Defining Defeat

In December 2018, President Trump announced the U.S. had “defeated ISIS in Syria” and indicated his initial decision to withdraw all U.S. forces.[1] This action raised blood pressures all over the U.S. Central Command headquarters.[2] It also raised many important points for analysis, among them how U.S. Central Command defined the defeat of the Islamic State in its strategy. Defining such a term in doctrine is critical when attempting to link tactical actions to conditions that attain policy objectives. In essence, doctrine, while not dogma or regulation, guides thinking about warfare.

While some may disdain a by-the-book approach to decision-making and planning, the tacit understanding of a shared lexicon is important in providing clarity of language and establishing the basis for shared understanding. A meaningful definition of defeat and an understanding of what it takes to accomplish the defeat of an enemy force in general, and specific adversaries like the Islamic State in particular, is also important. Considering these necessities, it is alarming that there is no joint force definition of defeat. However, there is a U.S. Army doctrinal definition:

Given this definition, and absent any publicly known measures of performance and effectiveness to assess the counter-Islamic State mission in Syria, there are no consistent answers on what conditions meet the U.S. determination of its defeat. Some might offer a definition of defeat is too pedantic, thus meaningless. Defeat is determined by policymakers; it is a political decision that considers military input. Absent a shared understanding of what defeat means, there is no structure for such a determination. Accepting that the use of force must be guided by policy, the dialogue between senior military and policy leaders must focus on what force can accomplish.[4]

First, an observation. The definition of defeat must be useful under the broad conditions of the general typology of strategy, attrition versus annihilation. These general classifications of warfare apply irrespective of the context of war and the conditions of warfare, from irregular warfare to conventional. Depriving the enemy force, its commander, and even the adversary government of the means and will to prosecute warfare can be accomplished by attrition of popular support for the war, such as through information operations or by the destruction of the enemy’s means to conduct warfare.

Based upon this observation the following general definition of defeat is offered:

Defeat is a mission task requiring the friendly force commander to deprive the enemy force and its commander of the means and will to interfere to a significant degree with the actions of the friendly forces and attaining friendly force objectives. Defeat can result from both the use of force or the threat of its use.

Defeat, as a mission task in tactical land operations is appropriate at the corps and division level. Corps commanders and division commanders can use defeat in their intent and mission statements while referring to an enemy echelon or element. Corps and division commanders use more precise terms like seize, secure, hold, fix, or even destroy when assigning tasks to subordinate formations. In assigning missions to regiments, brigades, and smaller units, the use of precise terms helps to focus the subordinate units and assist in refining appropriate measures of effectiveness and performance. These measures link accomplishment of subordinate tasks to the attrition and annihilation of the means of warfare and contribute to diminution of the will of the enemy to prosecute the war. Defining and describing defeat must be considered across all three levels of warfare.

“Vercingetorix throws down his arms at the feet of Julius Caesar” by Lionel Royer (Wikimedia)

The tactical level of warfare on land extends from the squad (nine to 11 troops) through the corps level (10,000 to 80,000 troops or more). The corps and division commanders achieve the defeat of an enemy force by directing the execution of tactical tasks—including attack in zone, seize an objective, occupy key terrain—that are assigned to subordinate formations. Derived from the proposed definition of defeat, a description of tactical defeat is:

The destruction of key enemy capabilities through combat action, or negation of possible enemy action through the placement of friendly forces in positions of advantage, rendering the enemy force commander temporarily unable to significantly interfere with the actions of friendly forces.

Defeating the enemy’s ability to fight is as important as defeating its will and means. If friendly commanders can make the enemy abandon an area or effort by denying or destroying resources or arousing popular resistance to an extent that makes it impossible to continue, they can defeat an otherwise capable enemy force. Clausewitz wrote of combat as being the only effective force in war with an aim to destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to a further end, the end of policy. He went further, even writing, “That holds even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed.”[5]

This Clausewitzian rejoinder applies at operational or strategic levels more commonly than at the tactical level, but should be included in the consideration of how to defeat an enemy force. The disintegration of enemy formations must start at the tactical echelon. The enemy commander's will is an uncertain target in the first place and will be very difficult to assess. The enemy commander might possess the will to fight in spades, for example; but if denied the ability to command and control his forces, the enemy could be defeated. If tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat, then linking tactics to strategy is the purpose of the operational level of war and the operational art.[6]

The operational level of war focuses on the planning and conduct of campaigns. The art of the operational level is linking tactical successes and even failures to the accomplishment of strategic and policy objectives. Thus a description of defeat at the operational level of warfare is:

A temporary condition whereby the defeated forces' commander is unable to pursue an adopted course of action due to loss of capability or will, and can no longer significantly interfere with the actions of friendly forces.

The policy objective is the guiding purpose for the use of warfare. All military actions thus are subordinate to and supportive of setting the conditions for attaining policy objectives. In the main, then, a useful description of defeat at the strategic level is:

The military’s contribution to achieving policy objectives that supports a political determination of defeat. This is a temporary military condition, usually attained through a combination of the success of tactical and operational actions against an enemy, whereby the enemy force is unwilling or unable to achieve its operational objectives and can no longer significantly interfere with the actions of a friendly force.

The strategic level of warfare overlaps with the domain of policy. Clausewitz writes, “To bring a war, or one of its campaigns, to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy.  On that level strategy and policy coalesce: the commander-in-chief is simultaneously a statesman.”[7] Strategists, therefore, must understand the positions of policymakers and how strategy contributes to policymaking. In coming to an understanding of the art of strategy and its interrelationship with the art of policy, it is necessary to consider how to cope with the occasional operational defeat, the mixed result of a tactical action or a stalemate. Best military advice must include consideration of this alternative perspective when coming to grips with the totality of a complete strategy. A complete strategy considers success and failure, allowing for resilience in overcoming the occasional setback and getting back on course to attaining policy objectives.

