Some Unsolicited Advice for the Next CNO

As way of background, the following is an edited-for-brevity version of the primary content of that e-mail (sent in October 2019, so it is clearly somewhat dated):

• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). I am a critic. I believe LCS to be a strategic mistake of epic proportions. My current recommendations WRT the program:
       - Stop building them, but that ship has sailed (pun intended!).
       - Mothball a third of the class(es), put a third into the reserves as NRF ships, keep a third on active duty.
• Expeditionary versus forward-based navy. We are a forward-based, not expeditionary, navy. We do not have enough logistics ships, we don't have any repair ships or destroyer tenders, we don't have enough submarine tenders, we don't have enough fleet tugs or salvage ships, we don't have enough floating drydocks, etc. We can't re-arm our primary surface combatant weapon system (VLS) at sea. We are overly reliant on forward bases overseas. Our over-dependence on forward bases will pose an operational challenge to the US Navy, and therefore a strategic challenge to our nation.
• T-ESD/T-ESB.  I think these ships can, with the innovative application of containerized machine shops, rewind shops, electronic repair labs, habitability facilities, operating rooms, medical wards, C&C spaces, cranes, davits, etc., be rapidly converted to serve as AR's/AD's/AS's/AH's/Command Ships.
• FFG(X). I am hopeful. Numbers count - in wartime you need to escort more things than you do in peacetime, you can NEVER have enough ASW assets, and high-low is the only way to get there.
• DDG-1000. This ship class has the real possibility of making LCS look rational. Plan on increasing manning, and the FFG-7, LCS, and DDD-1000 programs should be evidence enough that we don't know how to do "reduced manning."
• Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS). Closing the Basic course was a mistake, and a lot of folks said so at the time. You can draw a straight line from that decision to FITZGERALD and MCCAIN. I think we are probably on a good path to rebuilding the community's professional training.
• Mk VI Patrol Boat. I am a big fan of these. In general, I think the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is probably the most innovative, flexible, and exciting force we have in the USN.
• Mine Warfare. We need to get over our "deep blue navy" hatred of this community. Build a class of mine warfare ships to replace the MCMs, separate MIW from ASW, and figure out how to treat the community with the respect it deserves.
• Maintenance expertise. We broke the path from Apprentice through Journeyman to Master Technician that used to exist when we had Sailor-manned SIMAs, AR's, and AD's. Provide technicians the opportunities to work on real systems by assigning Sailors to maintenance jobs ashore (repair facilities) and afloat (AR's/AD's/AS's).

• Expeditionary Navy. In the past, I have provided background, rational, strategy, and force structure for building a navy that can carry the fight to any opponent overseas.[i]  The right number of ships is 351.[ii]  Those recommendations stand.
• FFL (Corvette). We need to build a class of small, affordable escort warships with primary warfare areas of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW). I propose modifying a version of the Coast Guard’s HERITAGE-class Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) as follows[iii]:
• • Add the CAPTAS-4 sonar system
  • Add four to eight anti-ship cruise missiles (Harpoon or Naval Strike Missile)
  • Replace the 57mm gun with an eight-cell VLS launcher to carry Vertical Launch ASROC and quad-packs of NATO Sea Sparrow Missiles (NSSM)
  • Add a Close-In Weapon System (CIWS: Phalanx Block 1B or SeaRAM).
  • Modify as necessary to support the MH-60R.
  • Sorry, no AEGIS!
• LCS. I am too far removed from current efforts to right this ship (pun intended) to make any specific recommendations, but I still like the idea of putting a percentage of these ships into a revitalized Naval Reserve Force (NRF). Reconstituting the NRF in this way would provide some long-term cost savings while also providing the Surface Reserve component with some desperately needed platforms on which to train. In addition, these units would be available in the event of a national crisis and can support peacetime counter-drug patrols.
• DDG-1000. This class should have always been designated a land-attack cruiser; it is in no way a destroyer as destroyers have been historically defined/understood.  Again, I am too far removed to provide specific recommendations, but I would focus these ships on being the operational centerpiece of land-attack surface action groups (SAGs).
• Operational tempo (OPTEMPO). The number one thing the Navy can do to improve force material readiness, morale, and retention is return to predictable six-month long deployments. OPTEMPO necessarily got out of whack after 9/11 as the Navy adjusted to support operations in Afghanistan, and then again in Iraq, but those efforts are largely over, and the Navy needs to return to a rational and sustainable level of effort.

Notes: