Persian Partners—From Sparta to Hezbollah

Iran's proxy warfare strategy extends beyond mere command and control dynamics, encompassing complex alliances with both state and non-state groups. These partnerships, collectively known as the "Axis of Resistance," shape regional power dynamics. The term emerged in 2002 as a response to the US labeling Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis of evil," emphasizing resistance to US hegemony as the defining characteristic.

This curious cooperation is understood by realist scholars as ‘an axis of convenience.’ In this view, such partnerships represent a strategic realpolitik response to Iran's comparatively constrained conventional military strength, constituting a significant aspect of its regional security policy. A group’s Islamic credentials (or lack thereof) matters less than its willingness to converge with the Iranian leadership’s aim at self-preservation. In this way, for many decades Iran, a self-styled Islamic Shia republic, has supported a variety of secular, leftist, and Sunni Islamist groups.

The Shah also channeled money to Lebanese Shia through Iranian Ayatollahs, local Arab ayatollahs, and religious schools. He funded these and other groups strategically, in hopes that they could be useful to challenge Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism. Note that the justifications are virtually identical: “We should combat and contain the threat [of Nasserism] in the East coast of the Mediterranean [Lebanon] to prevent shedding blood on the Iranian soil.” 

The history of proxy wars, from ancient alliances to modern geopolitical strategies, underscores the enduring complexities of international relations. A reflection on such history can add to our understanding of the complexities of modern geopolitics. In the time of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta, fighting Athens not for some abstract notion of "Greek" unity but for its own self-preservation and dominance in the Peloponnese, found an unlikely ally in the form of Persia—a sprawling empire that it had fought just a decade earlier. The war remained undecided until the intervention of Persia. Led by the Spartan leader Lysander, the Spartan navy—funded by Persian aid—ultimately defeated Athens, marking the period of Spartan hegemony across Greece.

At first glance, this alliance seems paradoxical, even heretical to modern ears. How could the proud Spartans, champions of their own interests, stoop to solicit aid from the very empire they bled against? Why would Persia support an old enemy? Yet, delve deeper, and the complexities of this relationship begin to unfurl.

For Sparta, locked in a life-and-death struggle against the maritime might of Athens, Persian support offered a tantalizing opportunity—an opportunity to tip the scales of war in their favor.

Demaratus, a Spartan king who was at Thermopylae, but not on the side of Leonidas, adds another layer to this tale. Demaratus was in the camp of Xerxes, the Persian king. Driven into exile by political intrigue in Sparta, Demaratus found refuge among the Persians. As an advisor to Xerxes, Demaratus (something peculiarly missing from films like 300) played a pivotal role in shaping Persian strategy against his homeland.

Like Persia’s partnership with Sparta before it, Iran's contemporary engagement with groups today defy easy categorization. Its security cooperative with Christian Orthodox Armenia (against Shia Azerbaijan) transcends religious and ideological divides. Just as Sparta's alliance with Persia was forged in the crucible of necessity, so too is Iran's engagement with partners shaped by strategic imperatives and realpolitik considerations.

America’s own alignments are illuminating here. US-promoted “Democracy” summits are criticized for including participants not on democracy ratings, but for deference and loyalty to the US. And instead of simplistic flow-charts that capture the one-way direction leverage is imagined flowing in patron-client relationships, the reverse can also be seen. Recent engagements with Israel, for example, demonstrate that loyalty to partners and loyalty to stated values can clash. Reality can be a tough adversary and the blood in Gaza underscores the struggle of the "rules-based order" and international law. But, in these instances, when faced with a choice, President Biden consistently opts for maintaining alliances and strategic positioning over espoused "values."

Publicly, Washington doesn’t use its leverage to compel its will on Saudi and Israeli leadership. It appears wary of testing the limit of such influence. Consequently, the US finds itself in a state of limbo, accused of complicity yet also exerting minimal influence. But, this hesitancy also emboldens its partners, who sense America's indecision and use it to goad their “patrons” to do things against  their interest.

In their “We Now Know” (1998), International Relations (IR) theorists Richard L. Russel and John Lewis Gaddis write that during the Cold War, both regimes and rebels “learned to manipulate the Americans and Russians by laying on flattery, pledging solidarity, feigning indifference, threatening defection, or even raising the specter of their own collapse and the disastrous results that might flow from it.” We’ve seen this again under a number of different administrations, both republican and democrat—where for example former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that the Saudis wanted to “fight Iran to the last American.”

Washington's current strategy is centered on reducing the capability of Iran-partnered militias to attack the US rather than persuading them against targeting Americans in the first place. This focus on weakening attack capability, even at the risk of potential escalation, tacitly concedes that these strikes are unlikely to deter the militias. Recall that the bombing of the Houthis did little to stop their attacks.

A more effective approach would entail reducing the militia’s motivation to target the US, thereby rendering their capacity a lesser concern. One potential avenue for achieving this could be brokering a ceasefire in Gaza. Since the conflict in Gaza, there have been more than 160 attacks on US troops by militias, except for the 6 days when there was a ceasefire. Washington’s reluctance to pressure its Israeli partner for a ceasefire exposes US troops to unnecessary risk, resulting in the tragic deaths of five Americans, including two Navy SEALs  in the Red Sea.

By addressing the genuine grievances of these groups, rather than merely countering their narratives, and simultaneously employing appropriate coercive measures, the US stands a better chance of dissuading them from further violence. Honest acknowledgement of grievances, coupled with the presentation of viable alternatives and better solutions than offered by competitors, can help weaken the common bonds among such disparate entities.

Inadvertently, the US has encouraged groups to recognize common goals where an axis actually could form. The aim of foreign policy should be to disaggregate rivals, not motivate collaboration. By acknowledging the nuances of these relationships, we can hope to better understand and more effectively pursue constructive solutions to seemingly intractable conflicts.  

Siamak Tundra Naficy is a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Department of Defense Analysis. An anthropologist with an interdisciplinary approach to social, biological, psychological, and cultural issues, his interests range from the anthropological approach to conflict theory to wicked problems, sacred values, cognitive science, and animal behavior. The views expressed are the author’s and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army, or the Naval Postgraduate School.