How To Ensure Trump's Golden Dome Effort Succeeds

Every President since the 9/11 attack on the United States has said defense of the homeland is the number one national security priority, yet the only U.S. airspace defended from cruise missile threats is a small portion of Washington, DC, and the entire country is increasingly vulnerable to conventional missile threats from China and Russia. That puts Americans at risk and increases the chances of adversary aggression abroad. 

Many Americans might be surprised to learn our homeland is so vulnerable, but the 2023 embarrassment associated with the Chinese spy balloon exposed unacceptable vulnerabilities in the ability of the U.S. military to detect threats operating at unusual altitudes and speeds. These challenges are exacerbated when one considers the difficulty in detecting low-flying cruise missiles. 

So, how did we get to this point? 

For years, both Republicans and Democrats talked about the return of great power competition but failed to devote sufficient resources to missile defense. That is why the United States homeland and regional missile defense capabilities are so lacking. 

Indeed, insufficient funding continues to result in costly delays to vital missile defense programs. 

Lt. Gen. Heath Collins, the director of the Missile Defense Agency, said on May 6 that reduced funding levels have slowed the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) program, which is vital to America’s ability to defeat hypersonic weapons. The speed, trajectory, and maneuvering capabilities of hypersonic glide vehicles make them particularly difficult to defeat. Unfortunately, GPI operational capability is not expected until 2035. 

The primary cause of the delay?: “resourcing,” Collins says.

Unfortunately, the GPI is not the only program experiencing delays caused, at least in part, by insufficient funding.

The Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI) is another example. NGI is a necessary and overdue upgrade for the ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California that serve as the primary defense against a North Korean ballistic missile attack on Americans at home. That program is delayed by about 18 months, and Collins says funding played a role in the delay.

This helps explain why President Trump’s January 27 Executive Order is so important. It recognizes the threat to Americans, catalyzes an overdue response, and establishes clear direction for the defense department. This process, however, will be more difficult than many realize, requiring integration over time of efforts to detect, track, and engage from space to near space to airborne to ground and shipboard systems. The United States also needs both short-term solutions that leverage existing systems and technologies as well as longer-term solutions that require research and development investments today that could pay off in the 2030s.

In its reconciliation efforts, Congress has included nearly $25 Billion in funding — with a prudent emphasis on the space-based aspects of future missile defense. That reconciliation funding should be in addition to a base discretionary defense budget in fiscal year 2026 that is at least 3 to 5 percent higher than inflation compared to fiscal year 2025 enacted levels.

To be clear, though, sufficient funding is not enough. The Pentagon will also need strong leadership that should come from an empowered four-star leader with space and missile defense expertise.

Moreover, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) should be formally assigned as the lead engineer and be responsible for overall system architecture. The abysmal performance of the Defense of Guam mission development effort from 2021-2024 makes clear that MDA is the only place with the engineers who can design such a comprehensive architecture. The pace of development required will mean MDA needs authorities outside the normal Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).

To avoid unrealistic overreach that undermines more attainable goals, it should also be made clear that Golden Dome is not about defeating a full-scale nuclear attack from Russia and China. The defense against a nuclear attack on the United States should instead rely on a modernized nuclear triad that persuades any potential adversary that a nuclear attack on the United States would invite a devastating response, thereby making the aggression unwise.

Finally, the significant costs associated with the endeavor should be mitigated with innovative efforts, including sensors (dirigibles and unmanned aircraft equipped with radars) that operate up to the near-space region and non-kinetic engagement systems such as directed energy that complement kinetic space-based systems.

President Trump and his administration deserve credit for sounding the alarm and taking initial action to begin to address the growing missile threat, as does Congress for putting nearly $25 billion on the table. Now, it is up to Congress to appropriate the funding and up to the Pentagon to turn the vision into reality in a manner the U.S. taxpayers can afford.

Retired U.S. Navy RADM Mark Montgomery and Bradley Bowman are senior directors at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where they lead FDD’s Air and Missile Defense Program.