Should Russia Be Resisted, or Accommodated?

With the resurgence of Russia under Putin after the fall of the Soviet Union, followed by the Russian full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States faces a challenge to provide an appropriate response.  According to several recent articles,[1]^,[2],[3] the choice for the U.S. is between one of resistance or accommodation, or as is reported in these articles, containment, and competitive coexistence.

Advocates of competitive coexistence, who agree that Russia is a permanent rival, whose character cannot change through pressure, suggest that the relationship should be carefully managed to prevent direct military confrontation.

A similar debate occurred roughly 50 years ago.

On 14 December 1975, a group of American ambassadors met in London to discuss “How to manage the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower.”  According to notes of that meeting, State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt stated that Eastern Europe was within the Soviets’ scope and area of natural interest, and specifically stated “So it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one. Our policy should be the Finlandization of Eastern Europe.”[4]

In March 1976, a Washington Post article reporting on this meeting suggested that American policy may have changed by recognizing Soviet domination over Eastern European countries. This concept became known as the “Sonennfeldt Doctrine.”[6]^,[7]

Though Sonennfeldt’s defenders denied any such concept[8]^,[9], it was apparent that in 1976, the senior leadership of the U.S. State Department felt that the Soviet Union was an ascendant power in relation to the United States, and that the Soviets and their hold on Eastern Europe must be accommodated.

However, the correlation of forces would not be moving toward the Soviet Union, but in fact toward the United States, as recognized by the Soviets themselves.

In 1979, the Soviet KGB developed a model to measure perceived changes in the balance of power/correlation of forces. This computer model was developed by military and economic specialists. It consisted of a database of 40,000 weighted elements, based on military, political, and economic factors.[10]

The model assigned a fixed value of 100 to the combined economic-military-political power of the United States. The program experts believed the Soviet Union would be safe with a Soviet value of 60 (60% of overall U.S. power). [11] 

By 1981, however, the model revealed that the Soviet Union was not only falling behind the U.S., but that the Soviet's hold on Eastern Europe was deteriorating. [12]^,[13]

By 1984, the model calculated that Soviet power had declined to 45% of that of the United States. Forty percent was viewed as a critical threshold. If the rating fell below 40%, the KGB and military leadership would inform the political leadership that the security of the Soviet Union could not be guaranteed.

As the Soviet decline weakened their control over their Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe, the U.S. policy was to exploit that weakness. According to NSDD 75, U.S. Relations with the USSR, 17 Jan 1983,

“U.S. policies should seek wherever possible to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in foreign policy and move toward democratization domestically. . .  The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow’s hold on the region while promoting the cause of human rights in Eastern European countries.”[14]

Thus, by rejecting a strategy of accommodation advocated by State Department officials associated with Helmut Sonnenfeldt in the late 70’s, and by asserting strategy of resistance to Soviet domination in Eastern Europe in the early 80’s, the U.S. contributed to the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet control, and the demise of the Warsaw Pact.

Like the geopolitical struggle between the U.S. and Soviet Union over Eastern Europe at the tail end of the Cold War in the 70’s and 80’s, the U.S. and Russia today face off over Ukraine, with the similar rival strategies for the U.S., that of resistance or accommodation, or as is expressed in recent articles, containment or cooperative coexistence.

Advocates of competitive coexistence believe that the U.S. does not have the ability to change Russia through pressure or inducement, but in the 80’s the U.S. did precisely that to the Soviet Union, taking advantage of its increasing weakness. And as in the 80’s for the Soviet Union, Russia today’s worsening military, political, and economic conditions would give the U.S. an opening to exploit, and to change Russia through pressure or inducement.

Numerous Russian officials, including the finance minister, [15] economy minister, [16] head of the Central Bank, [17] and the Sberbank CEO, [18] acknowledge Russia’s deteriorating conditions from the Russia-Ukraine War.

