A Blueprint for a US-South Korea Combined Multi-Domain Task Force

SEOUL and WASHINGTON—In an era of accelerating geopolitical competition and rapid technological advancement, the security landscape of the Indo-Pacific region and the Korean Peninsula demands a forward-thinking evolution of the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. The challenge for the alliance is to enhance deterrence while accounting for changing strategic and operational realities. 

U.S. Army Gen. Xavier Brunson, U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, and Republic of Korea Gen. Jin Yong-Sung pose for a picture in Seoul on Nov. 3, 2025. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Daniela Lechuga Liggio)

As U.S. Army Colonel (ret.) David Maxwell has argued, a combined Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), built from the lessons learned from the U.S. Army’s MDTF model, is a necessary response to these evolving threats. By combining U.S. capabilities and concepts with the ROK’s advanced technology and deep regional expertise, a forward-positioned, U.S.-ROK MDTF would help to counter an increasingly dangerous North Korea and to dissuade China from any major aggressive moves in the region. 

However, the Korean Peninsula does not have the luxury of waiting for Washington to deliver a new, fully resourced MDTF. The U.S. Army has prioritized the development of the first five of its MDTF units elsewhere, and the NDS has limited the United States to making “critical, but limited” contributions to the ROK’s defense. Therefore, to field a combined MDTF with the required urgency, the onus of building this critical capability falls on the forces already stationed on the Korean Peninsula.

The creation of a combined MDTF would not start from scratch. Rather, it would build on decades of deep-rooted military cooperation between the two countries. The U.S.-ROK alliance already possesses a long-standing combined headquarters in the form of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), established in 1978. Though the day-to-day operational control of all ROK forces was returned to Seoul in 1994, CFC headquarters remains designated to assume operational command and control of ROK and U.S. forces defending the ROK in wartime. CFC leads planning, preparation, and training for this mission, especially during large-scale command post exercises. This integrated structure provides a proven foundation for joint and shared command and control under a unified command structure, a critical element for the seamless operation of any multi-domain unit.

Furthermore, the ROK has already been proactively adapting to the new strategic environment by establishing its own division for multi-domain operations, with a significant focus on integrating information operations. This parallel evolution demonstrates a shared understanding of the future battlespace and creates a natural partner for a U.S. multi-domain unit. A combined task force would fuse the ROK’s specialized knowledge of the local terrain, population, and adversary with advanced U.S. technological and intelligence capabilities.

A combined MDTF would fill a critical gap in the alliance’s deterrence and rapid-response capabilities. Currently, there are two standing command-and-control mechanisms for response to North Korean aggression. The first is a ROK response to a small-scale provocation under the direction of a ROK chain of command. The second is the activation of CFC’s wartime command-and-control structure at theater level. As years of analysis and wargaming have shown, these options leave the alliance in a dilemma if North Korea launches an attack that falls somewhere between a small-scale provocation and full wartime activation. For example, North Korea might launch an attack beyond the level of the sinking of the Cheonan or the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, but short of a full-scale offensive across the demilitarized zone. Such a limited attack could be beyond a contained provocation that the ROK forces should handle alone but still limited enough that an activation of CFC wartime command and control would be an overly escalatory and politically infeasible response. 

Given the growing combat experience of North Korea’s light infantry forces, its expanding drone capabilities, and its increasingly accurate missiles, the risk of a limited North Korean surprise attack in a contained or isolated location such as the ROK’s Northwest Islands (along the disputed North-South maritime boundary) is growing. A combined MDTF could provide the U.S.-ROK alliance with an ideal standing force to address this current gap between the two response options. With proper training, planning, resources, and authorities, an MDTF could respond to such North Korean aggression against the ROK in a quick, combined, and calibrated manner, regardless of where it originates.

The strategic context for this integration is further enhanced by emerging trilateral agreements in which the United States has continually reaffirmed its deterrence posture with Japan and the ROK. These cooperative frameworks—solidified by commitments such as the sharing of real-time missile warning data and joint military exercises such as Freedom Edge—create new opportunities for deeper operational integration.

The rapid success of the U.S. Army’s first MDTF provides a benchmark and a model to accelerate. Launched as a pilot program in 2017, the experimental MDTF sought to help the joint force counter Chinese anti-access/area-denial systems—designed primarily to prevent U.S. air and maritime power projection—by positioning long-range fires and effects inside the First Island Chain, while also serving as a central testbed to inform the Army’s transition to multi-domain operations. By 2018, this experimental MDTF participated in major joint activities, such as the Rim of the Pacific and Valiant Shield—exercises traditionally reserved for air and maritime components. It did this despite lacking fully developed doctrine, validated concepts, and a formalized organizational structure. By 2022, a formally activated MDTF had also established a persistent presence in the First Island Chain.

This precedent provides the most critical lesson. If an experimental unit could meaningfully contribute to joint operations and directly shape the operational environment in such a short timeline, then U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) is positioned to move much faster. Building on a proven MDTF model, an existing forward presence, and a mature combined headquarters, USFK can bypass the initial conceptual hurdles and tyranny of distance that the pilot program had to overcome, moving directly to implementation and integration with regional partners.

