Post-Truth and National Security: Background and Options for a New Administration

Gary L. Geipel, Post-Truth and National Security: Background and Options for a New Administration, No. 604, October 28, 2024

Dr. Gary L. Geipel
Dr. Gary L. Geipel is a Senior Associate at the National Institute for Public Policy, a professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, and a communications consultant to industry and public affairs clients. Previously, he held diverse analysis and communications roles in government, industry, and the nonprofit sector in the U.S. and abroad.

“Post-truth” describes an information environment characterized in particular by “truth decay,” to use a term coined by RAND scholars, in which verifiable facts are widely ignored or distrusted—replaced by opinion if not outright invention.[1]  In this author’s larger analysis, the major components of our post-truth environment are (1) the embrace of “narratives” over fact-based accounts of the world, (2) increasing “tribalism,” and (3) a breakdown of corrective institutions, leading to the “entrenchment” of these conditions on a massive scale.[2]  See Figure 1 for a summary graphic useful throughout this paper.

Based on the 2024 U.S. presidential election campaign—as thoroughly tribal and narrative-based as any in recent history—readers may find the notion that a new administration will care about “post-truth and national security” humorous at best.  As president, however, neither Kamala Harris nor Donald Trump will be able to bask in the forgiving waters of their post-truth campaigns.  Faced with actual decisions, a Harris or Trump administration will need to sort fact from torrents of fiction—or face potentially immense consequences.  Where U.S. national security is concerned, the challenges and risks of post-truth continue to grow apace.  Impressionistic, social-media-borne understandings of conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, for example, already have as much influence on U.S. policy as verifiable information and longstanding national or alliance interests.  The next administration will face constant decisions about whether to ignore, manage, or try to shape a digital information environment full of alternative realities.

This paper builds on earlier work by this author.[3]  It provides an update on post-truth conditions and their impact on national security, isolates the most pressing challenges for the United States, and offers responses that could be effective and practical for an incoming administration.

Definition

General Threats

National Security Scenarios

Narratives

Information Accuracy

Designed Crises / Ignorance

Tribalism

Decision Quality

Epistemic Coups

Entrenchment

National Resilience

Fatal Distractions

The large-scale narratives that power online information exchange consist of individual assertions that cohere into a larger notion of how some aspect of the world works.  Narratives are not collections of evidence put forward for questioning and eventual reassessment, however, in the manner of scientific paradigms.  Today’s dominant narratives usually emerge from dramatic events and fragments of information but evolve quickly into rigid dogmas—rigged elections, systemic racism, the power of the Deep State, catastrophic climate change, the Great Replacement, and Settler Colonialism are examples—to which any verifiable evidence must conform if it is considered at all.

The notion of what constitutes “news” itself has been upended in this environment, as the assembly of narrative-conforming storylines by “influencers” replaces anything resembling objective journalism.  As political scientist Jon Askonas aptly describes it: “Today, journalists sell compelling narratives that mold the chaotic torrent of events, Internet chatter, and information into readily understandable plotlines, characters, and scenes. … Like Scheherazade, if they can keep subscribers coming back for more of the story, they will stay alive.”[4]

Tribalism, meanwhile, describes the sorting of more and more individuals into antagonistic groups based on cultural, ethnic, and religious affinity, partisan alignment, and/or geographic proximity.  Social media platforms encourage—indeed compel, via powerful algorithms—the clustering of these tribes into silos where the only available information confirms the particular narratives to which they have subscribed or succumbed.   In this environment, many institutions that once offered correctives—such as traditional news organizations, universities, and even scientific organizations[5]—have taken the path of least resistance and greatest profit to protect and further entrench narratives and tribalism rather than to challenge them.[6]

As described in previous work, [7] the general threats to national security arising from the current information environment center on (1) the accuracy of information in widespread circulation; (2) the quality of decision-making amid epistemic chaos; and (3) the ultimate resilience of a nation operating without a shared fact base.  Examples of these growing threats include “designed crises,” “epistemic coups,” and “fatal distractions,” respectively.

