2031, The Middle Kingdom Strikes Back

U.S. troopers in battle gear walk under the scorching sun during a joint military exercise on Wednesday, May 8, 2024, in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, northern Philippines. American, Australian and Filipino forces launched a barrage of high-precision rockets, artillery fire and airstrikes to sink a ship Wednesday as part of largescale war drills in waters facing the disputed South China Sea that has antagonized Beijing. (AP Photo/Aaron Favila)

As Chinese Admiral Peng viewed the results of the thermobaric strike on Scarborough Shoal, His Aide Lieutenant Liu asked, "Sir how many of their marines survived the bombing?"

"Six" answered the admiral, "but one died on the way to the hospital ship".

"What were they trying to achieve? asked Liu.

"That is a good question, Liu" the admiral answered. "Back in 2019, their marine corps commandant developed a concept that he called expeditionary advance base operations (EABO), and planned to put small groups of troops called Stand-In Forces on tiny islets in the first island chain armed with anti-ship missiles to deter or block our Navy from breaking out of the South China Sea."

"But we never intended to do that," said Liu incredulously.

"Why then, did we finally decide to take the Stan-In Forces out?" asked Liu.

"Two reasons", the admiral replied. "First, they represent a hazard to navigation. One of their missiles might sink a ship in innocent passage. At least, that will be what we tell the UN. Second, by showing the Americans how easily we can eliminate this one, we essentially hold the rest of their Stan-in Forces hostage. Ironically, it is a variation on the island hopping strategy that the Americans developed in World War II. They can either negotiate for abandoning the remaining Expeditionary Advance Force Bases or letting them wage suicidal Last ditch stands. Either way. we win."

"Could they not see the fatal flaw in their strategic logic?" asked Liu.

"Again, there are two answers. The first is that the Americans are slow strategic learners. They do not hold incompetent flag officers accountable for their performance. Look at Afghanistan. None of the generals who led them on a twenty-year program of building security forces that could not sustain themselves after they left the country was held accountable. Nor were the senior military leaders who mismanaged their disastrous final withdrawal. If I were in charge, I would bring the marine corps commandants who came up with their ridiculous Stand-in Forces concept and the navy officers who enabled them back on active duty and court martial them for negligence.

"What is the second reason sir?" Asked Liu.

"Their politicians became focused on our threat in the last two decades; and any scheme, no matter how absurd, that concentrated on China became what the Americans call 'the flavor of the month'. Both of the American parties latched on to any scheme that was anti-China. So, they allowed their navy and marine corps maritime prepositioning and amphibious capabilities to atrophy. Those were two problems that we did not have to concern ourselves with in the present conflict.”

"None-the-less sir, our victory was brilliant," observed Liu.

"It was not brilliant. It was basic strategy and operational art; we followed Sun Tzu and took advantage of our enemy's mistakes and hubris. Their actor John Wayne was right when he observed that 'life is tough, but it is tougher when you are stupid'".

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who lectures on war gaming and Red Teaming at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. He was a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2003-2005.