Command or Staff? A Look at O-5 Talent Management in the Army

I spoke to a friend of mine a few weeks ago who is currently serving as a garrison commander. This friend and I have known each other for a long while, and I’ve seen his capability, character and problem-solving abilities demonstrated on many occasions. As a special forces guy, the Army has sunk a good bit of money and time into selecting and assessing him, training him, and over the course of his career, developing him professionally to do all sorts of difficult, strategically important work. As a sitting O-5 commander, he’s been specifically, assessed, selected, and groomed (again) by the Army as a future senior leader because of his demonstrated ability and potential to tackle major issues and lead folks in and out of combat. By all Army metrics, he is the best of the best at what he does.

At the O-5 level, even the most important billets in the command are filled in this haphazard manner, and even when the right guy does end up in the right billet, he usually isn’t there for more than a year to ensure he is properly broadened. This ensures that at any given time, most of the people in key, field grade positions throughout the command are in the process of learning about (rather than effectively managing) the people, systems, and problems they are responsible for. This sounds like hyperbole, but it isn’t. Sit through the execution of any GCC level exercise, and you’ll see what I mean.

The trouble is, that some of the field grade positions at our command are actually important. O-5 staff officers are often the people responsible for developing the plans the DoD will use to execute national policy across the entire theater. They manage relationships (on behalf of their bosses) with senior DoD personnel at embassies, and with partner nation military leaders. They serve as the forward leads for major exercises. The run the planning groups that drive force allocation. Compare that to the scope of a garrison commander and then ask yourself which job is more important to the country.

I don’t deny that garrison commanders provide value; officers of the quality being selected for garrison command would do so anywhere. I only offer that in this (or other, similar senior NCO or senior civilian heavy) sort of organization, a talented O-5 is underemployed. These units could run effectively with an average O-5 – or a solid officer of lower grade - in charge. Conversely, the key O-5 level staff positions at a GCC are challenging, professionally developmental, and strategically important. The Army would be better served by assessing, selecting, and grooming a portion of its command select O-5’s to be key staff members in senior commands than by wasting stellar officers on positions of relatively little importance.

The officer in my example was an SF officer, and the referenced organization was a GCC, but the example is generally applicable to any of the basic branches and all the headquarters I’ve served on or worked with.  There are positions at each of these (or other equally important) organizations that are significantly more strategically critical and professionally developmental than many of the battalion command positions available.  The Army would benefit by incentivizing and investing more into these key staff billets.

Moreover, a portion of relative desirability of command over staff is driven by the way they are currently incentivized.  In terms of job desirability, most of the folks I know that competed for command were interested in tactical (or in some cases training) positions, but not necessarily command in general.  Many of these officers would enthusiastically take a key staff billet – with the senior leader access, strategic reach, and (relatively) sane hours that billet comes with – over a branch immaterial command they have no interest in taking.

None of these changes would be difficult for the Army to make. Many of the branch immaterial commands on the O-5 command slate could be replaced with key staff positions at a number of important commands, and the organizations and officers involved would both benefit from the change. The Army has been looking closely at how to improve the way the organization selects, develops, and retains talent to improve the performance of the DoD as a whole. This adjustment would be one more step in the right direction.

LTC Daniel Pace, U.S. Army, currently serves at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).  The views expressed in this article are the author's own and not that of the U.S. Army or DTRA.