The Right Fight in the Wrong Frontier

When state actors violate legal or ethical norms, the United States and its allies have a duty to respond—not just strategically, but morally. Yet when punishment or pressure is applied in an emerging domain where U.S. capabilities are contested, it risks undermining U.S. credibility more than deterring bad behavior. This dilemma is most evident in space and the Arctic region, both of which are considered emerging warfighting domains. These domains are parallel in their exposure to intensifying global power competition, accelerating military modernization, and the expanding presence of state and non-state actors. Yet the most striking similarity is the contested status of U.S. power and influence in both regions. This prompts a critical question: What drives the U.S. to assert moral authority in domains where it lacks enforcement capabilities?

China's advancements in space have been significantly aided by a longstanding pattern of stealing intellectual property, enabling progress that is both impressive and alarming despite operating at under 30% of the U.S. space budget in FY2023 (NASA’s $25.4 billion and the US Space Force's $26.3 billion). The Tiangong Space Station, the planned International Lunar Research Station, as well as the Chang’e-6 mission, which established China as the first nation to collect lunar samples from the far side of the Moon, are just a few notable examples.

Yet China’s exploratory initiatives and deepening human rights violations have become the least of U.S. concerns. China has begun positioning itself to establish warfighting readiness in a domain intended to be a shared frontier. Fusing its space resources by integrating its civil and military spheres, China has enabled the development of dual-use technologies that, although nominally aligned with international norms due to their peaceful applications, conveniently enhance its warfighting capabilities.  Launch sites, control centers, and numerous satellites now fall under the control of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army). This integration has yielded technology that has heightened tensions in the space domain. Recent developments include satellite systems equipped with grappling mechanisms capable of disrupting or capturing other satellites, as well as "kinetic kill vehicles" (KKVs) designed for satellite disruption and missile interception.  These capabilities were identified alongside Russia’s in the DoD’s 2020 Defense Space Strategy as “the greatest strategic threat” to the U.S. in space.

The problem with the U.S. morally posturing against China in space is twofold: firstly, China does not need the U.S. to advance in space. Policies treating China as anything less than a true peer competitor in space will prove futile. Secondly, by attempting to assert moral authority in a domain where it does not have a clear advantage, the U.S. effectively exposed its contested posture and therefore diminished its credibility. China’s increasingly bold behavior in space is shaped by these two realities, with the prospects of prioritizing peace and cooperation over sharpening its warfighting edge fading.

Like space, the Arctic has been exposed to a similar moral posturing, this time aimed at Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Reneging on its promise to exclude military affairs from its mandate in efforts to keep the Arctic a "zone of peace", the seven NATO nations on the Arctic Council issued a joint statement that, in light Russia's violations of the "core principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity", they would be "temporarily pausing [Russia's] participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies".  What was not configured into this decision was one core reality: that the development of capabilities in this region for the U.S. and its NATO allies has long taken a backseat to other national security concerns. Therefore, when Russia responded by continuing its invasion of Ukraine while also enhancing its status as a regional power, the U.S. and its allies lacked any viable countermeasure. Once again, the U.S. showed its hand—and had nothing to play.

Russia modernized Soviet-era bases with additional missile storage and loading bay facilities, established numerous ground force bases along its borders with NATO nations (effectively playing on NATO’s fear that its Arctic members will be the next target of invasion), and established a naval presence so formidable that regional counterparts pale in comparison. With the largest icebreaker fleet in the world and a Northern Fleet comprised of missile-carrying and anti-submarine aircraft, surface vessels including destroyers and battlecruisers, and most importantly, Russia’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (which serve as its sea-based nuclear deterrent and ensure its second-strike capability), Russia has demonstrated a greater warfighting readiness than the U.S. and its allies in the Arctic. This clear display of dominance in the Arctic poses risks of invasion and irreparable harm to deterrence.

With U.S. punishment proving toothless, Russia has grown bolder on two fronts: the Arctic and the battlefield in Ukraine. Russia has gained a clear insight into just how far the U.S. is willing to go to achieve its objectives, and it’s not far enough. This calls into question not only the U.S.’s ability to fulfill its moral obligations, but also to achieve strategic imperatives.

Given the lack of strategic payoff the U.S. has had in applying moral pressure to China and Russia in emerging domains, two truths emerge: first, the United States is failing in its moral duty by applying pressure ineffectively; second, this failure undermines the U.S.’s credibility, enabling adversaries to grow bolder and more resilient.

Space and the Arctic are domains where the U.S. cannot demonstrate a clear and uncontested advantage, while China and Russia have both clearly signaled their ability and willingness to establish warfighting readiness in these domains. The U.S. can’t pressure others, strategically or morally, from a position of weakness. Therefore, it is essential that the U.S. begin to base its policies on what is realistically achievable in an emerging domain rather than what it hopes to achieve. With American capabilities already under scrutiny, opponents are emboldened to advance their agendas with minimal concern for retaliation from a power increasingly perceived as unable to enforce its own deterrent threats. It’s also nudged America’s rivals closer together, with partnerships being forged that challenge U.S. influence even further. Russia is increasingly collaborating with China, which recently declared itself a "near-Arctic state", while China establishes bilateral partnerships in the space domain with Russia and Pakistan.

While China’s human rights violations and Russia’s repeated invasions warrant a response, it must be applied to a domain where the U.S. can carry out its threats. Ultimately, the effectiveness of any U.S. response—strategic or moral—hinges on our ability to see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. Pretending otherwise isn’t righteousness—it’s risk.

Rachel Butler is a doctoral student in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University. She holds master’s degrees in history and strategic studies, with research interests focused on ethical and cognitive warfare.