Bridging the Lethality-Sustainment Gap in the Pacific

“Militaries with adaptive doctrine, technologies, and leadership have a critical wartime advantage that may spell the difference between victory and defeat.”

At the heart of the new approach is a forward-postured presence within the First Island Chain (FIC) before conflict begins, positioning Marines across Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The utility of this forward presence rests on reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and land-based sea denial. Marines within the FIC serve as the targeting sensors, the “JTAC[s] of the Joint Force”. Utilizing advanced radars, passive sensors, and unmanned aerial systems, these low-signature units track PLA surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft. Occupying mobile land positions across sovereign allied territory, they are difficult to target. By transmitting real-time targeting data into the Joint All-Domain Command and Control architecture, they enable U.S. Navy warships, U.S. Air Force aircraft, and U.S. Army multi-domain task forces (MDTF) to strike from a distance.

The modern Corps also brings organic lethality via Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), an uncrewed, ground-based launcher that fires the Naval Strike Missile. Deployed at maritime chokepoints like the Bashi Channel or Miyako and Luzon Straits, Marines can deny the PLA Navy free passage into the Pacific. This land-based sea denial approach frees up multi-billion-dollar U.S. Navy destroyers and attack submarines for offensive maneuvers elsewhere.

Despite strategic clarity, serious vulnerabilities remain that do not fully satisfy USINDOPACOM's needs. The primary flaw is the fragility of intra-theater logistics. Currently, littoral distribution remains the most pressing challenge for the Marine Corps and the Joint Force. Distributed operations rely entirely on moving small units, launchers, fuel, ammunition, and other resupply items between isolated islands. To achieve this, the Marine Corps requested 35 Medium Landing Ships (LSM) capable of beaching themselves, offloading equipment, and blending with commercial traffic.

However, analysts express skepticism regarding LSM survivability. As a cost-saving measure, the LSM lacks the robust, organic air and missile defenses found on traditional Amphibious Warfare Ships (AWS). If the PLA establishes temporary local air or sea superiority, these defenseless logistics ships will become highly vulnerable targets. This would leave forward-deployed Marines with no choice but to exhaust their supplies within days.

This shipping bottleneck creates an immediate crisis for missile resupply. The issue stems directly from the difficulty of moving heavy physical cargo over long distances and transferring it into a contested network. For example, each NMESIS launcher carries very few missiles and lacks local storage. To rebuild these tiny stockpiles, transport assets must transit a contested maritime space. In contrast, the PLA faces no such transit hurdles because they launch weapons from secure, interconnected mainland bases. Without a robust intra-theater network capable of moving freight safely under fire, land-based sea-denial capabilities remain strictly limited in time and location.

General shortages of larger amphibious shipping further compound these readiness issues. USINDOPACOM requires ready, sea-based capabilities to respond to contingencies, from maritime raids to conducting major amphibious combat operations. These missions require large, survivable AWS platforms that comprise traditional Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEU) teams. The Marine Corps maintains a firm, statutory minimum requirement of 31 AWS vessels. The ARG/MEU team remains one of the highest-demand formations requested by U.S. combatant commanders, with two currently assigned to Operation Epic Fury.

However, budgetary disputes, design disagreements, and maintenance backlogs have left the AWS fleet well short of this operational minimum. Because these huge ships cost billions of dollars and take years to replace, they are not attritable assets. Losing even one is a major strategic blow. Ultimately, this shortage curtails MEU availability and forces an unsafe reliance on less flexible alternatives.

While the naval service continues to debate the procurement of various platforms, a glaring “missing middle” remains in the Marine Corps' surface- and aerial-connector fleets. The SIF currently lacks both organic, high-speed, shallow-draft surface platforms—such as commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) options like fast support vessels (FSVs)—and long-range unmanned aerial cargo platforms required to rapidly displace and sustain small units and precision fires within a contested littoral environment. As former Commandant General David H. Berger stated, “logistics is the pacing function.” Without a dedicated fleet of small, risk-worthy surface connectors and autonomous aerial cargo assets to bridge this gap, the logistics pacing function is severely bottlenecked. This forces SIF units to rely on vulnerable, high-signature AWSs or remain dangerously isolated from sea lines of communication. Because this capability gap leaves the SIF effectively stranded during the critical opening days of a conflict, the Marine Corps must look outside traditional military procurement to bridge the divide.

To mitigate immediate shipping shortages at the onset of a conflict, the Marine Corps must expand its existing expeditionary contracting capabilities, including contingency contracting officers with warrant authorities of $10-15 million. In the opening phases of a high-intensity fight, like we’ve seen in Operation Epic Fury, surviving within the WEZ requires immediate operational flexibility that traditional military sealift cannot provide on short notice. Contingency contracting officers must be forward deployed with the SIF to legally, rapidly, and autonomously acquire local commercial vessels, ferries, and barges from regional allies and partners.

