4 Trends That Will Define the South China Sea

Strategic Background

Of course, former FM Yang has not been the only senior official to voice these sentiments.  In September 2015, when asked about construction on China’s artificial islands, PLA military expert Colonel Li Jie replied flatly that, “This is our backyard, we can decide what vegetables or flowers we want to grow.”  That same month, Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai, the commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) North Sea Fleet, spoke at an international conference in London on a panel with senior U.S. and Japanese military officials.  With the American and Japanese officials seated next to him, Vice Admiral Yuan asserted that, “the South China Sea, as the name indicates, is a sea area that belongs to China.  And the sea from the Han dynasty a long time ago where the Chinese people have been working and producing from the sea.”  To this end, China’s “nine-dash line” is a portrayal of the PRC’s claims in the South China Sea.  The “nine-dash line” is deliberately ambiguous and virtually every country in the region has ongoing challenges with the claims it asserts.  However, that has not stopped China from acting to secure their interests. 

Photo Credit: MarEx

The South China Sea is one of the most volatile regions in the world and one of the most rapidly changing.  These four trends, based on China’s past actions, will define the future:

Trend 1: China will build more artificial islands, expand existing ones, and will continue to place “defensive” weapon systems on these islands.

According to a 2015 U.S. Defense Department’s Report, “China often uses a progression of small, incremental steps to increase its effective control over disputed territories and avoid escalation to military conflict,” a phenomenon known as “low-intensity coercion.”  A key element of low-intensity coercion has been China’s land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea.  At the most basic level, China builds artificial islands because it advances their interests, and in theory will help them enforce their claims.  In 2014, China began their land-reclaiming efforts in the Spratly islands and have since reclaimed approximately 3,000 acres of land through dredging sand on seven different locations.  The yellow dots below indicate China’s reclaimed outposts: Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Gaven Reef.                         

 Photo credit: CSIS

China’s current outposts in the South China Sea, where they are building airfields and harbors, enable them to conduct longer patrols and maintain a presence around the disputed islands.  What is significant to consider for the future is that China has proven that they can reclaim land and that they can do it very quickly.  China’s outpost built on Fiery Cross Reef was, at one point, a 90 m by 90 m block of dredged sand atop a reef, three short months later, China had transformed the outpost to an island 200-300 m wide and roughly 100,000 square meters in area.  The pace of their infrastructure construction is equally impressive; the airstrip at Fiery Cross Reef took approximately seven months to complete.  And the airstrips on Subi Reef and Mischief Reef are nearing completion at a much faster rate.  On October 10, 2015, Newsweek reported that a senior Chinese official speaking anonymously, asserted that, “There are 209 land features still unoccupied in the South China Sea and we could seize them all. And we could build on them in 18 months.”  A few weeks later, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, stated that, “The United States joins virtually everyone else in the region in being deeply concerned about the pace and scope of land reclamation in the South China Sea.”

Also concerning is the placement of what the Chinese call “defensive” weapons on their outposts in the region.  In May 2015, the United States announced that the Chinese had placed mobile artillery systems on some of their reclaimed islands.  According to the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), the majority of the seven reclaimed outposts are believed to have air-defense gun embankments.  Just this week, the United States revealed that China had placed two batteries of the HQ-9 anti-aircraft system and radar targeting arrays on Woody Island in the Paracels.  In response to this provocation, Secretary of State John Kerry said, “When President Xi was here in Washington, he stood in the Rose Garden with President Obama and said China will not militarize the South China Sea. But there is evidence every day that there has been an increase in militarization.”  

This is not the first time China has positioned advanced military equipment on Woody Island.  In October 2015, China deployed J-11 BH/BHS 4^th generation fighter aircraft to the island.  Although it is likely not a long-term deployment, it is particularly troubling considering the airstrips China has built or is building on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef.  These airstrips could easily serve as launching points or refueling depots for military aircraft in the near future.  Ultimately, China will continue to build, expand, and arm artificial islands in the South China Sea because they believe that, as Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai said, “the South China Sea, as the name indicates, is a sea area that belongs to China.”

Trend 2: China will seek to establish supplementary Air Defense Identification Zones.

An Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ, is the airspace over land or water in which aircraft are subject to identification, control, and other procedures as identified by the host country in the interest of national security.  Basically, it is a security buffer zone.  On November 23, 2013 China’s Ministry of Defense declared the establishment of an East China Sea ADIZ.  This ADIZ was particularly controversial because its boundaries overlapped those of a Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese ADIZ and also covered the Senkaku islands (referred to as the Diaoyu islands by China and the site of an ongoing dispute between the two nations).  According to Xinhua Net News, the official press agency of the People’s Republic of China, the new rules required that aircraft flying in the East China Sea ADIZ provide the following means of identification:

1.     Flight plan identification.

2.     Radio identification.

3.     Transponder identification.

4.     Logo identification. 

It also stated that, “China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.”  In response to China’s announcement, a State Department statement from Secretary John Kerry on that same day declared, “This unilateral action constitutes an attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea. Escalatory action will only increase tensions in the region and create risks of an incident.” 

Many nations believe that China’s actions constitute a violation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 87 that guarantees the right to freedom of overflight and the freedom of navigation on the high seas to all states.  The problem with these types of situations is that if the ADIZ is established and allowed to operate unchallenged, China’s actions quickly establish a precedent.  In this case, to underscore the importance of freedom of overflight and navigation, and to highlight the illegitimate establishment of this ADIZ, the United States flew a pair of B-52’s through the airspace and directly over the disputed islands in accordance with international law without following the protocol China demanded. 

Ancillary Air Defense Identification Zones, like this one in the East China Sea, have been described as the building blocks of what will become China’s “Great Wall in the Sky.”  By building more islands and establishing an ADIZ over the surrounding area, China can effectively extend their airspace much farther from their mainland by linking these zones together.  As mentioned above, China operates by executing an incremental, logically progressing plan to achieve their strategic goals.  That is exactly what they are doing now.  Here is an example: In early January 2016, China landed several civilian planes on the newly constructed airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef, ostensibly to just test the navigation and approach systems.  However, many recognize that landing civilian aircraft on the reclaimed island as just a precursor that will inevitably lead to military aircraft landing on Fiery Cross and eventually to the establishment of an ADIZ.  In the past, China attempted to establish an ADIZ in the East China Sea, a tenuous position that the United States and many nations challenged.  In the future, China will attempt to create more Air Defense Identification Zones, particularly in the South China Sea, and endeavor to link them together over time. 

Trend 3: There will be an increase in Chinese Coast Guard and merchant traffic in the vicinity of their artificial islands.

China’s use of their burgeoning coast guard and civilian merchant vessels to enforce their maritime claims is a prime illustration of their mastery of low-intensity coercion.  In the past, China has relied heavily on their coast guard and civilian fleets, and there are no indications this trend will slow down.  In fact, China’s distant fishing fleet has grown to become the largest in the world with over 2,000 vessels.  Additionally, China’s Coast Guard (CCG) is more than twice as large as any of their neighbors and they just built the largest coast guard patrol craft in the world.  However, it is not only the massive size of their fleet but also how China employs it that has generated so much interest.  The 2015 DOD report on China’s military stated that, “China uses the quantity and advanced capabilities of its CCG assets to overwhelm and deter South China Sea claimant nations with the goal of eventually compelling regional acceptance of China’s sovereignty claims.”

Because of its sheer number of Coast Guard ships, China is able to maintain a nearly ubiquitous presence in disputed areas in the South China Sea and uses these ships to enforce their claims.  A prime example of the impact of these ships in the region took place on Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands in March 2014.  Second Thomas Shoal is where the Philippines man a tanker ship that was intentionally run aground on the reef to serve as an outpost.  In this incident, China Coast Guard ships deliberately blocked a resupply mission for the Philippine personnel at Second Thomas Shoal.  The CCG attempted to block a second resupply run that same month but was unsuccessful.  This incident exhibits the lengths China is willing to go to enforce their maritime claims at the expense of other smaller nations.  Both China and the Philippines continue to have a dispute over Second Thomas Shoal and the surrounding waters. 

By relying on non-combatant vessels to lay claim to disputed regions, China hopes to lay the foundation for its sovereignty claim.  These ships can also defend China’s interests and confront merchant and fishing vessels from other nations while not drawing nearly as much consternation and condemnation from the international community as if they used their naval warships to enforce their territorial claims.  This trend will certainly continue. 