Examples continue to multiply.  Consider the relationship between major narratives and official U.S. policy on today’s two most serious military conflicts.

Designed Ignorance 1: The Middle East

Designed Ignorance 2: Ukraine

U.S. Foreign Aid: Dodging an Epistemic Coup

Post-truth narratives on the Gaza and Ukraine conflicts afflict American perceptions across party lines.  These perceptions, in turn, influence national security decision-making in profound ways—mirror-imaged along the partisan spectrum.  Figure 2, for example, summarizes U.S. House votes by party faction on the April 2024 aid package.  Almost 20% of Democrats (on aid to Israel) and more than 50% of Republicans (on aid to Ukraine) voted in line with prevailing narratives that emerged on the fringes of their respective parties as just described—leaving the diminished ranks of “other Democrats” and “other Republicans” to take a broader view of the available facts and corresponding U.S. interests.

Source: Catie Edmondson et al., “How the House Voted on Foreign Aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan,” The New York Times (April 20, 2024).

Occasional grassroots opposition to some aspects of U.S. national security policy is not new.  In previous decades, however, it was limited mainly to situations in which the U.S. had sustained military casualties and large-scale expenditures over many years (as in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars).  Opposition arose due to verifiable “facts on the ground.”  In contrast, today’s post-truth information environment inflames poorly founded opinions of overseas conflicts with little direct U.S. involvement—inventing “facts” (see Israeli “genocide” and Ukrainian “decadence”) that do not exist on the ground.  American officials may experience considerable personal dissonance when making decisions in this environment but have not pushed back consistently against post-truth cascades.  The resulting U.S. policy tends toward vagueness and indecision.  Hamas and Hezbollah, their Iranian backers, and the Putin regime—some of America’s most potent adversaries—have been the beneficiaries.

Our post-truth information environment and its growing impact on national security raise three urgent considerations for policymakers.  First, America’s elected officials must prioritize this challenge.  Second, responses to post-truth must transcend rather than reinforce partisan and tribal divides if they are to have a chance of success.  Third, the United States should elevate the goals of transparency and individual human agency in responding to post-truth—to remain true to our American values in a world of powerful adversaries.

Prioritize This

Rarely have challenges with a clear impact on the security and well-being of the nation been relegated to such policy-political backwaters as those associated with the post-truth information environment.  As a result: far from questioning the epidemics of deception, hostility, and smugness in our recent public life, more and more Americans regard this state of affairs as normal.  The effects of post-truth are not fevers that will pass with time.  The choice to live entirely outside the digital realm is a choice that most Americans can no longer make.  Much of our citizenship and our professional and social lives take place in the online cacophony.  We must make the best of it—yet we have not really tried.

Though ubiquitous, the effects of post-truth are not impervious to leadership and human engagement.  Like other serious challenges, however, addressing them begins with acknowledging them.

Transcend the Policy Divide

The harmful manifestations of the post-truth information environment afflict all Americans and can only be addressed in a framework of reasonable consensus.

One of the most harmful impressions about post-truth—reinforced constantly in most academic and media coverage of disinformation—is that it is a problem primarily or solely of the American Right.  This author’s previous work presented numerous examples to show that no education level, professional class, or geography—let alone ideological orientation—inoculates one against mindsets and behaviors hard-wired into all of humanity.[27]  The ideologically blinkered way post-truth has been discussed contributes significantly to the standoff around potential responses.

On the one side—associated with the Democratic Party and the progressive Left—responses focus on identifying and reducing the online flow of “disinformation,” understood as false information capable of causing harm.  On the other side—associated with the Republican Party and the populist Right—responses focus on assuring “free speech” as an antidote to groupthink.  Not unreasonably, some conservatives believe that it is their free speech that is most at risk from restrictions on disinformation, which too many on the left define as information contrary to progressive dogma.

