An Old Nuclear Strategy for a New Threat

In the late 1970s, the United States and NATO faced an emerging theater nuclear imbalance with the Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles (INF) with nuclear warheads capable of striking Europe and U.S. forces deployed there. On top of the Soviet’s massive superiority in conventional armored forces with 20 divisions in the former German Democratic Republic as the spearhead of 100 plus divisions of the Warsaw Pact, these deployments made problematic NATO’s strategy of flexible response. That doctrine called for forward deployed conventional forces, shorter range nuclear strike options, and ultimately supported by the U.S. strategic nuclear triad. This triple threat doctrine was adopted in 1961 by the Kennedy administration as the expansion of Soviet nuclear forces created a rough strategic nuclear parity which called into question the massive retaliation doctrine of the Eisenhower administration. 

The most significant challenge was not the technical hardware – the Pershings were essentially a nuclear version of a World War II-era German V-2 and the GLCMs a V-1 Buzz Bomb, with really smart guidance systems. But the political problems were immense even for a NATO accepting of American leadership, inured to the Cold War, and with half today’s membership. In the second half of the 1970s, America's armed forces and national morale were slowly recovering from Vietnam. Communism was on the march in Afghanistan and half a dozen African countries. Communist parties were close to entering government in several European countries. Stagflation and gas lines in both the U.S. and Europe sapped economic vitality. To his great credit, President Carter reversed the decline in the defense budget.   But Carter had unilaterally canceled the so-called neutron bomb, which German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had strongly supported over vehement opposition from many in his own party. The decision to deploy INF was, to a significant degree, compensation for that ill-judged action.  

The rationale for INF was more political than military. Existing U.S. nuclear forces, particularly invulnerable submarine-launched missiles, were superior in many respects. The essential issue, however, was whether Europe could really count on the U.S. to use its nuclear forces to repel a Soviet attack confined to Europe if nuclear forces were not stationed there. For the United States, INF provided the possibility of nuclear deterrence without the added risk of firing missiles from U.S. soil. Thus, the defense of the U.S and Europe were “coupled,” a term of art at the time, in a manner that worked to preclude a Soviet attack on one without engaging the other. Moreover, deployment centered on Germany assuaged French and other European’s fear of German flirtation with neutralism in its Ostpolitik outreach to the East.

Schmidt, and Helmut Kohl, who succeeded him in 1982, worked hard to overcome strong domestic disapproval and massive demonstrations at home and gain other European Allies' approval. Front line Germany was the key deployment location and the destination for the Pershings.  Securing agreement to deployments in other Allies, thereby spreading the risk and demonstrating Alliance solidarity to the German Bundestag and public, was critical to German approval. Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Britain eventually agreed to base GLCMs as well as Germany. Leonid Brezhnev and his successor Yuri Andropov made opposition to deployment the central element of their foreign policy and launched a massive propaganda campaign exploiting anti-nuclear front groups and the popular “nuclear freeze” movement. To ease the pressure, President Reagan in 1981 proposed a “zero option” under which the U.S. would refrain from deploying its INF weapons with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers if the Soviet Union eliminated all its equivalent systems. 

The Soviets rejected this proposal, and deployment went forward in December 1983 – the darkest days of the Cold War since the Cuban missile crisis. Russia suspended ongoing arms control negotiations but, as deployments proceeded, agreed to return in a new format. Some commentators in both the U.S. and Europe, including the arms control community, viewed the zero option as somehow asking too much of the Soviets, but Reagan stuck to his guns. Finally, in December 1987, the sides agreed to the zero option and included shorter-range nuclear systems as well. Two factors made this possible. First, the successful American deployment of INF over strong opposition firmly established American and NATO credibility. Second, the succession of Mikhail Gorbachev brought in a leader intent on revitalizing the sagging Russian economy and willing to establish positive relations with the West.   By 1991 the two sides had destroyed 2692 missiles under intrusive verification procedures, including on-site inspection. 

