Building a Warrior Ethos

The new administration has made much of the need to “build a warrior ethos” in the U.S. military, a worthy goal if pursued rationally and thoughtfully.  A good place to start is with the U.S. Army, which in every war suffers the highest casualties and, in the end, takes and holds the ground that usually determines victory.  In today’s Army, how do we encourage and incentivize our warrior leaders?

Every year approximately one third of a given year group of mid-grade captains will transition into quasi-civilian “single track” career fields, such as operations research, acquisition, cyber, army strategist, foreign area, financial management, network integration, information operations,  simulations operations, contracting and industrial management,  public affairs, systems automation, and others.  Many leave the combat arms because they did not excel as company commanders; by “restarting” in new career fields they are thus able to compete on an equal footing for promotion despite lagging performance with troops.  As captains they will leave the field army forever, serving in comfortable office settings for the rest of their careers but equaling or exceeding promotion rates for “line” officers.  Most will be sent to graduate school at government expense, setting them up for second careers after the Army.  They will serve in more agreeable locations and not be sent into harm’s way.  As one senior at West Point pointed out to me, “why should I branch combat arms when the hours are longer, the risks are greater, the stress is higher, the quality of life is lower, and career and promotion opportunities are no better?” 

His points were valid.  The Army rewards the behaviors it values most.  Today, that is not necessarily excellence in command of troops in combat.  Army promotion board guidance drives the point home in stating that “all assignments are important … the absence of command or combat experience should not be a basis for non-selection.”  A quick look at combat vs support officers shows the same distribution of awards, another indicator.  Clearly, enterprise management - not warfighting - is the driving force in Army talent management.

Many of these trends are well-intentioned.  For decades the Army pushed for equal promotion rates for women and minorities, who for policy or other reasons were underrepresented in the combat arms.  And it is certainly true that all Army jobs are important.  What is demonstrably not true is that all Army jobs are equally important.  Leading Soldiers in combat, at the sharp end in direct contact with the enemy, is clearly what matters most.  Great combat leaders are hard to find. It makes little sense to disincentivize them in ways large and small.

Critics will point out that at the very top, at the three and four-star level, combat arms officers predominate.  While certainly true, the odds of rising to that level for most officers are vanishingly small.  Less than 1% of all officers will reach brigadier general, and promotion beyond that step is even more unlikely.   Younger officers make the decision to leave the service or migrate out of the combat arms at the captain level, when promotion to general officer is at best a distant aspiration.  At that point, they must confront hard choices about family stability, future employment, and compensation as well as career progression.   Other factors, such as employment opportunities for working spouses, may also loom large.  Faced with today’s incentives, too many quality leaders find the pull to leave the combat branches too hard to resist.  They depart the service or leave the combat arms for the “institutional” army, where the rewards are greater and the risks and demands are lower.  If defense leaders are serious about rebuilding a warrior ethos, this must change.

How should the Army attack this problem?  Effective solutions seem straightforward. Promote combat arms officers earlier and at higher rates – the norm during the Cold War.  Weight selection for resident staff and war college in favor of the combat arms.  Restructure the awards system to reward service in combat formations (for example, by awarding the Legion of Merit to successful combat arms battalion commanders).  Other incentives, such as advancing combat arms officers one grade upon retirement or awarding “brevet” promotions, might also be considered.   Opportunities for success and advancement should of course be preserved for the very best in all career fields. But in the aggregate the combat arms should prevail.

All of this is culture-cracking.  The Army has embraced equal promotion opportunities for all for decades.  Proponents of the many non-combat arms communities will protest loudly.  Still, success on the battlefield must drive Army priorities.  Those who run the greatest risks and responsibilities and experience the most severe demands deserve to be rewarded accordingly.  It’s that simple.  As one famous German general declared in World War II, difficult decisions “must be accepted in silence … victory is the only thing that matters.”  

R.D. Hooker, Jr., is a Senior Fellow with The Atlantic Council.  He served three tours on the National Security Council and commanded a parachute brigade in Iraq.