
The False Choice That Could Get Us Killed
Published Nov. 17, 2026 • Read time: 10m
America's strategists are still fighting the last Cold War with categories that no longer exist.
For sixty years, American nuclear strategy and corresponding arguments over missile defense have been organized around a choice: counterforce or countervalue? Will our nuclear armed adversaries target our nuclear and strategic weapons enterprise, or will it target what it thinks we value more — cities, population, and industrial capacity? And conversely, what choice will we make regarding their target set? While it is a bit of an over-generalization, hawks on each side favored counterforce. Non-hawks and doves favored countervalue, or more precisely, the threat of countervalue retaliation as the foundation of deterrence. Entire careers were built on this debate. Treaties were negotiated around it. The intellectual architecture of the nuclear age rests on the assumption that these are two different things. They may have been in the 1950s, but are not now. The failure to recognize this may be the most dangerous strategic blind spot in American defense policy today.
The counterforce/countervalue distinction made sense in the world that created it. In the early 1960s, when Thomas Schelling was writing Arms and Influence and Herman Kahn was publishing On Thermonuclear War, the American nuclear enterprise was geographically separable from the American population. Minuteman missiles sat in silos scattered across the empty plains of Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota. Strategic Air Command bombers operated from bases in rural Kansas and Nebraska. The targets that mattered militarily and the populations that mattered morally occupied different zip codes. Our Soviet adversaries could, in theory, design a strike against one that spared the other. Similarly, we could have designed a limited missile defense to defend those nuclear sites or their command and control, while leaving countervalue targets vulnerable, thus not adversely impacting strategic deterrence. Yes, this is exactly what the Soviets did with their dense missile defense of Moscow. That theoretical separability between counterforce and countervalue target sets was the premise on which deterrence theory and supporting ideas on escalation were originally built. The premise is no longer true.
Consider what has happened to the American defense industrial base and the nuclear and strategic weapons enterprise over the past half-century. The facilities that design, build, maintain, and command the nuclear deterrent have become deeply embedded in civilian population centers — not by accident, but by the economic logic of defense industrialization. Workers need housing. Housing creates towns. Towns create economies. Economies attract more workers. Over decades, the military installations, and the civilian communities around them fused into single, inseparable entities.
Offutt Air Force Base exemplifies how the classic Cold War distinction between counterforce and countervalue targeting has evaporated into a strategic fiction. As the home of U.S. Strategic Command’s Global Operations Center, the operational nerve center of the entire American nuclear triad, Offutt is the quintessential counterforce target, an essential first-strike objective for any adversary seeking to sever U.S. nuclear command and control. Yet because that hardened facility sits embedded within the Omaha metropolitan area, surrounded by roughly 65,000 to 80,000 civilians living within a five-mile radius in Bellevue and eastern Sarpy County, any warhead aimed at decapitating STRATCOM simultaneously functions as a countervalue strike inflicting mass civilian casualties. A strategic weapon directed at Omaha does not discriminate between the counterforce target and the countervalue population. They are the same target.
This pattern repeats at every critical node of the American nuclear enterprise with the single exception of our actual land-based missile silos. The Pantex Plant outside Amarillo, Texas — the only facility in the country that assembles and disassembles nuclear warheads, is surrounded by a quarter-million people whose economic existence depends on the plant. The Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which processes the enriched uranium that sustains the stockpile, sits next to a metropolitan area of 900,000. Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, home port for the Pacific Fleet's ballistic missile submarines, is nestled within the Seattle-Tacoma metro area of four million. U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base — the nerve center that would coordinate any nuclear response, is embedded in metropolitan Omaha. The Pentagon, the intelligence agencies, and the national command authority are all located in Washington, D.C., a metro area of six million.
An adversary looking at these targets does not see a menu of counterforce and countervalue options. It sees a set of nodes where the strategic and the civilian are physically identical. Destroying the shipyard means destroying the town. Destroying the command center means destroying the city. The workforce is not adjacent to the weapon system. The workforce is the weapon system. This collapse of categories has consequences that neither hawks nor doves have fully reckoned with, especially as they argue over whether the construction and deployment of a Golden Dome or a comprehensive missile defense enterprise to defeat nuclear, conventional, and hypersonic threats is escalatory or destabilizes deterrence.
For the hawks, the counterforce strategists who argued, following Kahn, that credible deterrence required the ability to fight and limit a nuclear war, the fusion of targets eliminates the scenario they planned for. Limited counterforce strikes with manageable civilian casualties are no longer possible against the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, because every counterforce target of consequence is also a countervalue target. You cannot surgically remove the U.S.'s ability to command and control nuclear forces without killing tens of thousands of civilians in Omaha. You cannot destroy warhead production without devastating Amarillo. The "clean" counterforce strike is a fantasy from an era when weapons were built in deserts and tested on atolls.
