The Empire Strikes Back

Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the relevance of hard power. The United States must take note – the possibility for European escalation remains very much alive.

Indeed, Putin's most public political step before the invasion was his National Security Council meeting. The televised discussion was a public dressing-down, not a legitimate planning session. Putin called each of his siloviki (current and former security/intelligence operatives) to the witness stand, in turn forcing each to confirm Kyiv's impending offensive and bellicose offensive. The message, directed to the Russian elite, was clear. None of us is innocent – if we hang, we will hang together.

Similarly, several hours after operations commenced, Russian and Belarusian forces crossed the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, pushing on Chernihiv, from which the road leads to Kyiv. Finally, Russia opened an additional axis of advance in the late morning to early afternoon, crossing into the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone with armored units from Belarus and assaulting Antonov Airport to Kyiv’s west.

Putin's objective was to induce operational paralysis, conduct a decapitation strike against Kyiv, and mop up the rest of Ukrainian forces in short order. In the event, Ukrainian units held. The Donbas offensive has slowed, and the Russian military’s attacks in Donbas have been foiled, at least for now.

The Kharkiv axis of advance stalled as Russia encountered extremely spirited resistance, while Ukrainian forces withdrew into the city to prolong their defensive efforts. Ukraine has counterattacked at Chernihiv multiple times, retaking the city and beating back Russian assaults. Russia's greatest success has been in the south, particularly in taking Kherson. But Melitopol was contested until early 25 February, Ukrainian forces in Mariupol have defended the city’s western flank, and other units have blunted a Russian-Separatist armored offensive towards the city.

Russia's final axis of advance through Chernobyl was ultimately successful, even if Ukraine retook the Antonov Airfield, preventing a lightning strike against the capital late on 24 February. Russian forces then streamed into the city. Street fighting is likely to escalate in the days to come. Kyiv’s future hangs in the balance.

But whatever Kyiv and Zelensky’s fate, Ukrainian morale remains high. Forces in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv appear prepared to wage urban warfare until the bitter end. Indeed, Ukraine seems likely to keep fighting.

Thus, Putin will be faced with a choice. Either he sends ground troops into major cities, clearing them block by block, or bombards them, akin to Russia's actions in Grozny and Aleppo. The former choice will generate high Russian casualties, a particularly salient issue if Putin must commit conscripts, rather than regulars, to urban combat. While mitigating Russian casualties, the latter will guarantee resistance for months to years. A long-term counterinsurgency may be beyond the Russian military's grasp – even if the Russian National Guard will participate, which is likely, given their inclusion in the initial offensive.

Faced with a long-term insurgency or bombardment of urban areas, Putin may reckon that he must expand the war. Not against NATO initially – this would overstretch Russian resources – but against another weak target, namely Moldova. Indeed, Russia is baiting Moldova, having fired on a Moldovan-flagged tanker in the Black Sea that was likely in international waters, and attacking Ukraine’s Serpent Island near the Moldovan and Romanian coastlines.

Large protests are taking place throughout Russia against the Ukraine war. Moreover, reports exist that various military-related groups are raising the alarm on Russian conscript deployment to Ukraine. Another offensive against a different target – one that puts Russia right on NATO's doorstep in the Black Sea – may distract from these domestic concerns or the egregious brutality of a Grozny-style urban suppression campaign.

Romania and Bulgaria must be prepared. A declaration of states of emergency, mobilization of reservists, and the placement of military forces on a high state of alert would benefit the security of both states as it shows Putin the costs of broadening the war in Ukraine. In turn, NATO ought to increase its air policing mission in both countries and immediately deploy ground forces to NATO member state Romania given the prospect of conventional escalation.

U.S. and friendly state sanctions may yet affect Putin’s decisions, but such measures are finite and porous to deter attack against a NATO member. More intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT) in the form of drones, anti-tank rockets, air forces, and powerful naval combat forces deployed to the Mediterranean within striking distance of a Russian advance into Romania and Bulgaria are needed to deter Putin from his ambitions beyond Ukraine.

Seth Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy.