What Would Thucydides Say?
Published April 7, 2015 • Read time: 7m
WWTS? What would Thucydides say?
Glad you asked. This is World War I week for our senior course in Newport. That’s when I lecture on the statecraft of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and review America’s part in the Great War. The conflict remains a cipher in large measure, fully a century after armies dug trenches along the Western Front and stalemate set in.
Historians still quarrel about its causes, and wonder why the fighting dragged on for so long—and at such frightful cost—considering the modest goals the combatants entertained. Seldom is consulting classical antiquity a bad way to grapple with such complex, or mercurial, or obscure matters. Over the years the father of history has helped me puzzle out topics from Taiwan’s defense strategy to the impact of demographic decline on grand strategy to China’s and Russia’s aircraft-carrier ambitions.
Verily, then, Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War remains the Good Book for matters strategic. One of his central takeaways: individuals are not powerless amid the hothouse surroundings of power politics. Indeed, in his rendering Athenians and Spartans made fateful decisions all the time—for good or, often, for ill.
Yes, Thucydides ascribes the outbreak of war to the rise of Athenian power and the fear Athens’ ascent stoked in Sparta, regnant hegemon of the 5th-century-B.C. Greek world. Sparta feared losing out. It deployed force of arms to head off what looked like a mortal threat. Extrapolating from there, it’s safe to conclude that when a new competitor arises to challenge a hegemon, the newcomer and the oldtimer fight for supremacy.
Simple, eh? Except oftentimes they don’t. Oracles supply cryptic advice when asked, leaving the hearers to debate how to implement it. The gods punish hubris—overweening arrogance—with nemesis, or divine countermeasures. There would be no need for such devices were humans slave to vast, impersonal forces.
Shifting balances of power may bias human decisions toward war, then, but they don’t predetermine decisions. Thucydides predicts nothing. He admits he merely surmised that a shifting power balance precipitated the Peloponnesian War. Few of his contemporaries framed matters in terms that stark.
But even if he pegs the “truest cause” of the Peloponnesian War, it’s unclear he means to infer a general law of international relations from what was, after all, a single case among ages of human competition and warfare. Drawing world-historical conclusions from a sample size of one courts peril.
In all likelihood, furthermore, he’d be the first to warn against reducing his teachings to a simple formula. Fatalism will set in should we resign ourselves to the precept that the cycle of rise-and-fall brings war. If it’s foreordained that power transitions beget war, then the only thing to do is arm ourselves to the teeth—and gird ourselves for the bloody enterprises a vindictive Fate has in store.
That’s a worldview worth rejecting. The geostrategic environment channels thought and action while limiting and even foreclosing some options. But free will endures.
Thucydides’ chronicle shows it. His Athens blunders repeatedly during its 27-year war against oligarchic Sparta. Statesmen and generals flirt with hubris, and at times go far beyond flirting. Yet the city rebounds time and again, tapping the dynamism that suffused Athenian democracy and seafaring culture. Thucydides’ protagonists are not inert, doomed to go where vast impersonal forces take them.
Indeed, even Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War lasted only a moment by historical standards. The city bounced back once again, rebuilding its navy while fashioning a second maritime league. Sparta’s victory proved perishable by contrast. Indeed, Sparta fell to rival Thebes a mere 33 years after its fleet entered the port of Athens in triumph. Fear, honor, and self-interest may act as prime movers for human affairs, as Thucydides maintains, but they aren’t a trap. We aren’t captive to passions, or to cost/benefit algorithms, or to external forces.
So ends today’s sojourn through ancient Greece. The Great War helps debunk the idea that the emergence of new great powers inevitably gives rise to a trial of arms between the gatekeeper of the ancien régime and the upstart trying to crash through the gate. If Thucydides’ supposed doctrine was a trap, Great Britain should’ve been overwhelmed by enemies. After all, Britannia confronted not one but three powers on the rise: Germany, Japan, and the United States. Abandon all hope!
It seems the logic of rise-and-fall falters when the champ squares off against multiple contenders at the same time. Or least Thucydides’ logic can falter when the international geometry gets complicated. A century ago it led neither to war between the hegemon and an alliance among the challengers, nor to three mano a mano bouts.
Reality was messier. In the Great War, one of the challengers—America—joined hegemonic Great Britain to squash aggression from the third, Imperial Germany. Another, Imperial Japan, joined the Allied effort in a peripheral role.
Why did the antebellum years deviate from Thucydides’ script? Geographic distance helps explain why, for one thing. Germany lay just across the North Sea from the British Isles. Its High Seas Fleet, a would-be peer to the Royal Navy, pointed a dagger at Britannia from knife-fight range. By contrast, North America lay 3,000 miles away. Japan was farther away still, and had been a British ally since 1902. While their interests sometimes clashed with Britain’s, then, the United States and Japan weren’t natural enemies of Britain. The Kaiser’s Germany was.
For another, social and cultural affinities and friction points made a difference, as did the nature of the ruling regime in each country. The United States and Great Britain stemmed from a common heritage and had more or less like-minded liberal regimes. Germany and Japan were under imperial regimes that afforded military and naval officials plenty of room to meddle in foreign policy and grand strategy. That made them dangerous and unpredictable.
But again, Germany was close by, Japan far away. Arming for war under the leadership of the erratic Kaiser concentrated British minds, while Japanese ambitions remained hypothetical until the 1930s, when Tokyo ran amuck first in Manchuria, then in China proper, and finally in maritime Asia. Had the Japanese leadership exercised prudent self-restraint, it’s possible Thucydidean logic may never have taken hold in the Far East.
And finally, deliberate human decisions mattered. The Anglo-German naval arms race commenced around 1900, when a series of German navy laws ordained construction of a big-gun battleship fleet. Seeing this, British statesmen did something rare in the history of empires: rather than cling to every commitment, they started drawing down secondary commitments.
Freeing up resources and energy in faraway theaters let them refocus close to home. North American and Far Eastern squadrons returned to home waters. London struck up arrangements with Washington and Tokyo whereby the Royal Navy went away and these regional powers agreed to safeguard British interests in their neighborhoods. America and Britain never fought. Only much later did war with Japan come.
This foray into yesteryear is worth undertaking if only because the World War I epoch bears striking resemblance to today (alongside some noteworthy differences, such as nuclear weapons). This age, like that, is an age of globalization. A global sea power presides over the liberal order of seagoing trade and commerce. Great-power politics is kaleidoscopic, with multiple challengers on the ascent, a global power under strain, and other great powers—Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman power then, the European Union today—on the wane by diplomatic and military indices.
Thucydides lived in a kaleidoscopic era all his own. Classical Greece was far more than Athens and Sparta. Many, many city-states comprised the Aegean world—each of whose fortunes were brightening, dimming, or stagnant. He would instantly comprehend today’s setting, and that of a century ago. The rise and fall of states is important. It’s doubtful Thucydides meant to depict it as all-important—let alone as a crystal ball.
James Holmes is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Monthly Best Book of 2010. He is RCD’s new national security columnist. The views voiced here are his alone.

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