China's War Plans

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) makes no secret of its ambitions for global hegemony (though it uses the word “leadership” in place of hegemony). China’s quest for worldwide dominance is rooted in the shaky claim to power of Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This might seem like an odd contention to outside observers, including the Trump Administration who see Xi as the unquestioned dictator atop a party-state-economic monolith dominated at all levels by the CCP.  Xi, however, does not see his position in that way. He is, in fact, deeply insecure about his power and authority. His insecurity, in turn, feeds his ambitions, which creates more insecurity, and drives him to expand his power both domestically and internationally.

Insecurity, bordering on paranoia, drives Xi to ensure the loyalty of the PLA through permanent purges and indoctrination. Xi has appointed or replaced all the top leaders of the PLA, and has dictated that the PLA units devote between 20 and 40 percent of their time undergoing political and ideological indoctrination, which includes glorification of Xi himself. “Political power,” as Mao asserted, “grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Thus, Xi spends whatever he thinks necessary to ensure that those who wield the weapons are loyal and responsive to him personally.

One might reasonably conclude from all this effort at control that Xi sees the principal purpose of the PLA as defending him and regime against potential domestic opponents rather than winning wars against foreign adversaries. After all, every hour of indoctrination is an hour not training to fight. This interpretation would make sense if the indoctrination requirements were applied only to the army, which would be expected to play the main role in internal repression, as it did in June 1989. However, these requirements apply across all forces. It is not likely that the PLA Navy, Air Force or Rocket Force would be used against protesters.

Therefore, it is likely that Xi’s efforts to dominate the military imply a desire to ensure his unlimited freedom to deploy the PLA for warfighting, without having to consult colleagues or worry about the military’s loyalty. This means that Xi alone can make decisions about resorting—or not resorting—to military force to achieve his ambitions, and he alone will pay the political price for any negative outcomes of those decisions.

The most consequential of those decisions is whether to use force to bring Taiwan under CCP rule, an explicit and central goal that has eluded every leader of the CCP since Mao. Achieving that goal would confer near mythic status on Xi. The question of whether Xi would risk using military force for that purpose is central to estimating the probability of a shooting war between China and the U.S.. China would prefer first of all to absorb Taiwan without firing a shot, second, to use the PLA to conquer Taiwan while deterring U.S. armed intervention, and third, to engage in direct combat against U.S. forces only as a last resort.

Until China’s economic deceleration, the probability of war was slim. This was because Xi maintained a relatively long timeline for realizing his ambitions, noting that PLA modernization would be completed by 2035. This timeline was based on Xi’s age, PLA needs, and the CCP’s assumption of China’s inexorable rise in comparison to a declining U.S..  China’s economic and political strength would grow, and the U.S. would sink into economic, political, and military irrelevance, leaving China free to act in the Western Pacific without need to consider U.S. reactions. However, that is not what is happening. Instead, China’s economy under Xi has stalled in the face of declining productivity, overproduction, weak demand, deflation, massive debt, and a shrinking population of workers.

None of these problems are susceptible to a quick fix. Therefore, China must contend with low levels of growth for the long term and a likely economic decline relative to the U.S.. This turn of events has changed the timeline for Xi. The more time that passes, the weaker China’s position becomes relative to the U.S.. Furthermore, without economic growth, Xi must rely more heavily on nationalism and foreign threats as a basis for legitimacy. All of this will incentivize Xi to act against Taiwan sooner rather than later. Given that Xi now exerts uncontested control of the PLA, the pressure on him to use it to realize his Taiwan ambition will be immense. Therefore, U.S. and allied leaders cannot presume they have ample time to decide how they would respond and coordinate in the increasingly likely event Xi does resort to the military option.

Glenn Chafetz retired from the CIA in 2019, where he served multiple tours overseas and was the agency's first Chief of Tradecraft and Operational Technology. He currently directs a nonprofit, 2430 Group, that researches state sponsored attacks on the U.S. private sector.