By the mid 2000s, as Vladimir Putin cemented his absolute authority, Russia began a major rearmament program including the deployment, particularly to the Kaliningrad exclave, of multiple battalions of cruise missiles with prohibited range known as the SSC-8. Beginning in 2013, the Obama administration raised these violations in the Standing Verification Commission but declined to publicize them.   Russia responded by falsely claiming U.S. deployments of anti-ballistic missiles were a violation. After continuing to pursue diplomacy for two years, the Trump administration declared Russia in material breach and in 2018 initiated the Treaty’s withdrawal provision and requested funding for three missile systems with the previously prohibited ranges.

Today’s challenges are as great as NATO faced in the depths of the Cold War. The Russian cyberattack on Estonia in 2007 resulted in little other than ritual condemnation by NATO. The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 resulted in only minor sanctions at the time by the U.S., quickly removed as part of the Obama administration’s “reset” with Russia, and even fewer by the Europeans. The 2014 Russian seizure of parts of Donbas and Luhansk and the annexation of Crimea resulted in modest sanctions, largely symbolic NATO deployments to Poland and the Baltics, energetic but ineffectual diplomacy by France and Germany, and no lethal military aid from the U.S. until inconsistently undertaken by the Trump administration. In the runup to the current onslaught, military aid has been dribbled out, and economic sanctions were not substantial until the third day of the invasion. Only with the actual invasion did the U.S. begin to supply Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, the most effective light weapon available. U.S. forces sent to Europe as the crisis yielded to war have not included nuclear systems.

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin stated that he would have been prepared to use nuclear weapons if the occupation had been militarily challenged. Russian nuclear doctrine explicitly permits the use of nuclear weapons, particularly at the tactical level.   Putin has now declared a high alert for his nuclear forces. Belarus may permit the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on its territory. The White House has essentially ignored Putin's nuclear threats.

There are currently an estimated 100 U.S. air deliverable nuclear weapons stored in five original members of NATO; none are in the front-line states. This is a token force, appropriate for the peaceful interlude of the first fifteen years of the post-Cold War era. While Russia violated the INF Treaty, the U.S. was distracted in the Middle East and European perceptions of an endless golden age of tranquility and a general distaste for nuclear weapons, including by military men, combined to defer serious attention even as Russia violated the INF Treaty. NATO can no longer afford this lethargy in light of Russia’s estimated 1000 to 2000 non-strategic warheads. What is called for now is the immediate deployment of additional dual-capable strike aircraft together with their nuclear armaments to forward airfields in Poland, likely the staunchest of the Allies, possibly to Romania, and to some number of the Baltics. Every effort should be made to get full NATO approval but not at the expense of delay. If necessary, a coalition of the willing centered on Poland should be constructed and open to other NATO members to join. The United Kingdom and France should be invited to forward deploy elements of their own national deterrents. 

The second phase should be a U.S. announcement of immediate development of mobile ground-based missile systems with an explicit plan for forward deployment, possibly refurbished older systems, possibly new hypersonic systems. This should be done on the most accelerated time-scale possible as a major component of an expanded defense budget. It should be accompanied by an offer to forego deployment in the event of some acceptable peace agreement in Ukraine and removal of forward deployed nuclear forces by Putin or his successor. 

A sea change is underway in the American and European world view; its strength and duration are unknown. Partnership with Allies is important, but overemphasis can lead to paralysis or lowest common denominator outcomes. The steps outlined above would effectively recouple America’s nuclear deterrent to European security and remove any doubt about the willingness of NATO to defend its eastern members. One should be clear that this entails risk to the United States. But so does inaction or wishful thinking that Putin does not really intend to seek to reconstruct a European empire as he has said he will do. It worked once, it can again.

Gordon Bare is a retired U.S. Army and State Department officer. He served on the U.S. delegations for the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and for ABM Treaty compliance.