
Sanctions on Iran Are Not Enough
Last updated 04:57 PM EDT • Read time: 5m
America should welcome demonstrations in Iran against the brutal regime, but not fool itself that current policy is a success story yet. These protests demonstrate the strength of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign; however, collapsing the Iranian economy is not an end unto itself that improves U.S. or regional security interests. Sanctions have contributed to the Iranian economy’s deterioration, but have not and will not alone deter Iran’s malign behavior or force the regime to return to the negotiating table.
There is no doubt that U.S. sanctions have impacted the Iranian economy. The World Bank predicts Iran’s economy will shrink by 8.7% this year, and the IMF estimates that Iran has only $86 billion in currency reserves, 20% below where it was in 2013 when it agreed to the first interim deal over its nuclear program. Iran’s leadership recently tried to make up for lost revenues by raising heavily subsidized oil prices by fifty percent, leading to widespread protests. The protestors have not limited their demands to economic concerns but are instead focusing on the anti-democratic nature of the regime and its continued willingness to send troops and money on increasingly unpopular adventures throughout the region. The protests go far beyond concerns over oil prices, which is a great concern for the regime.
Despite economic woes and the resulting widespread domestic unrest, however, Tehran has so far been able to actively continue its malign policies. The Trump administration's focus on using solely economic tools without also providing increased military deterrence or diplomatic engagement is not comprehensive enough to curb Iran's provocative activity. So while the U.S. has nearly exhausted every aspect of Iran’s economy that it can sanction, the result has been increasing Iranian regional aggression and violations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal.
Iran has also repeatedly struck U.S. interests throughout the Middle East this past year, including shooting down an American drone and attacking the world’s most important oil refinery at Abqaiq. Even after the U.S. added troops and air defenses to the region in response to these latest incidents, the Pentagon still warns that Iranian aggression is likely to continue. This provocative Iranian activity occurs in an environment where the U.S. has yet to define redlines, leaving the door open for unwanted major conflict.
Likewise, Iran has continued its support for terrorist proxies in Yemen, Syria, Gaza, Lebanon, and Iraq. Iran's recently revealed stockpiling of weapons in Iraq shows that it can still maintain its foreign expeditions, despite heavy sanctions. This commitment to a long-term military presence in Iraq suggests that even under sanctions, the Iranians could be a more reliable partner than the U.S., which is retreating from the Middle East. Sanctions are insufficient if the goal is not just to maintain the status quo but instead roll back Iranian involvement in these countries.
U.S. sanctions have also failed to deter Iran from violating the JCPOA. Iran’s initial breaches shortened its nuclear weapon breakout time but were reversible. However, Iran’s decision in November to reactivate its Fordow facility was its most provocative to date due to the facility’s defensive capabilities against bunker busting bombs. In early January, Iran is set to make yet another dangerous infringement.
To effectively counter Iran’s military and nuclear actions, the U.S. needs to establish a more credible deterrent posture, instead of merely relying on sanctions. Without military pressure, Iran’s provocations are likely to be more dangerous to U.S. interests as it becomes increasingly desperate for a deal.
Limiting Iran's ability to pressure either the U.S. or the Europeans through military means will direct the regime towards diplomacy, but only if the U.S. opens the diplomatic door. America's military options need not provoke a major conflict, and in fact, could help deter one. Through low-risk means, such as cyber or covert action, the U.S. can signal that it will no longer tolerate Iran's malign behavior without provoking an open confrontation.
Yet, these methods alone cannot eliminate the risks for escalation or the possibility that Iran will not continue its malign actions, so the U.S. should also consider combining these deniable means with more direct action. This should include increasing its interdiction of ships with weaponry bound for Iranian proxies throughout the Middle East. Since maritime interdiction activities are asset intensive, gaining coalition assistance in this endeavor is vital.
The U.S. should also add diplomatic pressure by aiding its partners in Iraq and Lebanon, who offer an alternative to Iranian control. Iran has shown the ability and willingness to dampen protests inside of its borders, but recent protests against Iranian-backed governments are also a challenge to the long-term success of Iran’s regional project. Tehran’s desire to spread its ideology and become a hegemon throughout the Middle East is core to the Islamic Republic’s identity, so growing dissatisfaction with the regime in these countries is a threat to its legitimacy.
With its economy continuing a downward spiral, Iran faces the decision to again lash out at U.S. and European interests or return to the negotiating table. Sanctions have given the U.S. significant leverage over the Iranians, but a more comprehensive approach that better leverages military deterrence capabilities and diplomatic initiatives can do much more to achieve an actual "maximum pressure" campaign.
Vice Admiral John W. Miller, USN (ret.) is former Commander of U.S. Fifth Fleet and a participant of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) 2018 Generals and Admirals program. Ari Cicurel is a policy analyst at JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy.

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