
How the Russian Invasion Puts American Communities at Risk
Last updated 06:11 AM EST • Read time: 6m
What Russia’s Campaign Means for U.S. Homeland Security
Introduction
Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine marks a Rubicon moment in a nearly decade-long campaign. This week, Russian conventional forces advanced by land, sea, and air beyond Ukraine’s Donbas region and into the heart of the country. A forceful response from the U.S. and its allies in Europe is imminent. On Thursday, President Biden responded with the announcement of additional measures to "impose severe cost on the Russian economy, both immediately and over time.”
The current crisis in Ukraine is nested within Russia’s broader ambitions to advance its position and influence in global and regional affairs — and at the expense of its perceived main opponent, the United States.
In particular, we believe that the U.S. faces three increased risks to its internal security due to this escalating crisis: (1) severe cyberattacks against its critical infrastructure, (2) a targeted misinformation campaign to sharpen existing political and social divisions, and (3) a ramp-up in violent political unrest.
Cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure
First, we will likely see an increased tempo in Russia-based cyber operations against critical American infrastructure. When squaring off against peers, such as the U.S., Russia tends to rely on a suite of irregular warfare methods. Russia's preferred method of strategic competition is a Molotov cocktail of conventional force and “hybrid” instruments. Integrating multiple lines of effort across domains, this approach falls in the "gray zone" between traditional notions of peace and militarized conflict. As Russia initiated a ground war against Ukrainian forces via tank maneuvers and pitched battle, it will simultaneously look to engage the U.S. via more subversive means. It is already doing so.
With the world focused on Ukraine, this is an optimal time for Russia to coerce U.S. political leadership by undermining national resiliency, confidence, and stabilization at home. Cyber operations are well suited to this task. This would not be without precedent and is well within Russia's capabilities. Over the past several years, Russia-sponsored actors have systematically used cyber operations to probe and target U.S. critical infrastructure — and specifically power grid, healthcare networks, telecommunications providers, and financial systems.
The groundwork for the upcoming attacks was most likely plotted months ago, with embedding of malicious code in links that will unfold against Russian targets in a sophisticated manner. For example, using a phishing technique, Russia-linked accounts used a shortened URL address embedded in emails of prominent Ukrainian government officials that blocked their family members’ access to bank accounts as a show of force and intelligence capabilities. While phishing is a long-used approach, the knowledge of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Chairman Ruslan Stefanchuk's banking and family details, for example, showed just how far the Russian-linked hackers were willing to probe.
Disinformation to exploit political divisions within the U.S.
Second, Russia is well-positioned to undermine the U.S. resolve by fomenting internal division through a targeted disinformation campaign. Again, there is significant precedence. Not only has Russia tried to influence U.S. elections, but it has also used coordinated disinformation efforts to exacerbate social, racial, and political tensions on hot topic issues in the U.S.
An unclassified assessment from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence provided specific detail of how, instead of targeting physical infrastructure surrounding the 2018 mid-term and 2020 presidential elections, Russia waged disinformation campaigns designed to denigrate Democrat candidates. For example, in the 2016 election, Russia weaponized memes for both pro-Trump and pro-Clinton sides to amplify divisions between supporters. Most recently, Russia has tapped into anti-government, anti-authority violent extremist sentiment by amplifying discord about the efficacy of vaccines and masks in response to COVID-19.
Any such disinformation campaign is aimed less at sowing chaos but more at turning the tide of public opinion in support of Russia's objectives. Given the nature of the crisis in Ukraine, we anticipate that a Russian disinformation campaign may center around a number of related themes, including: foreign policy platforms favoring isolationism, the moral foundations of the Ukraine campaign, and the sowing of mistrust in incumbent political leaders. The timing for such a campaign is particularly auspicious as the U.S. enters the midterm election cycle.
Increases in violent political instability
Finally – as an indirect result of Russia’s hostilities – we foresee an increased risk of violent political instability within the United States. The crisis in Ukraine will likely come at a tangible cost to the American people in the form of rising gas prices and costs of living. America is facing hardships, including two years of a contentious COVID-19 pandemic, entrenched partisan polarization, a growing threat of violent domestic extremism, the normalization of armed politics, and a 40-year high rate of inflation. And Americans are growing increasingly distrustful of their political leaders and neighbors.
The original data point to a robust relationship between economic strain, group-level inequality, and support for violence. Insofar as Americans feel powerless to change these circumstances through peaceful institutionalized channels, they may choose to do so through violence. In some instances, this may result in increased violent protests. In other cases, domestic extremist groups may craft narratives exploiting these circumstances to inflate their ranks and justify violent acts against defined out-groups. Relatedly, Putin’s siren call has attracted radicalized U.S. persons to this new battlefront, who stand to return.
What does this mean moving forward?
We have identified risks already at play but can ease or worsen in the weeks and months ahead. Russia’s and the United States’ next steps will strongly shape this highly dynamic situation. Russian forces have opted to extend their operational range beyond the Donbas region, inevitably provoking a double-barreled response from the U.S. and the EU in the form of a severe and expanded set of targeted sanctions. This is necessary, but such punitive actions will further motivate Russia to bring the fight closer to the American homeland as a means of coercion. This means heightened vigilance and a “shields up” approach to safeguarding critical infrastructure and careful engagement with online sources of information.
Given the deep and situated intelligence that Russia has gathered about the individualized nature of the infrastructure and grievances across the United States, implications for what defenses should be raised are complicated. The Department of Homeland Security’s focus on State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) partnership is more important now than ever. Just as the attacks from Russia may vary, the U.S. approach will need to flex to local expertise of which vulnerabilities are most important to a given constituency.
Russian tank maneuvers aren’t coming to American soil anytime soon. Nonetheless, hostile actions aimed at undermining the security and stability of the U.S. are on the threshold. America’s resilience in this crisis will depend on targeted domestic policies to address these vulnerabilities.
Austin Doctor and Gina Ligon are faculty at the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (NCITE), University of Nebraska at Omaha.
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