For the doves, the arms controllers who argued, following Schelling, that stable deterrence rested on mutual vulnerability and the credible threat of countervalue retaliation, the fusion is equally disruptive. Schelling's framework assumed that leaving populations vulnerable was the price of stability: if both sides knew their cities were hostage, neither would strike first. But if the adversary's most attractive military targets are also population centers, then a "counterforce" strike automatically delivers the countervalue punishment that was supposed to deter it. The distinction between the act Schelling wanted to prevent and the act he wanted to threaten has dissolved. An adversary launching what it considers a limited military strike is simultaneously committing the mass civilian atrocity that should, in theory, trigger the very retaliation it was trying to pre-empt.
This paradox should be clarifying, but instead it has been ignored — because acknowledging it requires abandoning the conceptual vocabulary that three-plus generations of strategists were trained to use. And it requires some to abandon long-held beliefs about missile defense being escalatory, which is a politically uncomfortable and unacceptable position from some, due to the current administration’s advocacy of Golden Dome.
Here is what the collapse of the old paradigm means for American strategy.
First, the most dangerous scenario is not a bolt-from-the-blue full-scale nuclear attack. It is a limited strike, perhaps a dozen warheads, aimed at the handful of facilities that sustain the American nuclear deterrent over time. An adversary that destroys Pantex, Y-12, key submarine industrial base sites, and Strategic Command headquarters has not launched Armageddon. It has launched a precisely targeted attack against a small number of sites. But it has functionally ended America's ability to remain a nuclear power over the long term: No new submarines. No warhead maintenance. No enriched uranium. No centralized command. The existing deployed arsenal remains, but it becomes a wasting asset with no industrial base to sustain it. This is not a scenario from a previous Tom Clancy novel. It is the logical endpoint of counterforce thinking applied to the actual geography of the American nuclear enterprise.
Second, the traditional argument that defending against nuclear attack via a comprehensive missile defense architecture is destabilizing needs to be re-examined in light of this reality. The Schelling-era case against missile defense rested on the assumption that it threatened the adversary's retaliatory capability — that a country behind a defensive shield might be tempted to strike first, knowing it could absorb the weakened response. That logic holds when defense aims to protect the entire population or neutralize the adversary's entire arsenal. But defending the specific nodes where strategic infrastructure and civilian population overlap does something different. It denies the adversary the option of a limited, "surgical" strike that achieves strategic disarmament below the threshold of total war. It does not threaten the adversary's deterrent — their thousands of remaining warheads can still reach targets not covered by any defense. What it does is eliminate the most tempting and dangerous scenario: the one where a small number of weapons, whether nuclear or hypersonic, achieve an outsized strategic result.
Third, deterrence itself is strengthened, not weakened, when an adversary cannot separate its counterforce objectives from countervalue consequences. If every military target an adversary considers striking is also a city full of civilians, the adversary must confront the full moral and escalatory weight of its action at every level of conflict — not just at the top of the escalation ladder. There is no "limited" option that avoids mass casualties. There is no "proportionate" response to a counterforce strike that killed 50,000 civilians in and around Omaha. The fusion of targets raises the threshold for any nuclear use, not just all-out war, because it eliminates the comforting fiction that nuclear weapons can be used precisely against military targets with "acceptable" civilian losses.
This is, in fact, the strongest argument for why the United States should stop debating nuclear strategy and missile defense in Cold War categories, and start describing the world as it actually is, which further includes the advent of non-nuclear hypersonic missiles, fractional orbital bombardment (FOB), and non-nuclear strategic attacks and effects. The countervalue/counterforce distinction was never a fact about the world. It was an analytical convenience — a way to organize thinking about targets that happened to be geographically separable in the 1960s. The geography, technology, and capabilities have changed. The categories have not. And the gap between the two is where the strategic risk and danger lives, and where it could also be mitigated via missile defense – Golden Dome.
The strategists and even Members of Congress who insist on fitting today's reality into yesterday's framework are not being rigorous. They are being nostalgic. And nostalgia in strategy and defense policy is not charming; but rather, it is lethal. The first step toward a coherent American strategic posture in the late 2020s and early 2030s is admitting that the choice between countervalue and counterforce — the choice that has organized every serious nuclear debate since Eisenhower, is a choice that no longer exists. What we do with that recognition as we continue to debate the merits of Golden Dome, space-based interceptors, or the exorbitant cost estimates of national missile defense will determine whether deterrence holds or fails. But we cannot even begin that conversation until we stop pretending the old categories routinely weaponized by those opposed to Golden Dome and missile defense still describe anything real.
Adam Strickland is a retired Marine Corps Infantry Officer, and now the Senior Director of the Future Warfare Initiative at Anduril.

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