These local vessels can serve as surrogate intra-theater transport assets for moving troops, distributing ammunition, and relocating fuel caches between islands. Utilizing localized commercial vessels provides two distinct advantages: it rapidly expands the available distribution pool before military-purposed LSMs arrive, and it complicates the adversary's targeting architecture by forcing them to distinguish between local civilian commerce and military movements. Relying on organic assets alone is a single point of failure; formalizing expeditionary contracting protocols through internal naval contracting policy changes ensures a legal mechanism to leverage local commercial maritime infrastructure on day one of a conflict.

To rectify these imbalances and maximize the Marine Corps’ contribution, several refinements must be implemented by the Service and the Department of War. First, the Joint Force must aggressively diversify theater logistics. Relying solely on the LSMs, AWSs, or maritime preposition ships is an unacceptable risk. The military must fast-track alternative resupply methods, including autonomous extra-large unmanned vessels such as the MV Yara Birkeland; the U.S. Navy’s medium unmanned surface vessel program, for which the USV Ranger was a prototype; and long-range unmanned aerial cargo platforms similar to the Kaman K-MAX, which was tested during Operation Enduring Freedom. While the Department of the Navy executes its Shipbuilding Plan, existing COTS options, such as FSVs and unmanned conversion kits, provide readily available, attritable assets that can help close tactical logistics chains now without being cost-prohibitive. These unmanned systems can operate continuously throughout the FIC and SIC to deliver fuel, ammunition, and supply parts, thus reducing risk to human crews.

Second, the Marine Corps must drive the creation of new, permanently integrated organizational structures dedicated entirely to joint movement, maneuver, and contested logistics within the littorals. While recent integrated naval organizations like TF-51/5, 61/2, and 76/3 provide a strong proof of concept for integrated command, they must be formalized into standing commands and expanded beyond their limited focus. To sustain SIF inside a contested WEZ, the Services should establish standing Joint Littoral Maneuver Task Forces. These new, permanent organizations could structurally fuse the Navy and Marine Corps existing and future connections with U.S. Army composite watercraft units under a single, integrated commander. Thus, enhancing USINDOPACOM’s intra-theater movement and sustainment of units like the U.S. Army’s MDTF, Marine Littoral Regiments, and other Joint Force units. By institutionalizing these purpose-built commands, the Joint Force ensures that navigating the complex ‘last tactical mile’ of contested logistics is the core, everyday mission of a dedicated joint command, rather than an operational afterthought.

Finally, the Pentagon must enforce a stable procurement strategy for AWSs that can survive between funding cycles. The persistent failure to maintain the required fleet of 31 AWSs constitutes a strategic power-projection vulnerability. The Pentagon must prioritize and fund modern amphibious transports to guarantee USINDOPACOM always has responsive combat forces afloat. These ships provide the essential mobility, command-and-control, and medical support required to sustain distributed maritime operations across vast ocean distances.

America’s ability to deter conflict in the Indo-Pacific rests on the credibility of its forward-deployed forces. The Marine Corps’ adaptation provides a viable method for blunting a fait accompli, but its success is wholly dependent on the broader Joint Force’s commitment to sustaining it. Lethality in the FIC has clearly matured over the last decade, while logistics has atrophied. If the Department of the Navy and the Joint Force fail to aggressively field a diversified, resilient, and survivable logistics architecture, the vanguard of American deterrence will have a limited magazine and a short lifespan. Crucially, any viable sustainment network must be built with the expectation of combat losses. Filling the “missing middle” for intra-theater lift requires attritable air and surface resupply assets—platforms that can be mass-produced and replaced at a cost point sustainable throughout a protracted conflict. The strategic choice is clear: either fully resource the unglamorous work of contested sustainment or accept that the nation’s forward-deployed forces will be unable to fulfill their mission when it matters most.

LtCol Steven Bancroft is an active-duty Marine Corps Combat Engineer Officer currently serving as the Deputy G-3 Operations for 1st Marine Logistics Group. He has served in Iraq and Afghanistan and has 10 years of experience in the Indo-Pacific theater.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the United States Navy, the Marine Corps, the Department of War, or the U.S. Government.

image: U.S. Marines with Battalion Landing Team 3/5, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, scan for targets during a defense of the amphibious task force live-fire exercise aboard San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Portland (LPD 27) in the South China Sea, June 12, 2026. The 11th MEU, embarked aboard the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group, is a persistent, combat credible force contributing to deterrence and crisis response in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations. U.S. 7th Fleet, the U.S. Navy’s largest forward-deployed numbered fleet, routinely interacts and operates with allies and partners to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Luke Rodriguez)