Ironically, effective responses to the post-truth information environment can be found precisely in the synthesis of these two views—but not in either of them alone.  Disinformation is the often-dangerous manifestation of post-truth while free speech sets the guardrails within which disinformation should be confronted.

Seen this way, an effective synthesis begins with acknowledging that disinformation cannot simply be purged.  As Renée DiResta describes it in a recent book, “[I]f we boot off the bad actors, filter nasty speech, or kill off the algorithms that help wild conspiracy theories trend, will we return to a less polarized, more harmonious way of relating to each other? No. That’s because the content itself reflects real opinions. Real demand.”[28]  That is a breakthrough insight worth emulating—from someone closely associated with the anti-disinformation side.

The free-speech imperative raises another serious question about the anti-disinformation approach: who will decide what is disinformation and what to fight?  One of the most bizarre and frightening ideas in response to post-truth is to appoint a federal government “reality czar”—as discussed in a typically one-sided New York Times assessment in 2021.[29]  Though the progressive Left in particular struggles to accept this, one person’s “reality” can be another’s coerced dystopia—as America’s experiences with the COVID-19 pandemic should have made clear.  No “czar” can sort these views into right and wrong in a free society.

At the same time, digital free speech without an understanding of risks and the possibility of error correction also is a path to bad outcomes.  Enjoying the freedom to speak does not equal the freedom to speak without challenge or rebuttal.  The government cannot supply that pushback, however.  Not even the digital platform companies can.  It will take an army of citizen-users of information platforms—better enlightened about what they are dealing with.

Encourage Transparency and Individual Control

Beyond preserving free speech, the other key considerations in a response to post-truth should be to maximize transparency and to expand the choices and tools available to individual citizens.

Transparency should take at least three forms.  First, the United States should greatly increase transparency about the post-truth problem itself.  This begins with elected officials willing to acknowledge that we are struggling to trust information and that the problem afflicts all of us—not just the usual suspects in the other party.

Second, transparency about the federal government’s response to post-truth is essential—especially where national security is concerned.  Any new commissions, laws, and offices created to deal with the problem should be rolled out with maximum detail and visibility—unlike the Biden Administration’s ill-conceived roll-out of a Department of Homeland Security “Disinformation Governance Board” in 2022.[30]  As citizens, Americans should know not only what their government is doing but who is involved, how the work is conducted, and how to access the assistance and tools that exist.

Finally, transparency is vital where the U.S. Government’s own “fact base” is concerned.  In an information environment where versions of reality can vary so widely as to prompt completely different responses, knowing in real time what its leaders believe and consider important is healthy for an open society.  This is not as simple as pointing to long-standing “Freedom of Information” options.  Nor is it as complicated (indeed impossible) as trying to capture every data point in the federal government’s decision process on myriad issues.  But especially when national security is involved—when alternative realities multiply and collide—knowing what presidents and their teams know, to the extent practicable, can be clarifying for all concerned.

Presidential addresses to the nation during a crisis served this purpose in the recent past and still could help.  Today, however, something akin to the Ukrainian government’s “pre-bunking” efforts before the February 2022 Russian invasion is needed as well.  As assessed by RAND, Ukraine’s efforts to share with domestic and international audiences what it knew about Russia’s intentions—and to debunk Russian disinformation in advance—contributed significantly to understanding and support for Kyiv.[31]  Except in rare instances—in which delicate “sources or methods” actually would be at risk—classification should not be a barrier to similar transparency in the United States.  The topic of U.S. Government information security exceeds this brief.  This author shares the view of political scientist Jon Askonas, however, that “reforms to the government secrecy system that serious critics from both political parties have demanded for fifty years, and a true recommitment to openness, can restore Americans’ faith in their institutions.”[32]

For similar reasons, the U.S. Government and its citizens would benefit from information tracking efforts that do not rely on classified sources at all.  New private-sector tools, for example, promise an ability to track the content, origins, and reach of digital narratives—giving decision-makers time to assess and respond to such information flow and citizens a better sense of what is being discussed outside their siloes.[33]  Recently, for example, a tool created by the firm Edge Theory compared “narrative slants on nuclear doctrine”—and other live topics— originating with Western media and “foreign malign sources.”[34]

