Flaws in Putin's Art of No-Deal for Peace Become Apparent

Executive Summary:

Several rounds of revisions and Ukrainian input have curtailed and clarified the now roughly 19-point proposal, which Witkoff is set to present to Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow this week (RBC, November 28). The problem for Putin is that rejecting this updated plan could antagonize U.S. President Donald Trump. Suggesting changes would mean accepting the basic framework of the updated draft, which reportedly dismisses aspects of the Russian demand to address “root causes” of the war by increasing the number of troops that Ukraine is allowed to keep and potentially leaving the question of Ukraine’s future North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership open (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 26). Even the initial 28-point plan departed from many of the Kremlin’s maximalist demands that it has presented as non-negotiable since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which some hyper-nationalist Russian commentators criticized (Topwar.ru, November 24). The initial leaked plan’s ceiling of 600,000 for Ukrainian troops—which Kyiv rejects as a matter of principle—is seven times higher than Moscow’s original demand. Without any restrictions on key weapon systems, Ukraine’s army could become a “steel porcupine,” extensively armed to deter further Russian aggression  (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 23).

The main incentive Witkoff can offer Putin to show greater flexibility is the prospect of a new meeting with Trump. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said during his Moscow visit last Friday that Budapest would be a perfect place to make a peace deal (Izvestiya, November 29). Russian public opinion is ready to accept a cessation of hostilities as a “victory,” and some mainstream pundits are advancing arguments for the benefits of preserving the Kremlin’s territorial gains, even if incomplete, and for rehabilitating the new provinces and restoring Russia’s strength (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, November 24). The Kremlin’s war of attrition has depleted Russia’s human and financial resources, and many regions are reducing payments to sign up for contracts to serve in the war zone (see EDM, October 21; Radio Svoboda, November 30). Underfunding for infrastructure inevitably results in various breakdowns, with the serious damage to the space launch site at the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan and the failed test of the Sarmat intercontinental missile just two examples (Naked Science, November 29; The Moscow Times, November 30).

Putin may have a more positive view of Russia’s economic performance than most experts, but the enforcement of new U.S. sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil has clearly upset him (Kommersant, November 28). The sharp drop in oil export revenues is a serious setback for government efforts to slow the rapidly rising budget deficit, but Putin appears to be less concerned about macroeconomic impacts and more concerned about the unexpected application of U.S. sanctions (Glavportal, November 26). Putin

Putin appears to hope for a swift resumption of unimpeded economic relations with the United States. The drafts disregard EU reservations about lifting sanctions, and the initial 28-point draft contained the odd provision that all “ambiguities of the last 30 years” would be considered settled (Vedomosti, November 21). Corrupt and sanctioned “oligarchs” with close ties to Putin, such as Yuri Kovalchuk and Gennady Timchenko, have already begun discussing new joint ventures, including access to gas fields and rare-earth metals, with anonymous U.S. partners (The Moscow Times, November 30). Ukraine, in the meantime, has expanded its war against the Russian energy sector by directly hitting two tankers of the Russian “shadow fleet” in the Black Sea with naval drones (Vzglyad, November 29).

Putin makes proposals for an end to his war so beneficial for Russia that they are unacceptable for Kyiv, and attempts to blame Ukraine for the lack of peace. This art of no-deal has repeatedly been exposed as fraud through determined efforts by Zelenskyy, his many allies in Europe, and some politicians and experts in Washington. Profits from doing business with Russia are a mirage—the economic environment in Putin’s militarized autocracy would remain, even after a hypothetical ceasefire, harsh and severely corrupt. No beautiful peace can come from the ugly war that makes a lot of sense for the ageing dictator in the Kremlin. If Putin’s calculus is altered by consistent and collective Western pressure, however, a difficult compromise could be reached that would neutralize his obsession with subjugating Ukraine.

Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.