Are The Wheels Coming Off the JADC2 Bus?

The Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) framework is intended to support a new way of warfare by exploiting the vast amounts of information available to warfighters on the future battlefield. This will allow elements of the Joint Force to sense, decide, and act faster and with greater precision. JADC2 is not a single system or network but rather a means of integrating existing and planned command and control (C2) capabilities.

In testimony before Congress, the nominee for Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Christopher W. Grady, who would be responsible for ensuring JADC2’s implementation, provided yet another definition of JADC2: “JADC2 is an important developing joint capability, critical to the success of the Department. JADC2 is not a joint product or program of record but rather a capability delivery framework to modernize and accelerate the fielding of material and non-material C2 capabilities.”

Defense analysts have begun to question whether JADC2 is even doable, given the current decentralized approach to creating and operating C2 networks. Some have warned that the current approach to joint C2 gives too much control to the individual Services or even to individual headquarters over the needs of the warfighters.

Senior leaders in the Pentagon have begun to admit openly that the current approach to JADC2 is not living up to its initial promise. Wanda Jones-Heath, the principal cyber adviser for the Air Force and Space Force, observed that “every service has their own contribution to JADC2.The Department of Air Force is ABMS, the Army is Project Convergence and I think the Navy and Marine Corps … [Project] Overmatch. All different. I have looked at all of the documentation associated with all three. We are not aligned with what we need to be interoperable and fight together.”

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Doug Bush, also warned of problems realizing the goals of JADC2: “My perspective would be that the biggest challenge [to JADC2] is not really an acquisition challenge. We have a lot of flexibility in acquisition. The challenge I see is mostly one of joint coordination and design, meaning bringing together the good work the services are already doing and then integrating that in a way that’s comprehensive.”

These and similar concerns have reached the highest levels of the Pentagon. Recently, Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Deputy Secretary of Defense, rightly called for greater senior oversight of the Department’s efforts in the area of command and control:

“Neither the secretary nor I are satisfied with the — where we are in the department on advanced command and control. Every day in the department you can find examples where the speed and quality of decision-making [at the] tactical level, operational level, up at the strategic level, can be vastly improved and create that edge that we need for the future. A lot of good work going on throughout the department [but] what I’m really focused on right now is taking that … good work that’s going on and scaling it to the enterprise level.”

Congress has also signaled its concerns. In its FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) indicated nervousness regarding the cost, schedule, and performance of the JADC2 effort. The HASC cyber and innovative technologies subcommittee requested a Government Accountability Office review of JADC2, including inventories of related efforts, timelines, goals, and potential shortfalls. A committee staffer explained that there was concern regarding DoD’s ability to orchestrate all the elements of the JADC2 architecture:

“JADC2 is a very complex undertaking, and there are a lot of pieces that all need to come out together in order to create this capability that the department is depending on. The services have their specific efforts that may be succeeding or encountering challenges, each on their own merits, and they’re supposed to net together into this cohesive whole.”

But how will the individual elements of JADC2 be integrated in order to create that cohesive whole? The Pentagon needs to act swiftly and decisively to prevent the wheels from coming off the JADC2 bus. Clearly, the Pentagon’s senior leadership needs to step in to ensure that the separate-specific C2 systems can be integrated. The Army’s top acquisition official has correctly argued the need for a more concerted Pentagon effort to dictate standards for JADC2 in order to ensure that each of the individual services are developing capabilities to help realize the future operating vision.

But standard setting alone will be insufficient. To successfully move data of various classifications between Service-controlled sensors and shooters and from CONUS to the tactical edge at the speed of relevance, DoD needs a unifying capability, perhaps a joint cloud that could mediate between the various JADC2 participants without the seams and latencies that exists today for Joint Force C2. That joint cloud would act as a unifying force, taking information in from all constituent C2 nodes and allowing shooters and commanders across the Joint Force at all levels to access this common data pool at speed. That would enable true JADC2.

Dan Gouré, Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute. Gouré has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team. You can follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute @LexNextDC. Read his full bio here.