The West's Inconsistency with Serbia in the 90s and Russia Now

A power-hungry despot, who is commanding forces to commit unspeakable acts of violence and wants to erase a culture. This description applies to Vladimir Putin, but it also describes the former president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević. In the 1990s Milošević sent Serbian forces in states of the former Yugoslavia, in the name of nationalism, just like Putin has in Ukraine. Serbian troops murdered and raped civilians, Russian troops are doing that now. NATO played a crucial role in ending the violence in the former Yugoslavia, but NATO has refused to intervene in Ukraine. The juxtaposition of NATO’s response to Russia now versus how it handled Serbia in the 1990s exposes the inconsistency in the West’s rationale for intervention.

The Yugoslav Wars extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, when the nation declared independence in January 1992. The action led to Serbian forces going into Bosnia and Herzegovina. By June 1992, the war had displaced 2.6 million Bosnians. The violence continued to disproportionately impact Bosnians. The UN Security Council responded by enacting a no-fly zone in 1993 over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO enforced the no-fly zone and shot down four Serbia planes in 1994.

As violence quelled in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it flared in Kosovo. 1996 saw an increase in Kosovar insurgent attacks on Serbians, in response to oppressive policies from Serbia. By 1998, these insurgents killed several dozen Serbians. Serbia responded by disproportionately murdering and displacing thousands of Kosovar Albanians. Serbia even violated a cease-fire.

The high tolls on Kosovar Albanians and Serbia’s violation of the cease-fire caused NATO to conduct a series of bombings. Russia, then led by Boris Yeltsin, refused to send in troops to support Serbia and even supported NATO’s demand for an end to the war. Russia was Serbia’s strongest ally, so Yeltsin’s refusal caused Milošević to stop fighting.

Based on these facts, many would argue that there is more justification for the West to intervene in Ukraine than in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. When Russia invaded, Ukraine was a fully independent nation. The world has still not fully recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Ukrainian insurgents never created the kind of violence that Kosovar ones did. Russia is creating the same kind of displacement, violence, and cultural genocide that Serbia did in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Russia’s power is fueling the West’s refusal to intervene. Russia is on the UN Security Council and can veto any resolution. In 1993, Russia did not veto the security resolution for a no-fly zone in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but today Russia would veto a no-fly zone over Ukraine. Russia never sent troops to fight back against NATO forces, but any NATO intervention in Ukraine would force a confrontation with Russian forces. Serbia did not have nuclear weapons, Russia does.

The Clinton administration justified their support of NATO’s involvement in Serbia by citing a national security threat. In that war, it was obvious that Serbia wanted to hold together what was left of the former Yugoslavia, so it did not have the US in its crosshairs. Regardless of how much of an actual security threat Russia is to the West, their intervention in countries all over the world show they pose more risk than Serbia in the 1990s. The West supported NATO’s intervention against Serbia based on human rights concerns. But Russia has committed the same kind of atrocities against Ukrainians that Serbia did against Kosovar Albanians and Bosnians.

Skeptics of support for Ukraine have openly said they want Ukraine to make concessions because of the risk of nuclear war. The West is likely treading lightly out of fear of a full-scale war or nuclear war. The West should want to avoid both kinds of wars. But the West’s inconsistency in their actions in the two situations demonstrates the need for skepticism with any rationale for intervention.

Todd Carney is an international lawyer and a frequent writer on international issues. He earned his juris doctorate from Harvard Law School.