Trump's Claim That Ukraine Can Win Back Territoy Isn't Wrong

Russia is bleeding on the battlefield. Ukrainian drones are not only destroying weapons and equipment but also draining the Kremlin’s finances. At home, ordinary Russians are reliving the final days of the Soviet Union: coupons, fuel shortages, rationing of petrol and long lines are once again becoming part of daily life.

In fact, Kyiv’s strategy became so effective that even Donald Trump could not ignore it. By early 2025, Ukraine was emerging as a drone superpower, demonstrating that it could strike deep into Russian territory. When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met Trump in February, the optics were poor as Trump dismissed Ukraine’s leverage, claiming he had “no cards” to play. Yet in reality, Ukraine was already conducting sustained strikes on Russian oil refineries, gathering battlefield data to iterate and improve, while rapidly expanding its long-range drone fleet. About 38% of Russian oil refineries are offline.

But beneath the surface, Ukraine’s relentless campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure was undermining the very foundation of Moscow’s war economy. As Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, wrote: “A strictly symmetrical response to Russia’s strikes on infrastructure, to their terror, will accelerate the path to ending the war. The price for Russia will be high; it will feel the consequences of its military strategy, which is based on killing civilians.”

On the battlefield, Ukraine built a “drone wall” that Russians have been unable to break. Strike drones account for around 80% of Russian battlefield losses.

At sea, Ukraine’s fleet of naval drones forced Russian forces into retreat from occupied Crimea. Kyiv effectively neutralised a third of the Black Sea Fleet. Now that “drone wall” is expanding the kill zone well beyond 20 kilometres, with Ukrainian drones and missiles striking at ranges of up to 100 kilometres. These attacks are crippling Russian logistics, preventing soldiers and equipment from reaching the front. On 29 September, Ukraine demonstrated even greater reach, striking the Elektrodetal factory in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast 240 kilometres inside Russia with Neptune cruise missiles.

As one Russian commentator lamented: “Everyone is silent. HIMARS hit Belgorod, there is no power! Drones are striking Belgorod, Kursk regions. And Peskov is telling us how our economy is doing.”

Kyiv’s strategy became so effective that even Donald Trump could not ignore it (President of Ukraine/Flickr)

Since July, Russia has boosted gasoline purchases from Belarus by 36% from a year ago and may even increase oil supplies to Minsk just to re-import more fuel back. At the same time, Moscow faces a ballooning budget deficit, which is expected to reach 5.7 trillion roubles this year. As a result, the Kremlin had to announce tax hikes, including raising VAT to 22% from 20%, and looming cuts to social spending. The military is being forced to cut back as Russia’s economic strain grows.

On the battlefield, Russia has made little progress, prompting Trump to call it “a paper tiger”. By August 2025, after more than a million casualties, Moscow actually controlled less Ukrainian territory than it held in August 2022.

Since Russia is unable to achieve its goals in the war and with mounting signs that the empire is dying, the Kremlin is growing increasingly desperate. The escalating hybrid war it is waging across Europe today is less a show of strength than a symptom of weakness.

What Ukraine is building is more than just battlefield success – it is a strategy of strategic neutralisation. Rather than relying solely on attrition or forcing Moscow to the table, Ukraine is systematically rendering Russia’s objectives unworkable.

Over time, Kyiv will keep raising the costs of war beyond what the Kremlin can sustain. Yet Putin has staked his survival on conquering Ukraine, tying his fate to an increasingly unattainable victory. With the Russian bear bleeding from thousands of cuts delivered by Ukrainian drones, something will eventually have to give – militarily, economically, or politically. Even Trump, wary of being seen as backing a loser, may decide to bring a heavier stick to the fight.

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. His work on warfare has been featured in the Atlantic Council, Centre for European Policy Analysis, and the Modern Warfare Institute, among many others.

This article appeared originally at Lowy Institute's the interpreter.