Chiefs of Staff United States of America Department of Defense (Incorporating change 20 November 2014).

[30] Banasik, MirosÅ?aw (2015),'How to understand the hybrid war', Securitologia, 21 (1), 19-34. Bjerregaard, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas (2012), 'Hybrid Warfare: A Military Revolution or Revolution in Military Affairs?', (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College). Blank, Stephen (2011),'Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defense Doctrine', in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press). Hoffman, Frank G (2007), 'Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars', (Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies). Nissen, Thomas Elkjer (2016), 'Social Media's Role in 'Hybrid Strategies' ', (NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence).

[31] Bartles, Charles K. (2016), 'Getting Gerasimov Right', Military Review, January-February 2016, Selhorst, Tony (2016), 'Russia’s Perception Warfare: The development of Gerasimov’s doctrine in Estonia and Georgia and its application in Ukraine', Militaire Spectator, Jaargang 185 (Nummer 4 – 2016).

[32]Hoffman, Frank G (2007), 'Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars', (Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies).

[33] (Thornton 2015)

[34] (Kasapoglu 2015)

[35] Hoffman, Frank G (2016), 'The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War', 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength (The Heritage Foundation) (p26).

[36] Galeotti, Mark (2016), 'Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia’s ‘new way of war’?', Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27 (2), 282-301., Selhorst, Tony (2016), 'Russia’s Perception Warfare: The development of Gerasimov’s doctrine in Estonia and Georgia and its application in Ukraine', Militaire Spectator, Jaargang 185 (Nummer 4 – 2016).

[37] Hoffman, Frank G (2016), 'The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War', 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength (The Heritage Foundation) (p26).

[38] Hoffman, Frank G (2016), 'The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War', 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength (The Heritage Foundation) (p26).

[39] Hoffman, Frank G (2016), 'The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War', 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength (The Heritage Foundation) (p26).

[40] Schadlow, Nadia (2015) “The Problem with Hybrid Warfare,” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2015. Retrieved from http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/the-problem-with-hybrid-warfare Accessed 5 July 2016.

[41] For example, grey-zone conflicts occur below the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Article 5 threshold and below the level of violence necessary to prompt a United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution.

[42] Giles, Keir (2016c), 'Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power', (London: Chatham House). p10.

[43] Giles, Keir (2016a), 'The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare', (Riga, Latvia: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence). Giles, Keir (2016c), 'Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power', (London: Chatham House). p4

[44] Giles, Keir (2016a), 'The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare', (Riga, Latvia: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence).

[45] Darczewska, Jolanta (2014), 'The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study ', in Anna ?abuszewska (ed.), Point of View (42; Warsaw OSW Centre for Eastern Studies) p12, Darczewska, Jolanta (2016), 'Russia's Armed Forces on the Information War Front ', in Anna ?abuszewska (ed.), (Warsaw, Poland: Os?rodek Studiów Wschodnich | Centre for Eastern Studies) Nissen, Thomas Elkjer (2015a), '#TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia- @Characteristics_of_ Contemporary_Conflicts', (Copenhagen, Denmark: Royal Danish Defence College)

[46] Mazarr, Michael J. (2015), 'Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding A Changing Era of Conflict', Advancing Strategic Thought Series (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press). p89.