U.S. Preemptive Concessions Gain Nothing From Russia in Ukraine Ceasefire Talks

Executive Summary:

The White House is keen to broker a ceasefire and political-diplomatic settlement. As speed remains a priority, the Kremlin has added preconditions for a ceasefire and any eventual settlement. This time the agenda focused on a maritime and aerial ceasefire and commercial navigation in the Black Sea basin. Although the U.S. delegation offered several preemptive concessions, Moscow’s representatives demanded more. Both sides released separate statements on the outcome of the talks, along with the Ukrainians’ own interpretive comments (President of Russia; The White House, March 25). Meanwhile, Russian offensive ground and air operations have continued at high rates (Ukrinform, March 23–26).

The Black Sea is the quietest theater in the ongoing war. Ukrainian naval drone warfare has, since autumn 2023, broken Russia’s blockade of Greater Odesa’s ports, opened a safe and stable corridor for Ukrainian and international shipping, decimated the Russian fleet, and confined the fleet’s remainder to the easternmost Black Sea (see EDM, November 15, 2023, March 26, August 13, 2024). At the same time, Ukrainian drone operations have carefully avoided interfering with the oil tanker traffic on the Novorossiisk-Istanbul shipping lane (see EDM, November 8, 2022, November 15, 2023, August 13, 2024 [1], [2]). Given this combination of Ukrainian strength and restraint in the Black Sea, the recent U.S. initiative for a “moratorium on firing” or “maritime ceasefire” would be reaching for “low-hanging fruit,” as Trump administration senior officials admit (Fox News, March 26). That move could, however, ban Ukrainian drone warfare, allowing the still-powerful remainder of the Russian fleet to return to Sevastopol undisturbed and threaten the shipping corridor in the westernmost Black Sea. Unsurprisingly, Kyiv opposes this proposal (Facebook/Rustem Umerov, March 25).

All those measures (“ensure … eliminate … prevent … inspect”) are carryovers from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which empowered Russia to regulate and supervise Ukrainian and foreign commercial shipping in the Black Sea until Ukrainian drone warfare forced the Russian fleet to relocate from Sevastopol to the remote eastern Black Sea (see EDM, July 26, 27, 2023).

The U.S. and Russian parallel statements from Riyadh do not specify who is intended to be the enforcer of these measures, nor do they stipulate which party is the object of the enforcement. Under the Montreux Convention, the United States and other non-riparian navies may not enter the Black Sea for an indeterminate period (United Nations (original version, League of Nations), 1936). Ukraine has no surface navy to enforce any Black Sea measures and is not a party to this U.S.-Russia agreement. Furthermore, Türkiye has not been invited to these talks at all (Ukraine has an interest in Türkiye’s participation as a third party with legal agency in the Black Sea).

It is apparent that Russia aims to return its remaining, still-powerful fleet to Sevastopol undisturbed in the event of a maritime ceasefire and once again regulate other countries’ activities as it did in 2022–2023. According to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Trump had suggested renewing parts of the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Putin “consented to the renewal” (TASS, March 23, 24). This time, however, no roles seem to be envisaged for Türkiye and the United Nations Secretariat.

Washington’s apparent agnosticism toward this possibility adds to Kyiv’s concerns. The Ukrainian delegation in Riyadh declined to issue a joint statement with its U.S. counterparts, lest it be construed as progress in the talks. The Ukrainian chief delegate, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, issued a separate statement on President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s instructions:

Kyiv had offered to refrain from attacking Russian military targets at sea in return for Russia not striking Ukrainian maritime and riverine ports from the air (Ukrayinska Pravda, March 24). Lifting the Russian blockade of the port of Mykolaiv (Ukrainian-held on land but blocked by Russian forces from the Kinburn Spit) is a top priority for Ukraine’s agricultural export business and the government (Kyiv Independent, March 25).

In stark contrast to the White House, the Kremlin is in no hurry. Its chief delegates to the Riyadh consultations, former Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and three-star General Sergei Beseda of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), each possess decades of experience dealing with the Russian-instigated “frozen conflicts” and with Ukraine (Kyiv Indepedent, March 24; Russian International Affairs Council, accessed March 28). This again starkly contrasts with the U.S. negotiating team led by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who are engaged in their first major geopolitical negotiation (U.S. Department of State, Green Beret PAC, accessed March 28). Returning to Moscow, Karasin commented that a lengthy and complex negotiation process will follow (TASS, March 25). As Trump claimed to distinguish the “contours of the deal,” Peskov replied, “a great many aspects need to be worked out” with a “huge amount of nuances” (TASS, March 23). The Kremlin is prepared to negotiate for “as long as it takes.”

Vladimir Socor is a Senior Fellow of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation and its flagship publication, Eurasia Daily Monitor (1995 to date), where he writes analytical articles on a daily basis. An internationally recognized expert on the former Soviet-ruled countries in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, he covers Russian and Western policies, focusing on energy, regional security issues, Russian foreign affairs, secessionist conflicts, and NATO policies and programs.