In a fight with a near-peer, peer, or nuclear-armed state, it might be better that we accept defeat, a mixed result, or a stalemate in a great-power war before intention or miscalculation breaches the nuclear threshold than to escalate and win at a far higher cost. This hard thinking must be included in the thought that precedes action. Provided that our country’s overall strategic position remains strong and deterrence of potential future enemy action is strengthened it could be argued a tactical or operational defeat or at least a draw in an action can be acceptable. The key consideration is whether or not the current situation at the time—from the tactical through strategic to the policy levels—is good enough provided that our overall strategic position remains strong and deterrence of any further or future aggression is relatively strengthened compared to plausible alternatives. This part of best military advice must be considered before a decision on the use of force is taken. Planners and strategists are fond of saying the enemy gets a vote, yet consideration of defeat is rarely, if ever, considered prior to it happening.[8]

There are other questions a doctrinal definition of defeat must address, some of which follow, reinforcing the importance of a commonly understood doctrine.

“Surrender of Lord Cornwallis” by John Trumbull (Wikimedia)

An accepted joint and service definition of defeat is important to professional officers who will continue to be charged with policy tasks such as “degrade and then defeat the Islamic State.” A doctrinal definition is, one, the common lexicon of the services and, two, the starting point for usable measures of effectiveness and measures of performance that link military tasks to attaining the objective of defeat. Instead of vague pronouncements, using a better set of definitions, senior military leaders can more confidently state “because of x, y, and z the enemy force is defeated, therefore Mr. President/Mr. Secretary the joint force achieved military conditions for you to declare the enemy is defeated.”

If Clausewitz still has something to say about the phenomenon of warfare, it is why the unequal dialogue of military professional and policymaker requires some structure. Of course, the declaration of the strategic defeat of an enemy is a policy and political decision. Hence, the policymaker’s decision will consider many factors beyond solely military input, and it could well be an incorrect decision. The obligation to render best military advice when waging war requires senior military leaders to use fact-based measures to underpin the policy declaration and support the policymaker.[9]

By providing a sound doctrinal basis for the development of measures of effectiveness and performance in support of policy we can address solving two  additional problems. First, a better definition educates military officers in the use of the word defeat in a commander’s intent statement and mission statement, with specified tasks like clear, hold, build, destroy, secure, and so on appropriate to each level of warfare. Second, a better definition can give some purpose to information provided to policy makers when deciding on the use of force. Here, military officers can enter into the dialogue with policymakers knowing and stating what the use of force can and, most importantly, cannot accomplish.

On 27 October 2019, during an interview televised on CNN, Secretary of Defense Esper stated the goal of U.S. policy was to ensure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State, thus the defeat of the Islamic State remains a policy objective.[10] Defining defeat is important, and a more useful definition will strengthen each of the crucial linkages from tactical task to strategy.

Policy does not stand still, conditions change on the perspective of success or failure, and the use of force remains an extension of policy. In order to provide more precision in crafting strategy and design to attain strategic and policy objectives we must have a commonly accepted military lexicon and a better definition of defeat.[11]

Kevin Benson is a retired U.S. Army officer and former Director at the School of Advanced Military Studies. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

This article appeared originally at Strategy Bridge.

[1] “Trump declares defeat of ISIS in Syria as US reportedly plans total withdrawal of troops,”

Yaron Steinbuch, December 19, 2018. https://nypost.com/2018/12/19/trump-declares-defeat-of-isis-in-syria-as-us-reportedly-plans-total-withdrawal-of-troops/

[2] I was at CENTCOM headquarters during this time.  I asked how defeat was defined and what were the associated measures of effectiveness and performance.  The lack of answers to my questions is the spark for this article.

[3] Army Doctrinal Publication, ADP, 3-0 Operations, 2019, page 2-4.

[4] These two paragraphs are drawn from many discussions with other national security professionals. See also On Grand Strategy by John Lewis Gaddis, The Direction of War by Hew Strachan, and Just War Reconsidered by James M. Dubik, to name a few good books.

[5] On War, Carl von Clausewitz, ed and trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, page 97. Hereafter cited as On War.

[6] These words are attributed to Sun Tzu. I have not been able to find them in any translation of The Art of War. The full quotation is “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is noise before defeat.”

[7] On War, page 111.

[8] Michael O’Hanlon offered this in an email exchange on 26 August 2019: “But there may be times when tactical defeat, or at least stalemate, if it reinforces deterrence and prevents further ambitions, contributes to strategic success, especially for an established superpower with extremely powerful alliances. Yet that way of thinking is anathema to most American defense folks, in or out of uniform, so I hope that you consider it within your purview, Kevin, and that you don’t simply relegate it to the policymakers.”

[9] For a discussion of the policy maker’s right to be wrong see Dubik, Just War Reconsidered, Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, and Cohen, “The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force,” in Feaver and Kohn’s Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security.

[10] Christiane Amanpour's One-On-One Interview With Defense Secretary Mark Esper; Defense Secretary Says He Was On Call With Turkey's Erdogan. Aired October 22, 2019 - 13:30 ET Found at CNN.com/transcripts

[11] Lieutenant General, retired, Don Holder, Lieutenant General, retired, Jim Dubik,  Lieutenant General, retired, Mark Hertling, Colonels, retired, Greg Fontenot, Steve Leonard, and Lieutenant Colonel, retired, Professor Steve Lauer, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Lavin, and Major, promotable, Ian Fleischmann contributed their feedback to these proposed definitions. Michael O’Hanlon also contributed invaluable feedback to me during the formulation of this article. I am in their debt for their reviews and comments. This article expresses my own views and any mistakes are my own.