In addition to transparency, post-truth responses that play to the historical strengths of American society should encourage individual control over online engagement.  One such effort—largely funded by investor Frank H. McCourt, Jr.—seeks to establish a new, open-source “Decentralized Social Networking Protocol (DSNP)” that “enables users to reclaim and control their data and can support a healthier digital ecosystem, where apps are interoperable, data is portable, and platforms must adhere to [individual users’] terms.”[35]  To demonstrate the viability of this new protocol and user-centric platform policies on a large scale, a McCourt-affiliated non-profit entity called Project Liberty is organizing a “People’s Bid” to acquire the TikTok social media platform.[36]

Somewhat more modestly, a growing group of academics focuses on the promise of so-called “middleware” to enhance the power of platform users.  Barak Richman and Francis Fukuyama elaborated on this approach in a 2021 essay: “A spate of third-party companies would create and operate software to curate and order the content that users see on their digital platforms, according to the users’ preferences.  Users could insert their preferred middleware as plug-ins to the platforms and thus choose their own trusted intermediary to sort their news, rank their searches, and order their feed.”[37]  Middleware has been criticized as little more than an additional siloing mechanism that could increase self-segregation.  Its advocates push back that—if combined with greater transparency about the harms of deception on digital platforms—middleware tuned to accuracy could become attractive to more and more users in the manner of proven career or investment advice.  The argument for middleware hinges on the possibly optimistic notion that truth will be recognized as more valuable than its alluring alternatives.

These and other means of equipping Americans to identify and resist disinformation may help them as individuals navigating a digitized society and as citizens concerned with national security.

Earlier work identified three broad types of policy responses to the post-truth information environment—encompassing norm-setting, technology-based responses, and education efforts.  This five-part agenda for consideration by incoming federal officials builds on that framework.

One—Above all: elected officials beginning with the President of the United States should acknowledge the heightened challenges of opinion formation, decision-making, and national resilience created by the digital information environment—making clear the implications for national security.  This should be done in a spirit of humility, emphasizing the susceptibility of Americans across ideological and party lines and committing the new administration to bipartisan problem-solving efforts.  The issue warrants initial elevation to a State of the Union-type setting or even a stand-alone address but must be reinforced regularly by the President; the Secretaries of Defense, Education, HHS, and State; and Congressional leaders.

Two—Linked to the national security risks of post-truth: the dangers of “always-online” socialization should be elevated to a public health emergency, recognizing their close connection to mental health (especially among young people), economic productivity, and other aspects of general well-being.  The U.S. response to the COVID-19 pandemic left many Americans with a dim view of such drills but also provided essential lessons on transparency, citizen engagement, and course correction to improve large-scale efforts in the future.  Virginia and other states have begun to test restrictions on smartphone use in public schools that should be given a chance.[38]  Large-scale awareness and education efforts are as important as restrictions and will be taken more seriously in a widely recognized emergency.

Three—Education should be the centerpiece of America’s response to post-truth.  In their online silos and embrace of alternative realities, Americans place not only their nation but also themselves and their families at serious risk—yet they remain largely in the dark about the nature of the problem or what to do about it.  A new administration should lead efforts to develop and promulgate curricula that equip Americans from a young age (a) to understand the difference between information and truth, facts and opinions, and evidence and impressions; (b) to approach information critically; (c) to recognize deception and propaganda; (d) to identify reliable authorities and seek them out; and (5) to challenge and revise their conclusions.  In a pervasively digital society, these skills are as important as reading, writing, and arithmetic.  To be effective, they must be imparted objectively—a daunting challenge for an education establishment notoriously one-sided in its ideological orientation.

