American Pressure Can Help Realize European Strategic Autonomy

U.S. Army soldiers with the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, march in front of the official party to be reviewed during a Handover Takeover ceremony held at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, May 28, 2024. The 1st Cavalry Division’s mission in Europe is to engage in multinational training and exercises across the continent, working alongside NATO allies and regional security partners to provide combat-credible forces to V Corps, America’s forward-deployed corps in Europe. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Brett Thompson)

If Macron and other European leaders take a more confrontational stance and weigh the possibility of directly intervening in Ukraine, then they do so because they assume U.S. officials will eventually back them up—or already do. Rather than signing on to Macron’s intervention, the U.S. should make clear that it will not sacrifice American lives and intends to shift focus away from Europe, to force a readjustment of expectations and incentivize Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that Europe is already responding to the pressures of war in this way.

As a sign that it is taking European defense seriously, the European Union Commission unveiled the EU’s first defense industrial strategy in March. Its goal is to raise the EU’s collective readiness and improve the production of defense articles. The EU intends to compel member states to procure at least 40% of defense equipment collaboratively. Additionally, the EU wants member states to put half of their procurement budgets towards procuring within the EU by 2030.

Unsurprisingly, this ambitious plan has drawn criticism from EU member states. Brussels is accused of encroaching on the sovereignty of European countries by dictating where countries ought to purchase equipment. By far the most preferred source remains the U.S., which accounts for 63% of defense acquisitions by EU countries.

The EU Commission’s strategy aims to create an industrial foundation for European strategic autonomy. For now, it is encountering opposition from countries that prefer to acquire the bulk of their equipment from the U.S.. However, if the U.S. decides it has higher priorities outside of Europe, European countries will eventually feel the consequences of not having a stronger continental defense industry.

While production capacity remains a major concern for Western defense planners, other steps are being taken toward greater European defense integration. In 2023, the Dutch 13th Light Brigade merged with the German 10th Armored Division, completing a process of integrating the Dutch land forces into the German Bundeswehr that began in the 90s. Now, all brigades of the Dutch land forces are components of German divisions, creating a combined force totaling some 50,000 personnel. The merger constitutes the closest cooperation between any two NATO members. Deputy Commander of the Dutch Army, Major General Jean-Paul Duckers, has said that “many people don't even realize the uniqueness of what we are doing.”

The merger of the Dutch and German militaries can serve as an example of rational European defense integration. Military integration of this kind enables smaller countries, such as the Netherlands, to specialize while contributing to the force potential of larger European states.

European defense integration has often involved discussion of an ‘EU Army.’ A common objection to the creation of such a single European army is that the European Union has 27 member states and 24 official languages. This naturally encumbers any significant steps towards military integration. Rather than creating a single army that speaks 24 languages, Europe may eventually see the creation of several integrated formations according to the Dutch-German model. For instance, the Austrian Bundesheer could follow the Dutch example and merge with the German military, and the Belgian armed forces could merge with the French. These examples are problematic for various reasons, namely Austria’s neutrality and Belgium’s internal divisions. Still, the potential to replicate the Dutch-German model exists across Europe.

Discussion of European strategic autonomy peaked during the Trump administration when it became abundantly clear that the U.S. president viewed Europe as not doing enough for its own defense. The ongoing Ukraine crisis is a stark reminder that our wealthy and capable European allies cannot afford to ignore defense matters. While some dismiss the concept as a “pipe dream” or as “dead”, strategic autonomy remains the only, albeit difficult, path to making Europe an attractive partner and thus strategically relevant in the modern day.

Crucially, a conventional—but contained—war in Europe, interminable and destabilizing conflicts in the Middle East, and great power competition across the globe all mean that it is in America’s and Europe’s interest to shore up European defense and enable the U.S. to focus on higher priorities elsewhere.

Julian Fisher is a Ph.D. student at the University of Washington and a previous Global Politics Fellow at George Mason University. His research focuses on Global Politics and International Law.