Alexandra Prokopenko, who worked at Russia’s central bank until early 2022, stated that

As in the 80’s, when the U.S., took advantage of Soviet weakness and challenged and defeated the Soviet’s hold on Eastern Europe, the U.S. of today has a similar opportunity to remove the Russian threat to Ukraine. U.S. policy makers should take advantage of this current waning of Russian power, and bestow freedom for Ukraine, as it did for Eastern Europe forty years before.

MAJ Dennis S. Nelson (U.S. Army, ret.)

[1] Thomas Graham, Russia: Containment or Competitive Coexistence? National Interest, October 26, 2025

[2] Adrian Macovei, Russia: Containment or Competitive Coexistence? Oct 26, 2025, https://macovei.substack.com/p/russia-containment-or-competitive

[3] Competitive Coexistence: Russia Will Always Be a Rival for NATO – NI, 25 Oct 2024

https://en.topcor.ru/52885-konkurentnoe-sosuschestvovanie-rossija-vsegda-budet-sopernikom-dlja-nato-ni.html

[4] Historical Documents Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976 Document 14 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/d14

[5] State Department Cable, D760038-0497, U.S. Policy in Europe, 1 Feb 1976,

https://aad.archives.gov/aad/display-partial-records.jsp?f=4412&mtch=1&q=D760038-0497&cat=all&dt=2082&tf=X

[6] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “A Soviet-East Europe ‘Organic Union’,” Washington Post, 22 March 1976

[7] Piotr Dlugolecki, “The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine: A Plan to Finlandize Eastern Europe,” Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 2017|3|15, https://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-d392799d-ef8c-4005-81de-23a35398b432

[8] Marvin Kalb, The “Sonnenfeldt Doctrine” that wasn’t” Brookings, 19 Oct 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-sonnenfeldt-doctrine-that-wasnt/

[9] Correcting the Record on the So-Called ‘Sonnenfeldt Doctrine’, National Interest, 26 Nov 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/correcting-the-record-on-the-so-called-sonnenfeldt-doctrine-2488

[10] President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, “The Soviet ‘War Scare,” February 15, 1990, National Security Archive, https://www.archives.gov › files › declassification › iscap › pdf

[11] President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, “The Soviet ‘War Scare,” February 15, 1990, National Security Archive, https://www.archives.gov › files › declassification › iscap › pdf

[12] President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, “The Soviet ‘War Scare,” February 15, 1990, National Security Archive, https://www.archives.gov › files › declassification › iscap › pdf

[13] Benjamin Fischer,  A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Sept 1997,  https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/

[14] NSDD 75, U.S. Relations with the USSR, 17 Jan 1983

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP97M00248R000401070004-5.pdf

[15] Georgi Kantchev, The Warning Signs for Russia’s Economy Are Flashing Red, Wall Street Journal

5 July 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/the-warning-signs-for-russias-economy-are-flashing-red-ff1658bd?msockid=0890d53860c46e1e1011c30861246f08

[16] Russia teeters on the edge of economic collapse after 40 months of war, 6 July 2025, El Pais, https://english.elpais.com/economy-and-business/2025-07-07/russia-on-the-edge-of-economic-collapse-after-40-months-of-war.html

[17] Russia teeters on the edge of economic collapse after 40 months of war, 6 July 2025, El Pais, https://english.elpais.com/economy-and-business/2025-07-07/russia-on-the-edge-of-economic-collapse-after-40-months-of-war.html

[18] Sberbank CEO Warns High Rates and Strong Ruble Creating ‘Perfect Storm’ for Russian Economy, Moscow Times, 20 June 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/06/20/sberbank-ceo-warns-high-rates-and-strong-ruble-creating-perfect-storm-for-russian-economy-a89516

[19] Alexandra Prokopenko, Putin’s Unsustainable Spending Spree- How the War in Ukraine Will Overheat the Russian Economy, Foreign Affairs, 8 January 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putins-unsustainable-spending-spree#