Four—A new administration should encourage and invest in the rapid development of technology-based measures (a) to increase Americans’ control over their digital lives and (b) to track and understand virulent narratives likely to influence national security.  Fact-based middleware and new social networking protocols are examples of tools that could enhance control, but additional approaches should be encouraged simultaneously.  Where tracking tools are concerned, a new administration should make clear that its purpose is not to attack or outlaw competing views but to equip decision-makers (and ordinary citizens) to recognize and respond to information before millions have embraced it uncritically.  Such technologies should not become shadowy additions to the government’s intelligence suite but public resources to help all Americans establish a shared fact base.

Five—The United States has allies in its response to the post-truth information environment—as in other military-security realms—and should work closely with them to deal with our common challenges.  We can develop norms of digital truth-seeking together, and share ideas and best practices for education and technology-based responses.  The United States has essential values of free speech and societal openness in common with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and our allies in Asia, Oceania, and elsewhere.  In contrast, the governments of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia deliberately control information inside their own countries—and will spread these models of control if given a chance.

This agenda is an outline requiring additional detail.  It is exemplary rather than definitive.  It is intended above all to call for action.  America’s post-truth information environment and its impact on national security demand much higher-level, more even-handed, and more widespread attention than these problems have received from the handful of academics and activists who engage with them today.  Mastering the post-truth information environment without succumbing to authoritarianism or chaos will be an essential test of liberal societies in the 21^st Century.  It is time for the United States to meet that test.

This article appeared originally at National Institute for Public Policy.

[1] See Jennifer Kavanagh and Michael D. Rich, “Truth Decay: An Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Rose of Facts and Analysis in American Public Life,” RAND Corporate Research Report RR-2314-RC (2018).

[2] Gary L. Geipel, Reality Matters: National Security in a Post-Truth World, Occasional Paper, Vol. 3, No. 6 (Fairfax, VA:  National Institute Press, June 2023), available at https://nipp.org/papers/reality-matters-national-security-in-a-post-truth-world/.

[3] Ibid.

[4v] Jon Askonas, “How Stewart Made Tucker,” The New Atlantis (Summer 2022), available at https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/how-stewart-made-tucker.

[5] Geipel, op. cit., pp. 16-18, 43-44.

[6] See, for example, Martin Gurri, “Journalism Betrayed,” City Journal (Winter 2021), pp. 12-19.

[7] Geipel, op. cit., pp. 34-51.

[8] The Harvard Crimson (October 10, 2023), available at https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2023/10/10/psc-statement-backlash/.

[9] “An Open Letter from Participants in the Palestine Festival of Literature,” New York Review of Books (October 14, 2023), available at https://www.nybooks.com/online/2023/10/14/an-open-letter-from-participants-in-the-palestine-festival-of-literature/.

[x10] Brian Fung and Claire Duffy, “The Israel-Hamas war reveals how social media sells you the illusion of reality,” CNN (October 16, 2023), available at https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/14/tech/social-media-misinformation-israel-hamas/index.html.

[11] “I Can’t Erase All the Blood from My Mind,” Human Rights Watch (July 17, 2024), available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/07/17/i-cant-erase-all-blood-my-mind/palestinian-armed-groups-october-7-assault-israel.

[12] Laura Silver, et al., “Views of the Israel-Hamas War,” Pew Research Center (March 21, 2024), available at https://www.pewresearch.org/2024/03/21/views-of-the-israel-hamas-war/.

[13] Jamie Ballard, “Has genocide been happening in either Israel or Gaza?” YouGov.com (January 19, 2024), available at https://today.yougov.com/politics/articles/48442-has-genocide-been-happening-israel-gaza-americans-split-holocaust-native-americans-ukraine-poll.

[14] Center for Antisemitism Research, “Antisemitic Attitudes in America 2024,” ADL (February 29, 2024), available at https://extremismterms.adl.org/resources/report/antisemitic-attitudes-america-2024.

[15] “US and allies call for an immediate 21-day cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah,” Associated Press (September 25, 2024), and “Biden calls for ‘a cease-fire now’ amid Israel’s strikes in Lebanon,” Associated Press (September 30, 2024).