A combined MDTF aligned with USFK (as well as CFC and the United Nations Command in the ROK) could therefore play a critical role in regional security by integrating with the Japan Self-Defense Forces and other regional partners on missile defense, intelligence sharing, information operations, and synchronized responses to regional crises. While air and maritime exercises remain essential, they do not fully reflect that most populations, infrastructure, and political objectives are land-based. Achieving true multi-domain effectiveness requires fully integrating land forces, making the creation of a combined MDTF on the Korean Peninsula indispensable for reestablishing deterrence in the First Island Chain.

The USFK maintains a posture of immediate readiness. The U.S. Army piloted the first MDTF using a field artillery brigade assigned to First Corps as an experimental test unit. Unlike that pilot brigade, the 210th Field Artillery Brigade is the Army’s only forward-deployed field artillery brigade that is already “in position, ready to fire.” This gives the 210th a greater regional understanding and a unique positional advantage to lead the development of new multi-domain concepts on the Korean Peninsula.

A rocket is fired from a new M270A2 Multi Launch Rocket System in South Korea on December 11, 2025. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Ashton Smith)

A combined MDTF on the Korean Peninsula would integrate the 210th’s fires capabilities into a fully networked sensor-to-shooter architecture across all domains, including the ability to engage targets at sea. These efforts would operate alongside, but separate from, the existing formations such as the 2nd Infantry Division-ROK/U.S. Combined Division, the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, and U.S. Space Forces-Korea. Collectively, they would create an integrated fires complex that incorporates land-based fire assets dispersed throughout the strategic triangle of the ROK, Japan, and the Philippines. By incorporating newly validated long-range and data-linked missiles into 210th’s recently fielded M270A2 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and pairing them with the full spectrum of integrated space capabilities and machine-to-machine decision-making tools found in these other units, a combined unit could strike mobile targets faster and deeper across the peninsula. This integration would also enable a more responsive posture against maritime threats in the West (Yellow) Sea, East Sea, and East China Sea with near seamless coordination with regional allies. This ecosystem would also enable “plug and play” flexible deterrence and response options, allowing U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to rapidly integrate additional fire assets and newly upgraded capabilities onto the Korean Peninsula or elsewhere in the region.

By linking land-based fires with space-based surveillance, aerial reconnaissance, and cyber intelligence, the task force could dramatically shorten joint kill webs and strengthen partners’ and allies’ ability to respond to regional crises.

In alignment with the NDS, which emphasizes the critical role of allies and partners in reestablishing deterrence, the formation of a combined MDTF offers a powerful mechanism for burden-sharing. This extends beyond troop commitments and into the strategic alignment of defense industrial capabilities. Establishing a combined MDTF on the peninsula would supercharge the defense industrial base, both in the United States and within the region, by creating sustained demand for interoperable and adaptable technologies.

The pilot MDTF augmented a field artillery brigade with an information, intelligence, cyber, electronic warfare, and space (I2CEWS) detachment, which accelerated technology solutions for other domains. While this provides a valuable precedent, the USFK cannot simply copy and paste that solution. Instead, it must design and tailor capabilities for the region. This also means recognizing that Korea-based forces have already established a dominating position inside the perimeter that the United States would need to penetrate in the event of a crisis. Developing and dedicating capabilities such as those found in today’s multi-domain effects battalions to the Korean Peninsula would capitalize on this positional advantage.

This initiative would also encourage the co-production and co-development of next-generation technologies such as unmanned sensing, counter-drone capabilities, and autonomous systems. The Pentagon has already signaled a strategic shift toward unifying acquisition and foreign military sales to improve efficiency and enable burden-sharing, a policy that would directly support a combined MDTF. By fostering a resilient and integrated defense industrial ecosystem, the United States and the ROK can jointly develop and field the advanced capabilities required for multi-domain operations, reduce costs through economies of scale, and ensure supply chain security. This approach would strengthen economic ties as it enhances both countries’ military readiness.

The path to a more secure future for the Korean Peninsula and the First Island Chain lies in bold and innovative adaptations. By building on a historic partnership, leveraging unique posture, and aligning with ongoing Army Transformation Initiative efforts and the NDS, the United States and the ROK can and should collectively build a combined MDTF. Such a force would be the ultimate expression of Katchi Kapshida—a motto for the U.S.-ROK alliance meaning “we go together”—ensuring the alliance remains ready and capable of deterring aggression and preserving peace in a complex and ever-evolving threat environment.

Colonel Christopher Lee is an Indo-Pacific foreign area officer for U.S. Forces Korea.

Lieutenant Colonel Ben Blane is a field artillery officer experienced with multi-domain formations in the Indo-Pacific. He is also a research fellow with the Modern War Institute.

Markus V. Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served at the headquarters of Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea for twelve years, including five years as the director of its Strategy Division.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent those of any U.S. government entity or their other affiliations.

This article appeared originally at Atlantic Council.