Russia Acknowledges a Prolonged War: What Does That Mean?

Vladimir Putin has now acknowledged that Russia is fighting a protracted war in Ukraine.  He has also stated that there will not be another mobilization in the foreseeable future and reiterated that Russia’s strategy is a defensive retaliatory one and that this suggested no nuclear weapons would be used.  While the remarks about nuclear weapons should have been gratefully received abroad; Putin on December 8 publicly mused about using them preemptively against the U.S. and NATO.  In other words, he is back to making nuclear threats despite pressure from China and India and the West to forego such threats.  Since Putin also has recently said that only he can be trusted, and his reputation for mendacity has long since been incontrovertibly established, we are once again left in the position of reading his tea leaves.    For example, it is widely believed that the announcement of no new mobilization was intended to allay domestic, if not foreign apprehensions of just such a mobilization.  But are these really the takeaways we should grasp as a result of Putin’s remarks?

Similarly, for now the nuclear card has evidently been taken out of Putin’s hand by a combination of Sino-Indian opposition, U.S./NATO deterrence, Ukrainian resistance, and Russian military incompetence.  But his statements do not mean that he will not strike first with them if he deems it necessary or believes he can get away with it. Quite the opposite appears to be the case as his remarks on preemptive strikes suggest.   As he said in early December, “As for the idea that Russia wouldn’t use such weapons first under any circumstances, then it means we wouldn’t be able to be the second to use them either – because the possibility to do so in case of an attack on our territory would be very limited.”   This statement clearly intimates a desire for if not doctrinal sanction of first-use of nuclear weapons.  Whatever his intentions, his seeming “nuclear restraint” does not hide the fact that Putin is constantly escalating the war in non-nuclear ways, e.g., by systematically trying to destroy Ukraine’s infrastructure.  Moreover, Putin, in these remarks, justified the war to the Russian public on the grounds that Russia had acquired “new territories,” i.e., the four Ukrainian provinces that Russia has annexed.  Likewise, once again he compared himself to Peter the Great as a gatherer of Russian territories, e.g., the Sea of Azov.   Indeed, Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, commented that Russia still had work to do to complete the “liberation” of the territories seized from Ukraine and now annexed to Russia.  Thus, this address also signaled that Putin continues to remain uninterested in negotiations despite an apparently mounting tide of Western articles advocating negotiations.  This posture also confirms President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken’s remarks that Putin remains unwilling to negotiate.  Indeed, Putin evidently continues to believe that he can win by continuing to pulverize Ukraine’s infrastructure, playing the energy card to the hilt, stirring up crises in the global South --the new orientation of Russian foreign policy --, and intensified efforts to subvert European governments.  As part of this program, we should also expect an intensification of all forms of cyber and/or information warfare targeting the West since for Moscow these two phenomena are merely two sides of the same coin.

In other words, Putin’s acknowledgement of a long war is not one from which we can derive some solace or sense that he has come to some acceptance of reality.  Indeed, Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, has just stated that she is not certain that Putin is getting a fully accurate account of the war.  But by acknowledging that this is a protracted war, Putin, if anything, has reasserted that his objectives have not changed, that he still insists upon negotiating terms that are utterly unacceptable, not only to Ukraine, but to the West as whole, and that within the framework of a conventional war he will continue to search for ways to escalate this war.  Indeed, Peskov has reiterated that the absurd pretense of denazification of Ukraine, i.e., regime change, is still Moscow’s objective.  Thus, as the Institute for the Study of War reports, “Putin’s invocation of Russian imperial history on December 7 and his recent remarks regarding Russia’s role as the only “guarantee of Ukrainian sovereignty” are further indicators that the Kremlin is setting conditions for a protracted war aimed at eradicating Ukrainian sovereignty. The Kremlin’s deliberately inconsistent messaging is part of a persistent information operation intended to mislead the West into pushing Kyiv to negotiate and to offer preemptive concessions.”

Therefore, Putin’s acknowledgement of a protracted war also adds to the pressure on the West.  If Ukraine is to prevail and thereby put European and international security on a firmer long-term footing the West must continue to provide long-term and abundant economic, political, and military support for Ukraine until it wins a decisive and incontrovertible victory.   This means stepped up logistical support for Ukraine’s battered infrastructure, economy, energy supply, and weapons like air defense, airplanes, and breaking the blockade of the Black Sea.

It should be equally clear that the veritable flood of possibly well-intentioned but misguided calls for negotiations with Russia have no basis in reality as Putin is still fixated on destroying Ukraine as a political entity.  Despite the many Western calls for negotiations, Putin’s terms have not changed, and he clearly believes he can impose them by orchestrating intensified multi-domain pressures on the West and Ukraine.  This should not surprise us for it is consistent with everything Putin has done since deciding to invade Ukraine.  As the Economist observed, some time ago, escalation is his modus operandi and that has not changed.  Consequently, all those analysts who call for negotiations, or insist on Putin’s calculating and rational nature must therefore understand that Putin has subjected all of Russia to an obsession that also demands Ukrainian submission to it for him, in his view, to preserve his power, system, and legacy.  Retreat, or even negotiations, are therefore and unthinkable not an option for Putin.   This also means that Western pundits should shun speculating about Russia’s breakup or on fanciful ideas that are beyond Western capacity like managing Russia’s decline.  Instead, we must draw the appropriate conclusions from the reality before us and brace ourselves to our duties such as ensuring that Ukraine wins the war.  Once that occurs other possibilities might become possible, but this remains the urgent priority.

But beyond helping Ukraine wins and strengthening our alliances it is equally imperative that the West take the urgent steps to put its own house in order economically, e.g.  by overcoming its dependence on Russian energy.  At the same time, it must strengthen its presence in, attention to, and the resilience of Third World countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia to deprive Russia of the economic-political support that it is counting on to prevail. 

Therefore, if we are honest with ourselves, we must concede that neither Putin nor history gives us an alternative other and ensuring Ukraine’s victory, invigorating our own alliances, and enhancing our capacity to work with other global partners.  Putin’s recent acknowledgement about the likely longevity of this war do not signify a Russia more attuned to our understanding of reality. Rather those and subsequent remarks reveal an embattled dictator clinging to the life raft of his imperial and autocratic delusions and obsessions who intends to take Russia with him on a voyage of destruction.  And we do not have the luxury of being mere bystanders to this drama.

Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow at FPRI’s Eurasia Program. He has published over 1500 articles and monographs on Soviet/Russian, U.S., Asian, and European military and foreign policies, testified frequently before Congress on Russia, China, and Central Asia, consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency, major think tanks and foundations, chaired major international conferences in the U.S. and in Florence; Prague; and London, and has been a commentator on foreign affairs in the media in the U.S. and abroad. He has also advised major corporations on investing in Russia and is a consultant for the Gerson Lehrmann Group. He has published or edited 15 books, most recently Russo-Chinese Energy Relations: Politics in Command (London: Global Markets Briefing, 2006). He has also published Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005). He is currently completing a book entitled Light From the East: Russia’s Quest for Great Power Status in Asia to be published in 2014 by Ashgate. Dr. Blank is also the author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities (Greenwood, 1994); and the co-editor of The Soviet Military and the Future (Greenwood, 1992).