[16] Aamer Madhani antd Matthew Lee, “Biden and Harris call the Israeli strike killing Hezbollah’s Nasrallah a ‘measure of justice’,” The Washington Post (September 28, 2024), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/09/28/biden-hezbollah-nasrallah-israel-lebanon/3237d14c-7db9-11ef-980d-341a84fdff8f_story.html.

[17] Maria Ramirez Uribe, “How Kamala Harris and Donald Trump compare on Israel-Hamas war, two-state solution,” PolitiFact (September 11, 2024).

[18] “Kamala Harris makes the case in 60 Minutes interview for why she should be president,” CBS News 60 Minutes Overtime (October 7, 2024), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kamala-harris-2024-election-interview-60-minutes-transcript/.

[19] Alexandra Hutzler, “What Trump Has Said About Putin Since Russian Invasion of Ukraine Began,” Newsweek (March 14, 2022), available at https://www.newsweek.com/what-trump-has-said-about-putin-since-russian-invasion-ukraine-began-1687730.

[20] David French, “The Oddly Intense Anger Against Zelensky, Explained,” The Atlantic (December 23, 2022), https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2022/12/ukraine-aid-right-wing-republican-anger/676541/.

[21] Lionel Barber et al., “Vladimir Putin says liberalism has ‘become obsolete,’” Financial Times (June 27, 2019), available at https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36.

[22] “Trump promises to ‘settle’ war in Ukraine if elected,” PBS.com (September 11, 2024), available at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-trump-promises-to-settle-war-in-ukraine-if-elected.

[23] “Trump praises Russia’s military record in argument to stop funding Ukraine’s fight,” Associated Press (September 24, 2024.

[24] Richard Wike, et al., “Views of Russia and Putin,” Pew Research Center (May 8, 2024), available at https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/08/views-of-russia-and-putin/.

[25] Catie Edmondson et al., “How the House Voted on Foreign Aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan,” The New York Times (April 20, 2024).

[26] Nancy Youssef, “Trump Won’t Say if He Wants Ukraine to Win War With Russia,” wsj.com (September 11, 2024), available at https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/harris-trump-presidential-debate-election-2024/card/trump-won-t-say-if-he-wants-ukraine-to-win-war-with-russia-EJTMqfVZZFLB4kjn9fCJ?msockid=13fdbd3f53fc6d9b110fb2a352826c19.

[27] For example, Geipel, op. cit., pp. 21-27.

[28] Renée DiResta, Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality (PublicAffairs, 2024), p. 317.

[29] Kevin Roose, “How the Biden Administration Can Help Solve Our Reality Crisis,” The New York Times (February 2, 2021).

[30] “Disinformation head Nina Jankowicz resigns after DHS board is paused,” NBC News (May 19, 2022), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/dhs-disinformation-head-resigns-board-paused-rcna29578.

[31] Todd C. Helmus and Khrystyna Holynska, “Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation – Lessons for Future Conflict,” RAND Research Report (September 3, 2024), available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2771-1.html.

[32] Jon Askonas, “An America of Secrets,” The New Atlantis (Summer 2023), available at https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/an-america-of-secrets.

[33] See for example, “What is Narrative Intelligence,” EdgeTheory.com, available at https://edgetheory.com/narrative-intelligence.

[34] Available on LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/posts/activity-7233983714278391808-CmCY.

[35] See “5 Insights From Our Biggest Fight,” available at https://ourbiggestfight.com/key-insights/, and Frank H. McCourt, Jr., Our Biggest Fight: Reclaiming Liberty, Humanity, and Dignity in the Digital Age (Crown, 2024).

[36] “The People’s Bid for TikTok,” www.projectliberty.io, available at https://www.projectliberty.io/campaign/.

[37] Barak Richman and Francis Fukuyama, “How to Quiet the Megaphones of Facebook, Google, and Twitter,” Wall Street Journal (February 12, 2021).

[38] See, for example, Suzanne S. Youngkin, “Protect Kids From Social Media,” The Wall Street Journal (September 25, 2024).

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