South Korea's KF-X Project

The revelation by South Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) in late September that it had been denied crucial technology transfer from the U.S. government for the country's indigenous KF-X (Korean Fighter Experimental) program immediately placed the project in political crosshairs.

South Korea planned to procure 120 of the indigenous twin-engine multirole fighters, which are to be replete with high-end avionics systems and stealth features. Under the program outlines, the development stage – valued at $8 billion – will last until 2025, by which point serial production of the new fighters is planned for launch.

Despite this, the country's Agency for Defense Development (ADD) is in the process of attempting to bring forward the development timeframe for locally developed AESA radar from 2020-2024 to 2017-2021. DAPA officials also note that around 90 percent of the integration technology for AESA radar has already been accumulated through the integration of one on an indigenous FA-50 light combat aircraft produced by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI).

Each of the other three core technologies will be pursued via direct purchase from Europe, collaboration with a partnering country or countries, and/or – again – localized development.   

But positive spin about developing core technologies on its own aside, the blowback over the 2013 decision to opt for the F-35 has become intense in the wake of the belated announcement of the denial of technology transfer.

The office of the senior presidential secretary for civil affairs has now launched a probe into the KF-X program, with former National Security Office (NSO) chief Kim Kwan-jin coming under fire for his role in the decision, first announced on September 24, 2013, to reject a Boeing bid of an advanced stealth version of the F-15 in favor of the F-35.  

DAPA officials, meanwhile, are left scurrying to find solutions for acquiring the necessary technologies for KF-X, while parrying accusations from the same office that it tried to cover up the tech transfer failure. The presidential office has, in addition, launched a probe that calls into question the ethicality of the selection of Lockheed Martin as the preferred bidder for F-X III and, by extension, playing a major role in KF-X development.

Scrambling to fend off allegations that it lied about the tech transfer agreements within the F-35 contract, the DAPA has vowed full transparency and disclosure regarding all major issues surrounding the KF-X project to the National Assembly (legislature) and local media going forward. South Korea's Defense Ministry, meanwhile, is set to begin exploring using the U.S. defense acquisition system as a benchmark for DAPA processes in the future.

All this merely sidesteps greater issues, such as perceived over-reliance on the U.S. for modern defense technologies, the long-term strategic necessity of harnessing advanced technologies within local industrial capabilities, and providing the ROKAF with its desired optimal combat aircraft force level of 430 fighters.

Critics argue that by opting for a U.S. platform over the Eurofighter Typhoon, DAPA bypassed an opportunity for easier access to tech transfers. By doing so, goes this line of criticism, DAPA officials demonstrated a shortsighted view of defense procurement as strategic opportunity.

Then there is the larger matter of difficulties associated with production of a clean-sheet fighter design. A long-standing aphorism put forth by former U.S. Under Secretary of the Army Norman Augustine contends that attaining the final 10 percent of capability performance often results in cost increases of around 30 percent plus a host of unforeseen problems that stretch out a program's development phase. If this were to hold true to form, then the KF-X, which currently has a total estimated cost of $15.5 billion – including an R&D price tag of $6.9 billion – may ultimately cost South Korea an extra $4.65 billion to get the aircraft off the ground (it should be noted that 20 percent of the developmental costs will be absorbed by Indonesia through an industrial engagement arrangement between Seoul and Jakarta).

More problematic from the ROKAF point of view is the matter of maintaining a relative quantitative and qualitative level of airpower competitiveness during the near and medium terms while the KF-X undergoes developmental teething pains. The serviceability of the remaining F-4s and F-5s is questionable and, with the South Korean F-35 purchase involving just 40 aircraft rather than the originally sought 60, the ROKAF is considering a fighter lease as a capabilities bridge until the KF-X starts being inducted into service.

In the end, the ROKAF may have little choice but to undertake a gap-filling fighter lease while DAPA, the ADD and KAI – tapped in March to spearhead KF-X development – attempt to square the circle that comes from creating a modern combat aircraft from scratch.    

Daniel Darling is an international military markets analyst at Forecast International Inc., an aerospace and defense market research company located in Newtown, Connecticut. A graduate of Kansas State University, Dan covers the Europe and Asia-Pacific Rim military markets for Forecast, and formerly was responsible for the Middle East as well. He has been quoted or his work cited in: Arabian Business, Defense News, The Financial Times, Flight International, The National, The New York Times, Bloomberg, National Defense Magazine and Small Wars Journal, among others.