Trend 4: Countries in the region will increase defense spending to counter China.

From 2005-2014, China’s military budget grew at an average of 9.5 percent per year.  Their substantial military spending has paid dividends; they possess the largest number of naval vessels in Asia, a growing submarine fleet, the largest air force in Asia, and at over 2.3 million active military personnel they can boast the largest military in the world.  In order to balance and counter China’s growing influence, other neighboring nations will increase their defense spending and invest in noteworthy military advancements.  In fact, many countries have already made significant military developments. 

From 2010 to 2014, all countries in Southeast Asia strongly increased their military spending.  The top three greatest increases in that time span were Vietnam (59.1% increase), Cambodia (56.2% increase), and Indonesia (50.6% increase).  On average, defense spending in the region grew by approximately 37%.  While Cambodia is generally supportive of China, Vietnam and Indonesia have ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea with the PRC.

                        Photo credit: SIPRI Dataset

These defense increases reflect the reality that China’s military is rapidly advancing and making several countries concerned enough to make similar investments.  Vietnam has made protecting its maritime sovereignty a key pillar of its strategy, increased its Kilo submarine force to six vessels by 2017, upgraded its coast guard force, augmented its air defenses, and strengthened its surface fleet (in part with an $18 million guarantee from the United States in 2015 for Vietnam to purchase two U.S. patrol boats).  Indonesia is planning to establish a “Minimum Essential Force” (MEF) by 2029 that focuses on acquiring 274 ships, 12 new submarines, and 10 fighter squadrons.  The Indonesian Government also announced in July 2015 that it plans to build a new military base to guard their interests in the South China Sea on the Natuna Islands.  Furthermore, they are preparing to deploy a squadron of Sukhoi fighter aircraft and four Apache attack helicopters to its Natuna Island outpost.  The Philippines’ 2016 budget includes an unprecedented 25% increase in defense spending.  Most of the funds will be used to acquire patrol aircraft and naval frigates to help enforce its claims in the region.  These three countries only represent a microcosm of what is unfolding in the South China Sea.  The international community is witnessing countries investing significant financial resources on long-term plans to grow their military to counter China and defend their interests in the future.  This trend will continue as long as China maintains its current activities in the South China Sea.

The Future

While China will certainly seek to maximize their influence in the region, the international community must not automatically equate China as an enemy and view the events in the South China Sea as an inevitable march to conflict.  The results of the pending China-Philippines UN tribunal that contests the “nine-dash line” policy and China’s reclaimed outposts, and how China responds, will be indicative of China’s intentions in the region.  Depending on the outcome reached later this year, it could have a dramatic effect on stability in the South China Sea.  However, the international community must continue to work through established channels and existing legislation to solve complex territorial disputes.  When any country is found to violate international agreements like the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) they should be held accountable.

There are also several steps the United States and international community must continue.  First, freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) are absolutely critical to maintain peace, counter illegitimate territorial claims, and uphold maritime security.  FONOPS should be continued to the max extent practicable by the United States and partner nations.  Furthermore, these FONOPS should not be directed solely at China, but anywhere necessary to uphold international law.  As Secretary of Defense Carter noted, the United States will continue to “fly, sail, and operate anywhere international law permits.” 

Second, the United States should seek to increase military partnership, training exercises, and mil-mil exchanges.  This engagement must include China.  Even in the past two years, we have seen signs of progress between the two nations; China participated in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2014 for the first time, China and the United States conducted joint anti-piracy training in the Horn of Africa, and in November 2015 Chinese naval ships visited the United States while the destroyer USS STETHEM conducted a reciprocal port visit in Shanghai.  These cross-cultural opportunities are inherently valuable and can help minimize the chance of any misunderstandings of intentions that may arise.    

No one can foresee exactly what will unfold in the future in the South China Sea.  Based on China’s strategic vision and past trends, it is highly probable that China will continue with their land reclamation projects, they will position “defensive” weapons throughout the SCS on their outposts, they will create more Air Defense Identification Zones, they will continue to enforce their claims with coast guard and civilian vessels as much as possible, and their actions will drive neighboring nations to increase their defense spending to counter an increasingly more powerful China.

Andrew Poulin is a Naval Officer currently assigned to the State Department.  The ideas expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense or Department of State.